called quasi-things; and of this kind are the concepts or notions denoted by all abstract terms; which denote, not real things or individuals, but mere abstractions, as, e. g., such terms as "justice," the state," the names of the several colors, disease, death, etc.; where the things denoted are not actually existing things, but mere concepts of qualities or attributes of things objectified by the mind.

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$30. CONCEPT, NOTION," AND "THOUGHT DEFINED.-The term concept," or "notion," or "thought" (in this connection we may use either indifferently) is a relative term implying or connoting, in its strict or proper sense, an individual thinking mind of which it is the product; and hence the term will have a different meaning according to the correlative to which it refers. It must therefore have many different senses; of which two must be especially distinguished. In its proper sense it denotes simply a certain affection of the mind of the individual; and in this sense, obviously, it is momentary and evanescent,-like the snow falling on the river, described by the poet, as "ae moment white,

direct correspondence between the notion expressed and the quasi-thing signified, though in reality they are the same; but there is an indirect real correspondence between the notion of redness and the red things of which it is a quality.

then gone forever." For though, it is said, the thought recurs to us, it is not, nor can it be, the same thought, but is merely a copy or image of it. So, when a thought as it is said -recurs to us, it is always, or at least almost always, suggested to us by the word in which it is embodied; and, as to us, so also to others. But Logic does not have to deal with the momentary, fleeting thought of the individual, but with the thought only that is continuously, or we may say permanently reproduced, and communicated by one to another; that has become incarnate in words, and is thus, even when lost from the mind, at once preserved, and continuously suggested, or brought back to the consciousness of each and all. Hence, in Logic, the terms, notion, concept, and thought, are to be regarded as used in a secondary or derived sense, as denoting the common notions, concepts, and thoughts of mankind embodied in words. Hence the things or significates denoted by abstract and other universal terms have in fact a kind of existence outside of any and all individual minds; which, as opposed to substantial, may be called logical existence; i. e., they exist in the word (logos), and their existence is as real and of precisely the same nature as that of the word of which they are an essential part. Hence, though we speak of abstractions as fictitious

(i. e., feigned) or imaginary things, yet they are real, and in some cases, as, e. g., in the case of death, disease, misery, poverty, etc., terribly real facts. What is meant by the term “fictitious thing" is, not that the notion signified is false or unreal, but that, for logical purposes, it is fictitiously regarded as a thing.

31. THE NORMAL LOGICAL TERM.— Every term legitimate for logical purposes, or we may say every logical term, is therefore to be regarded as involving or implying three essential notions or elements, namely: (1) the vocal sign, or vocable, (2) the notion denoted, and (3) the actual things, or objective realities, to which the notion and the vocal sign are supposed to correspond. These are all to be regarded as, in one sense, essential elements of the logical term. For though, where the last is lacking, a term may exist, and it is, therefore, possible to have an absurd or nonsensical. term, yet such a term is not such as is contemplated when we regard the end of Logic; which is not to deal with absurdities or ingenious puzzles, but to discover truth and avoid error. Hence, an absurd or nonsensical term, or, in other words, a term whose signification does not correspond to reality, is not the normal or true term, essential to legitimate ratiocination; nor is Logic-unless in illustrating some of its formal operations-in any way concerned with

it, except to detect and expose its inherent vice and its essential insufficiency for logical purposes.

$ 32. THE DENOTATION AND CONNOTATION OF TERMS.-All terms are regarded in Logic as denoting or signifying classes of individuals. The individuals constituting the class denoted by the term are marked or distinguished by certain common attributes, at once common and peculiar to the class, as, e. g., the class "man" by the mark "rational," by which it is distinguished from other kinds of animals. Accordingly a term is said to denote the individuals designated by it, and to connote the qualities or marks by which the class is determined. Thus, e. g., the term denotes the class of animals known by that name, and connotes the quality or attribute of rationality by which the class is distinguished.

33. THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICATION OF TERMS. The individuals constituting the class denoted by a term are said to be signified by the term, and are called its significates. Thus the term, man, denotes the class, man, as a whole, but signifies each and all of the individual men composing it. The significates of a term may be real,-which is the case when they are real individuals or things, existing in 1 See infra, § 35.

nature; or they may be unreal, or fictitious, i. e., existing only in contemplation of mind; which is the case with all abstract terms, and with concrete terms where the classes of individuals denoted are fictitiously regarded as individuals,—as, e. g., when we speak of " man as one of the significates of "animal." When a term denotes a class of real individuals — as, e. g.,“ man," regarded as denoting men generally-its significates are real; when it denotes a class of lower classes-as, e. g., the several races, Asiatics, Europeans, etc.- they are unreal or fictitious. In the former case the term is said to denote an infima species; which is to be defined as a class made up of real individuals. By the meaning of a term is meant both its denotation, or signification, and its connotation taken together; and the word "meaning" may also be regarded as equivalent to notion or concept.

34. THE EXTENSION AND INTENSION OF TERMS. The extension of a term corresponds to its denotation, or signification, and is determined by the extent of the class denoted, or by the number of significates signified by it. The intension of a term is but another name for its connotation, both words denoting merely the qualities or attributes, or, in other words, the marks by which the class is deter