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what grounds are we to suppose the ordinary striplings

of infidelity reject it?

How then does it happen that those who affect scepticism are so ambitious to make their scepticism known? Because it is a short and easy road to distinction; because it affords a cheap means of gratifying vanity. To "rise above vulgar prejudices and superstitions"-" to entertain enlarged and liberal opinions," are phrases of great attraction, especially to young men; and how shall they show that they rise above vulgar prejudices, how shall they so easily manifest the enlargement of their views, as by rejecting a system which all their neighbors agree to be true? They feel important to themselves, and that they are objects of curiosity to others: and they are objects of curiosity, not on account of their own qualities, but on account of the greatness of that which they contemn. The peasant who reviles a peasant, may revile him without an auditor, but a province will listen to him who vilifies a king. I know not that an intelligent person should be advised to reason with these puny assailants their notions and their conduct are not the result of reasoning. What they need is the humiliation of vanity and the exposure of folly. A few simple interrogations would expose their folly; and for the purposes of humiliation, simply pass them by. The sun that shines upon them, makes them look bright and large. Let reason and truth withdraw their rays, and these seeming stars will quickly set in silence and in darkness.

More contemptible motives to the profession of infidelity cannot perhaps exist, but there are some which are more detestable. Hartley says that "the strictness and purity of the Christian religion in respect to sexual licentiousness, is probably the chief thing which makes

vicious men first fear and hate, and then vilify and oppose it."'*

Whether therefore we regard the motives which lead to scepticism, or the reasonableness of the grounds upon which it is commonly founded, there is surely much reason for an ingenuous young person to hold in contempt the jests, and pleasantries, and sophistries respecting revelation with which he may be assailed.

CHAPTER II.

PROPERTY.

Foundation of the Right to Property-Insolvency: Perpetual obligation to pay debts: Reform of public opinion: Examples of integrity—Wills, Legatees, Heirs: Informal Wills: Intestates-Minor's debts-A Wife's debts - Bills of Exchange-Unjust defendants-Privateers-Confiscations - Insurance-Settlements-Houses of infamy-Literary property

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DISQUISITIONS respecting the origin of property appear to be of little use; partly because the origin can scarcely be determined, and partly because, if it could be determined, the discovery would be little applicable to the present condition of human affairs. In whatever manner an estate was acquired two thousand years ago, it is of no consequence in enquiring who ought to possess it now.

The foundation of the right to property is a more important point. Ordinarily, the foundation is the law of the land. Of civil government-which institution is sanctioned by the Divine will-one of the great offices is, to regulate the distribution of property; to give it, if it has the power of giving; or to decide between opposing claimants, to whom it shall be assigned.

* Observations on Man.

The proposition therefore, as a general rule, is sound; -He possesses a right to property to whom the law of the land assigns it. This however is only a general rule. It has been sufficiently seen that some legal possessions are not permitted by the moral law. The occasional opposition between the moral and the legal right to property, is inseparable from the principle on which law is founded-that of acting upon general rules. It is impossible to frame any rule, the application of which shall, in every variety of circumstances, effect the requisitions of Christian morality. A rule which in nine cases proves equitable, may prove utterly unjust in the tenth. A rule which in nine cases promotes the welfare of the citizen, may in the tenth outrage reason and humanity.

It is evident that in the present state of legal institutions, the evils which result from laws respecting property must be prevented, if they are prevented at all, by the exercise of virtue in individuals. If the law assigns a hundred pounds to me, which every upright man perceives ought in equity to have been assigned to another, that other has no means of enforcing his claim. Either therefore the claim of equity must be disregarded, or I must voluntarily satisfy it.

There are many cases connected with the acquisition or retention of property, with which the decisions of law are not immediately connected, but respecting which it is needful to exercise a careful discrimination, in order to conform to the requisitions of Christian rectitude. The whole subject is of great interest, and of extensive practical application in the intercourse of life. The reader will therefore be presented with several miscellaneous examples, in which the moral law appears to require greater purity of rectitude than is required by statutes, or than is ordinarily practised by mankind.

INSOLVENCY.-Why is a man obliged to pay his debts? It is to be hoped that the morality of few persons is lax enough to reply-Because the law compels him. But why, then, is he obliged to pay them? Because the moral law requires it. That this is the primary ground of the obligation is evident; otherwise the payment of any debt which a vicious or corrupt legislature resolved to cancel, would cease to be obligatory upon the debtor. The Virginian statute, which we noticed in the last Essay, would have been a sufficient justification to the planters to defraud their creditors.

A man becomes insolvent and is made a bankrupt: he pays his creditors ten shillings instead of twenty, and obtains his certificate. The law, therefore, discharges him from the obligation to pay more. The bankrupt receives a large legacy, or he engages in business and acquires property. Being then able to pay the remainder of his debts, does the legal discharge exempt him from the obligation to pay them? No: and for this reason that the legal discharge is not a moral discharge; that as the duty to pay at all was not founded primarily on the law, the law cannot warrant him in withholding a part.

It is however said, that the creditors have relinquished their right to the remainder by signing the certificate. But why did they accept half their demands instead of the whole? Because they were obliged to do it; they could get no more. As to granting the certificate, they do it because to withhold it would be only an act of gratuitous unkindness. It would be preposterous to say that creditors relinquish their claims voluntarily; for no one would give up his claim to twenty shillings on the receipt of ten if he could get the other ten by refusing. It might as reasonably be said that a man parts with a limb volun

tarily, because, having incurably lacerated it, he submits to an amputation. It is to be remembered, too, that the necessary relinquishment of half the demand is occasioned by the debtor himself: and it seems very manifest that when a man, by his own act, deprives another of his property, he cannot allege the consequences of that act as a justification of withholding it after restoration is in his power.

The mode in which an insolvent man obtains a discharge, does not appear to affect his subsequent duties. Compositions, and bankruptcies, and discharges by an insolvent act are in this respect alike. The acceptance of a part instead of the whole is not voluntary in either case; and neither case exempts the debtor from the obligation to pay in full if he can.

If it should be urged that when a person intrusts property to another, he knowingly undertakes the risk of that other's insolvency, and that, if the contingent loss happens, he has no claims to justice on the other, the answer is this; that whatever may be thought of these claims, they are not the grounds upon which the debtor is obliged to pay. The debtor always engages to pay, and the engagement is enforced by morality; the engagement therefore is binding, whatever risk another man may incur by relying upon it. The causes which have occasioned a person's insolvency, although they greatly affect his character, do not affect his obligations: the duty to repay when he has the power, is the same whether the insolvency were occasioned by his fault or his misfortune. In all cases, the reasoning that applies to the debt, applies also to the interest that accrues upon it; although with respect to the acceptance of both, and especially of interest, a creditor should exercise a considerate discretion.-A man who has failed of paying his debts ought always to live with frugality, and carefully to economize such

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