commit an act of a certain intensity of guilt, yet it is lawful to commit one of a certain gradation less. Such doctrine would be purely gratuitous and unfounded it would be equivalent to saying that we are at liberty to disobey the Divine laws when we think fit. The case is very simple: If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same purpose; for lying and parricide are placed together and jointly condemned * in the revelation from God.

Then we are told that we may "tell a falsehood to a madman for his own advantage," and this because it is beneficial. Dr. Carter may furnish an answer: he speaks of the Female Lunatic Asylum, Saltpetriere in Paris, and says, "The great object to which the views of the officers of La Saltpetriere are directed, is to gain the confidence of the patients; and this object is generally attained by gentleness, by appearing to take an interest in their affairs, by a decision of character equally remote from the extremes of indulgence and severity, and by the most scrupulous observance of good faith. Upon this latter, particular stress seems to be laid by M. Pinel, who remarks that insane persons, like children, lose all confidence and all respect if you fail in your word towards them; and they immediately set their ingenuity to work to deceive and circumvent you.'" What then becomes of the doctrine of “telling falsehoods to madmen for their own advantage?" It is pleasant thus to find the evidence of experience enforcing the dictates of principle, and that what morality declares to be right, facts declare to be expedient.

Persons frequently employ falsehoods to a sick man who cannot recover, lest it should discompose his mind. This is called kindness, although an earnest prepara* I Tim. i. 9, 10.

† Account of the Principal Hospitals in France, &c.

tion for death may be at stake upon their speaking the truth. There is a peculiar inconsistency sometimes exhibited on such occasions: the persons who will not discompose a sick inan for the sake of his interests in futurity, will discompose him without scruple if he has not made his will. Is a bequest of more consequence to the survivor, than a hope full of immortality to the dying man?

It is curious to remark how zealously persons reprobate "pious frauds;" that is, lies for the religious benefit of the deceived party. Surely if any reason for employing falsehood be a good one, it is the prospect of effecting religious benefit. How is it then that we so freely condemn these falsehoods, whilst we contend for others which are used for less important purposes?

Still, not every expression that is at variance with facts is a lie, because there are some expressions in which the speaker does not pretend, and the hearer does not expect, literal truth. Of this class are hyperboles and jests, fables and tales of professed fiction: of this class too, are parables, such as are employed in the New Testament. In such cases affirmative language is used in the same terms as if the allegations were true, yet as it is known that it does not profess to narrate facts, no lie is uttered. It is the same with some kinds of irony: "Cry aloud," said Elijah to the priests of the idol, “for he is a god, peradventure he sleepeth." And yet, because a given untruth is not a lie, it does not therefore follow, that it is innocent: for it is very possible to employ such expressions without any sufficient justification. A man who thinks he can best inculcate virtue through a fable, may write one : he who desires to discountenance an absurdity, may employ irony. Yet every one should use as little of such language as he can, because it is frequently

dangerous language. The man who familiarizes himself to a departure from literal truth, is in danger of departing from it without reason and without excuse. Some of these departures are like lies; so much like them that both speaker and hearer may reasonably question whether they are lies or not. The lapse from untruths which can deceive no one, to those which are intended to deceive, proceeds by almost imperceptible gradations on the scale of evil: and it is not the part of wisdom to approach the verge of guilt. Nor is it to be forgotten, that language, professedly fictitious, is not always understood to be such by those who hear it. This applies especially to the case of children— that is, of mankind during that period of life in which they are acquiring some of their first notions of morality. The boy who hears his father using hyperboles and irony with a grave countenance, probably thinks he has his father's example for telling lies among his schoolfellows.

Amongst the indefensible untruths which often are not lies are those which factitious politeness enjoins. Such are compliments and complimentary subscriptions, and many other untruths of expression and of action which pass currently in the world. These are, no doubt, often estimated at their value: the receiver knows that they are base coin though they shine like the good. Now, although it is not to be pretended that such expressions, so estimated, are lies, yet I will venture to affirm that the reader cannot set up for them any tolerable defence ; and if he cannot show that they are right he may be quite sure that they are wrong. A defence has however been attempted: "How much is happiness increased by the general adoption of a system of concerted and limited deceit ! He from whose doctrine it flows that we are to be in no case hypocrites, would, in mere manners, reduce us to

a degree of barbarism beyond that of the rudest savage." We do not enter here into such questions as whether a man may smile when his friend calls upon him, though he would rather just then that he had staid away. Whatever the reader may think of these questions, the "system of deceit" which passes in the world cannot be justified by the decision. There is no fear that "a degree of barbarism beyond that of the rudest savage" would ensue, if this system were amended. The first teachers of Christianity, who will not be charged with being in "any case hypocrites," both recommended and practised gentleness and courtesy. * And as to the increase of happiness which is assumed to result from this system of deceit, the fact is of a very questionable kind. No society I believe sufficiently discourages it; but that society which discourages it probably as much as any other, certainly enjoys its full average of happiness. But the apology proceeds, and more seriously errs: "The employment of falsehood for the production of good, cannot be more unworthy of the Divine Being than the acknowledged employment of rapine and murder for the same purpose." Is it then not perceived that to employ the wickedness of man is a very different thing from holding its agents innocent? Some of those whose wickedness has been thus employed, have been punished for that wickedness. Even to show that the Deity has employed falsehood for the production of good, would in no degree establish the doctrine that falsehood is right.

The childish and senseless practice of requiring servants to "deny" their masters, has had many apologists I suppose because many perceive that it is wrong. It is not always true that such a servant does

*

I Peter, ii. I. Tit. iii. 2. I Peter, iii. 8.

† Edin. Rev. vol. I, Art. Belsham's Philosophy of the Mind.

not in strictness lie; for, how well soever the folly may be understood by the gay world, some who knock at their doors have no other idea than that they may depend upon the servant's word. Of this the servant is sometimes conscious, and to these persons therefore he who denies his master, lies. An uninitiated servant suffers a shock to his moral principles when he is first required to tell these falsehoods. It diminishes his previous abhorrence of lying, and otherwise deteriorates his moral character. Even if no such ill consequences resulted from this foolish custom, there is objection to it which is short, but sufficient—nothing can be said in its defence.

CHAPTER VII.

OATHS.

THEIR MORAL CHARACTER-THEIR

EFFICACY AS

SECURITIES OF VERACITY-THEIR EFFECTS.

A curse-Immorality of oaths-Oaths of the ancient JewsMilton-Paley-The High Priest's adjuration-Early Christians-Inefficacy of oaths-Motives to veracity-Religious sanctions: Public opinion; Legal penalties—Oaths in Evidence: Parliamentary Evidence: Courts Martial—The United States--Effects of oaths: Falsehood-General obligations.

An oath is that whereby we call God to witness the truth of what we say, with a curse upon ourselves, either implied or expressed, should it prove false.'*

A CURSE.-Now supposing the Christian Scriptures to contain no information respecting the moral character of oaths, how far is it reasonable, or prudent, or * Milton: Christian Doctrine, p. 579.