As letter, see "Letter." Where a nickel-in-the-slot machine was so | LOTTERY TICKET. than the times when he would lose, such The crime of conducting a lottery is similar to that of gaming, and in fact a lot tery is a species of gaming. The use of a slot machine, where the element of chance de termines whether the prizes are to be given, brings the operation thereof under the deflnition of lottery, whether the prizes given are stock in trade of licensed establishments or not. Therefore an ordinance of the city of New Orleans, making it unlawful for any person to engage in the operation of a slot machine, is legal. City of New Orleans v. Collins, 27 South. 532, 536, 52 La. Ann. 973. Trading stamp business. A lottery ticket is any device whatso to be paid or delivered on the happening ever by which money or any other thing is of an event or contingency in the nature of a lottery. Smith v. State, 11 Atl. 758, 759, 68 Md. 168. A ticket which purports to entitle the holder to whatever prize may be won by its corresponding number in a scheme called a prize concert, in which the prizes consist of gifts in greenbacks and in other kinds of property, and one-half of the tickets repre sent blanks in the awarding, is a lottery ticket. Commonwealth v. Thacher, 97 Mass. 583, 584, 93 Am. Dec. 125. A guaranty, or a written assurance or promise, whereby the guarantor binds himself that he will pay the prize which may be drawn to a certain number in a lottery, is a lottery ticket, within the meaning of the law prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets when made by the proprietor of the lottery or a duly authorized agent of the proprietor. Pub. Laws, c. 652, making it a misde- There is no set form of a lottery ticket. It meanor to sell or give a stamp or coupon, will be responsible for the prize, and, whethis a written promise that the proprietors in connection with the sale of property, which shall entitle the purchaser to receive er they use the usual form or not, their reIf a man opens an from some person other than the seller any sponsibility is the same. article of merchandise other than that ac- office, from which he vends assurances or tually sold, and for such other person to de- guaranties, as a substitute for lottery tickliver the extra article of merchandise on pre-ets, and for the purpose of evading and desentation of the stamp, does not prohibit a lottery. State v. Dalton, 46 Atl. 234, 236, 22 R. I. 77, 48 L.-R. A. 775, 84 Am. St. Rep. 818. Wheel of fortune. A device whereby one having paid for the privilege of whirling an arrow was entitled to the prize opposite the number on which it stopped, was a "lottery," pure and simple. Reeves v. State, 17 South. 104, 105 Ala. 120. LOTTERY GIFT. feating the law, although he does not strictly and literally sell lottery tickets, yet he does sell those papers which are substantial ly lottery tickets, if it can be proved or in ferred from the evidence in the cause he holds the tickets themselves for the benefit of the purchaser. Commonwealth v. Chubb (Va.) 5 Rand. 715, 720. A "ticket," within the meaning of Act Dec. 19, 1842, to establish lotteries and to prohibit the sale of lottery tickets, includes a ticket entitling the holder to one-fourth the prize drawn by its members, although such a ticket is usually called a quarter of a ticket. Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo. 606, 612. The term "tickets," when speaking of the sale of lottery tickets, is equivalent to "chances." Saloman v. State, 27 Ala. 26–30. The sale of a lottery ticket is in violation of Const. art. 4, § 28, forbidding any person to sell any lottery ticket, though the ticket had drawn the prize before the sale. Kitchen v. Greenabaum, 61 Mo. 110, 111. The phrase "lottery gifts" does not embrace anything which is free from chance or hazard. Hence Act June 3, 1885, entitled "An act for the suppression of lottery gifts by storekeepers and others to secure patronage," reciting in the preamble that the laws against gambling and lotteries are evaded by the giving of tickets entitling the holders to money or articles of value as an inducement to purchase, and providing that merchants and others giving and selling such tickets LOVE. shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, is void, under the constitutional requirement that the subject of every act must be clearly expressed in its title. Commonwealth Moorhead, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 513, 516. "Love between the sexes has different constituents from those found in mere friendship. It is very variable in its constitution. It may be refined, having elevated aims, or it may be gross, in which the baser desires predominate. So that evidence that a person acted toward another as a lover is inadmissible." Carney v. State, 79 Ala. 14, 19. LOVELY CLAIM. ▲ "lovely claim" is a donation made by the general government of two quarter sections of the public lands, according to the legal subdivisions of the public surveys, to a particular class of people embraced by the act of Congress of May 24, 1828, who have complied with the conditions therein imposed, and also with the stipulations of the treaty ratified between the United States and the Cherokee nation of Indians on the 28th of May, 1828. Logan v. Moulder, 1 Ark. 313, 33 Am. Dec. 338. LOW. "Low" is a relative term. A thing is said to be low when compared to other structures. A structure is said to be low according to the uses to which it is to be put. As used with relation to a bridge over a railroad track, the bridge is high or low according to the height of cars to pass under it. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tucker's Adm'r (Ky.) 65 S. W. 453, 454. "Low" is defined in the Century Diction ary as "not high in character or condition; not haughty or proud; meek; lowly; lacking in dignity, refinement, or principle; vulgar, groveling, abject, mean, base; in a mean condition, as a low-born fellow;" and such is its meaning in a bill to restrain the importation of armed men alleged to be of a low and lawless type. Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. (U. S.) 96 Fed. 353, 362. The "low-water mark" of a fresh-water mark on the Long Island shore, it was said that "low-water mark" means the low-water mark as the water flows after the land is re claimed from the bay or river by the erec tion of wharves and piers, and the filling from the shore for that purpose; but it was held that the Atlantic Basin, which was orig inally below the low-water mark on the Long Island shore, which was originally and had always continued below low-water mark, was in New York county, although practically inclosed by piers, wharves, etc. Orr V. City of Brooklyn, 36 N. Y. 661, 664. As margin of sea at low tide. "Low-water mark," as used in reference to tide waters, is the margin of the sea when the tide is out. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass, 435, 439, 4 Am. Dec. 155. "Low-water mark is the line or the margin of the water at ordinary low tides, and not the lowest possible state of the water at some particular time, from natural causes." Me. 384, 395, 46 Am. Dec. 568. Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Colony Ordinance 1641-47 provided that the title of the owners of land adjoining tidal waters should extend to low-water mark. Held, that the phrase "low-water mark" meant the lowest line made by the receding tide with the land, not the lowest line with a stream of fresh water emptying with the land. It has nothing to do with a into the sea, or a cove or tidal river mixed fresh-water stream or with a tidal channel, through which only fresh waters flow at low tide. Tappan v. Boston Water-Power Co., 31 N. E. 703, 705, 157 Mass. 24, 16 L. R. A. 353. As ordinary low-water mark. "Low-water mark" does not mean the lowest stages of water in seasons of great drought, but the height of the water in ordinary stages of low water. Kentucky Lumber Co. v. King (Ky.) 65 S. W. 156, 157. "Low-water mark," as a terminus of boundary, means ordinary low-water mark, and not the lowest point to which the water has ever receded. McBurney v. Young, 32 Atl. 492, 493, 67 Vt. 574, 29 L. R. A. 539. "Low-water mark," as used in deeds calling for the line of the land at low-water mark on a river, means the ordinary lowwater mark unaffected by drouth. Low water, as distinguished from high water, does not mean the lowest water the stream river is the point to which the river recedes may exhibit under special and extraordinary at its lowest stage. Paine Lumber Co. V. United States (U. S.) 55 Fed. 854, 864. In a case involving the construction of the statute fixing the boundary line between New York and Kings counties at low-water circumstances. Ordinary high water and ordinary low water each has its reasonably well defined mark, so nearly certain that there is not much difficulty in ascertaining it. The ordinary rise and fall of the stream usually finds nearly the same limits, but to bound title by a mark which is set by an extraordinary flood or an extreme drouth would do injustice, and contravene the common understanding of the people. Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa. (10 P. F. Smith) 339, 342, 100 Am. Dec. 566. By "low-water mark," as used where the level of a lake, or other body of water, is not constant, but is fluctuating, ordinary low-water mark is intended, or the line or level at which the waters of the lake usually stand when free from disturbing causes. Slauson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 69 N. W. 990, 991, 94 Wis. 642 (citing Diedrich v. Northwestern Union Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248, 24 Am. Rep. 399; Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. [14 Peck] 521). LOW WINE. Low wine is the product of the first process of distillation of spirituous liquors by the application of heat to a still containing the material, and differs from spirits, in that the latter passes through a second distillation. United States v. Tenbroek, 15 U. S. (2 Wheat.) 248, 258, 4 L. Ed. 231. LOWEST. "Lowest," in the meaning of a statute requiring that the contracts for public improvements shall be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder," is that the contract, when awarded, shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, but does not require the authorities to accept a bid when but one bid is made. In such case, there being no other bid with which to make comparison, such bid is not the lowest, but might as well be termed the highest. People v. Kings County Sup'rs (N. Y.) 42 Hun, 456, 458. LOWEST AVERAGED PRICE. Where a contract binds a gas company to furnish to a city such quantity of gas as may be required by the city council for public lamps at two-thirds of the lowest averaged price at which gas shall or may be furnished to private individuals in five certain specified cities, the words "lowest averaged price" means such cash price in each of the five cities named, averaged by adding together such lowest cash prices, and dividing the amount by five, the words "lowest averaged price" entitling the city to the benefit of such discounts as are or may be allowed to individuals by the company in each city furnished gas at the lowest price. City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Gaslight & Coke Co., 41 N. E. 239, 242, 53 Ohio St. 278. LOWEST BIDDER. A statute requiring municipal contracts to be given to the lowest bidder is not to be "construed literally, and accepted as an absolute restriction. In such case undoubtedly the bid should be bona fide, and should conform strictly to the prescribed specifications: but in determining whether a bid is the lowest among several others the quality and utility of the thing offered-in other words, its adaptability to the purpose for which it is fer in nominal amount may be exceedingly required-must be first considered. The oflow, while the thing offered may be exceedingly worthless." Cleveland Fire Alarm Co. v. Metropolitan Fire Com'rs (N. Y.) 7 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 49, 55; Id., 55 Barb. 288, 292. Under the laws requiring that contracts for street improvements in New York City must be let to the lowest bidder, on estimates made by the surveyor, where the surveyor had made an estimate founded upon a surface examination of the locality and bids are invited upon that basis, he who is the lowest bidder upon those estimates is the lowest bidder under the law, and does not lose his rights because the estimates prove to be erroneous when the work is actually done. Reilly v. City of New York, 111 N. Y. 473, 474, 18 N. E. 623, 624. It ought hardly to be supposed that a law requiring municipal authorities to let a contract to the "lowest bidder" means absolutely that the contract shall be given to the lowest bidder without regard to his fitness, responsibility, or capacity to perform the work, and generally such laws read to the lowest or best bidder, or the lowest responsible bidder. Clapton v. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. 117, 124. The words "lowest bidder" in Baltimore City Charter, § 1415, requiring certain public contracts to be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, necessarily implies a common standard by which to measure the respective bids, and therefore requires that specifications for the work and the materials be furnished as a basis upon which such bids may be made, and therefore it is improper to allow the bidders to furnish their own specifications. Packard v. Hayes, 51 Atl. 32, 36, 94 Md. 233. LOWEST RESPONSIBLE BIDDER. Act 1874, requiring all public work and materials which are capable of being contracted for to be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder," means the bidder lowest in amount and pecuniarily responsible. The word "responsible," as defined by Webster, means liable to accounting, accountable, answerable, able to discharge an obligation, or having an estate adequate to the payment of a debt. As used in the statute, it refers to the pecuniary ability of the bidder to answer to the undertaking, so that the interest of the city should suffer no damage. Lowest in price and responsibility, in the sense of being accountable, able to discharge the obligation, so as to save the city from pecuniary loss, is what is intended by the act of 1874. Gutta Percha Co. v. Stokely (Pa.) 11 Phila. 219–221. In the requirement that public work should be let to the lowest responsible bidder, the term "lowest responsible bidder" means one who complies with all the requirements of the statute, specifications, etc., not merely one whose bid is less than his competitors'. Boseker v. Wabash County Com'rs, 88 Ind. 267. the workmanship exhibited by the bidder in the performance of the kind of work re quired, are poor and unsatisfactory. People v. Kent, 43 N. E. 760, 761, 160 Ill. 655. tracts for certain work should be awarded to Laws 1875, c. 634, declaring that all conthe lowest bona fide "responsible bidder," meant that the successful bidder should be one "able to respond or to answer in accordance with what is expected or demanded." People v. Dorsheimer (N. Y.) 55 How. Prac. 118, 120. LOYAL VOTERS. St. 1881, p. 59, § 5, providing that the The words "loyal voters," as ordinarily board of commissioners having charge of the erection of an insane asylum may adopt or re-used, is quite different in meaning from that ject any or all bids for the erection of such of the phrase legal voters or qualified voters; asylum not being responsible or satisfactory, and therefore an averment that plaintiff was but in determining bids for the same work elected by the loyal voters of the county is or material the "lowest responsible bid" shall not equivalent to an allegation that he was be taken, means not only the bid by the one elected by the legal or qualified voters. Leeman v. Hinton, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 37, 41. whose pecuniary ability to perform the contract is best, but the one in point of skill, ability, and integrity who is most likely to do faithful, conscientious work, and fulfill the contract promptly, according to its letter and spirit. Hoole v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 217, 220. LTD. As used in connection with the signature of a limited partnership, signed by only one manager of such partnership, "Ltd." does not create a general liability; Act June 2, 1874, providing for limited partnerships, requiring that the word "Limited" shall be the last Act May 23, 1874, directing municipal officers to award certain contracts to the lowest responsible bidder, applies not to pe-word in the name of every such partnership. cuniary ability only, but also to judgment and skill. The duties imposed on the city Bernard & Leas Mfg. Co. v. Packard & Calauthorities are not merely ministerial, limit- vin (U S.) 64 Fed. 309, 310, 12 C. C. A. 123. ed to ascertaining whose bid was the lowest and the pecuniary responsibility of the bid der and his sureties, but it calls for the exercise of duties which are deliberative and discretionary. Interstate Vitrified Brick & Paving Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 30 Atl. 383, 164 Pa. 477; Douglass v. Commonwealth, 108 Pa. 559, 563, 42 Leg. Int. 337. "Responsible," as used in Act 23d May, 1874, Pamph. L. 230, declaring that all work to be done for the city shall be performed under contract, to be given to the lowest responsible bidder, means not only pecuniary ability to make a good contract by security for its faithful performance, but means the one who, under all the circumstances, will probably best perform the work. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343, 349. LUCID INTERVAL "Lucid interval" does not mean a perfect restoration to reason, but a restoration so far as to be able beyond doubt to comprehend and do an act with such reason, memory, and judgment as to make it legal. Frazer V. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 260, 263. The term "lucid interval" means not an apparent tranquillity or seeming repose, not a simple diminution or remission of the disease, but a temporary cure-an intermission so clearly marked that it perfectly resembles a return of health-and must be continued for a length of time sufficient to give certainty to the temporary restoration of reason. Godden v. Burke's Ex'rs, 35 La. Ann. 160, 173. "Responsible," as used in a corporate charter providing that contracts for public "A lucid interval,' as the term is used improvements shall be let to the lowest re- in speaking of lucid intervals of insane persponsible bidder, is not limited to financial, sons, is not merely a cessation of the violent but means ability to perform all the condi- symptoms of the disorder, but a restoration tions of the contract; and the commissioner of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to of public works may reject a bid notwith-enable the party soundly to judge of the act. standing it is the lowest made, and the bidder The evidence in support of a lucid interval, is able to give the required bond, if in the judgment of that official, after due investigation, the materials customarily used, and after derangement has been established, should be as strong and demonstrative of such fact as when the object of the proof is to show insanity; and it ought to go to the state and habit of the person, and not to the accidental interview of any individual, or to the degree of self-possession in any particular act." Ricketts v. Jolliff, 62 Miss. 440448. The term “lucid interval," used in reference to insanity, means more than a mere remission of the manifestations of insanity. It must be such a full return of the mind to sanity as places the party in possession of the powers of his mind, enabling him to understand and transact his affairs as usual. Ekin's Heirs v. McCracken (Pa.) 11 Phila. 534, 539. LUCKY. "Lucky," as used in an agreement for the purchase of a horse, by which the purchaser agreed to pay £63, and, if the horse was lucky, would give seller £5 more, was too vague and uncertain a term to be considered in a court of law, and the only certain part of the agreement was that for £63. Guthing v. Lynn, 2 Barn. & Adol. 232. Where a person has four bids from contractors on a house that he intended to construct, and, on the opening of the bids, such person stated to one of the bidders, "You are the lucky man," such phrase was merely a recognition that he was the lowest bidder, and was not equivalent to the award of the contract to him. Laskie v. Haseltine, 25 Atl. 886, 155 Pa. 98. LUCRATIVE BAILMENT. sembly, nor shall any person hold more than one lucrative office at the same time, except as in the constitution expressly provided, etc. Held, that the term "lucrative," as defined by Webster, means "yielding lucre; gainful; profitable; making increase of money or goods; as a lucrative trade, lucrative business or office"-and that the test was be an adequate compensation for the services whether the office yielded a pay supposed to office, which is its net profits, does not depend or duties performed. The lucrativeness of an on the amount of compensation affixed to it, but expenses incident to an office with a high salary may render it less lucrative in this latter sense than other offices having a much lower rate of compensation, but the office is nevertheless a lucrative one. State v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401, 405, 15 Am. Rep. 239. The office of county recorder and that of a county commissioner are lucrative offices. Pay, supposed to be an adequate compensation, is affixed to the performance of their duties. The lucrativeness of an office-its net profits does not depend upon the amount of compensation affixed to it. The expenses incident to an office with a high salary may render it less lucrative, in this latter sense, than other offices having a much lower rate of compensation. Dailey v. State (Ind.) 8 Blackf. 329, 330. "Lucrative office," as used in Const. art. 2, § 9, providing that no person shall hold more than one lucrative office at the same time, except as expressly provided, means an office, the incumbent of which is charged with duties under the laws of the state, for which he is entitled to compensation. If an office is purely municipal, the officer not beIn an action against a corporation for ing charged with any duty under the laws of the value of a picture lost by it while en- the state, it is not a "lucrative office," withgaged in carrying on a public fair, it appear in the meaning of the Constitution. The ofed that the article was shipped by plaintiff fice of school trustee is a lucrative one, for upon invitation of defendant, issued in pur- the trustee is charged with the performance suance of its general purpose to augment its of duties imposed by state laws, for the perreceipts, and lost after the close of the ex-formance of which compensation is provided. hibition by reason of the failure of defend- Chambers v. State, 26 N. E. 893, 127 Ind. 365, ant's agent to return the picture to plaintiff. 11 L. R. A. 613. Held, that the transaction was a lucrative bailment, and defendant was liable for the loss. Prince v. Alabama State Fair, 17 South. 449, 450, 106 Ala. 340. LUCRATIVE OFFICE. The office of colonel of volunteers is "Lucrative office," within Const. art. 4, § 21, prohibiting the holder of a lucrative office from holding any other office of profit under the state, means an office attached to which is a pecuniary salary. Thus an office to which is annexed a salary of $1,000 per annum is a lucrative office, within the sec lucrative, and so is that of reporter of the tion. Crawford v. Dunbar, 52 Cal. 36, 39. Supreme Court; and a colonel of volunteers cannot hold both without violating Const. art. 2, 9, providing that no person shall hold more than one lucrative office at the same time. Kerr v. Jones, 19 Ind. 351, 353. Const. art. 2, § 9, declares that no person holding a lucrative office or appointment under the United States or under this state shall be eligible to a seat in the General As The term "lucrative office," in Const. art. 4, § 20, providing that no person holding any lucrative office under the United States shall be eligible to any civil office of profit under this state, etc., refers solely to office under Pac. 853, 855, 73 Cal. 230. the United States. People v. Leonard, 14 The term "lucrative office," in Rev. St. 5095, which prohibits a person holding a lu |