storks,―a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid." But undoubtedly (assuming for the sake of the argument that dead and roasted one-legged storks belong to the genus stork) whatever may be universally predicated of storks may, unless the dictum be a delusion, be predicated of roasted and one-legged storks as well as of others. The error, therefore, consists, not in an incorrect inference of the particular proposition from the universal proposition including it, but in the illicit assumption of the universal proposition that whenever you shout at a stork it will put down a second leg, though it may have only one leg, and be dead and roasted.

$212. F. Consequentis.-There is much dispute as to the nature of the fallacy intended by Aristotle under this name. De Morgan and other logicians-following Aldrich-regard it as consisting in the "affirmation of a conclusion" which does not follow from the premises, or, in other words, as but another name for a Non-scquitur, which is at least the most convenient view.

213. CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES OF THIS KIND.-According to this view, the F. Consequentis will include (1) the merely formal fallacies, commonly known as fallacies of the syllogism; and (2) all the material fallacies of inference except Equivocation. The former

232

have been sufficiently treated in considering the rules of the syllogism; the latter, under the head of Substitution. The former as well

as the latter, and also the fallacies of Equivocation (or In Dictione), are also, it will be remembered, fallacies of Substitution.

APPENDIX OF NOTES

A-§ 4

Perhaps, when men understand that the main sources of Philosophy are to be found in the study of words, we may hope to escape the dreary treadmill on which philosophers have hitherto been exercising themselves. All progress in Philosophy that has been made has been the result of the unconscious observation of this method-as, e. g., the work of Locke, which, though weak in its metaphysics, constitutes the greatest contribution to philosophy made in modern times; and which, as shown by Horne Tooke, is merely an essay on language. "Perhaps," he says, "it was for mankind a lucky mistake (for mistake it was) which Mr. Locke made when he called his book an Essay on the Human Understanding. For some part of the inestimable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, reached to many thousands more than, I fear, it would have done had he called it "A Grammatical Essay," or "A Treatise on Words or Language " (Diversions of Purley).

B-8 6

Comparing the physical sciences and the mathe

matics with the moral sciences, the latter are infinitely the more difficult of achievement; and also infinitely more important to the welfare of mankind. For under the name of the moral sciences are included all the several branches of the Science of Human Nature; which is obviously the principal concern of mankind, and as such the science to which all others are to be regarded as subsidiary. This was the distinguishing characteristic of Socrates' philosophy. It was expressed in the injunction written over the portals of the Delphic god: "Know thyself!" and in modern times has been finely rendered: "The proper study of mankind is man." It is also embodied in the fine old term, the Humanities, which signifies those parts of education that have for their end the development of our manhood or humanity, and which must therefore constitute the essential elements of a rational general education.

This was the great discovery of Socrates; to the preaching of which, as the gospel most needed by men, his life was devoted. Nor have there been wanting, in succeeding ages, philosophers — and those the greatest-to continue his mission. But so averse are inen to being convinced of their errors that nothing is more odious to them than the attempt. Hence, generally, all means of defence are regarded as legitimate,-that is to say, not only fallacies, but falsehoods and slanders, and, at times,

the prison, or the rack, or death. Thus Socrates was poisoned for this offence only; which, though otherwise atrocious, was creditable to the Athenians, as at least proving an uncomfortable mental susceptibility to the power of reasoning or Logic. For in modern times we have invented a better method of dealing with such fellows, and have developed a mental integument as impervious to the weapons of reason as that of the elephant or rhinoceros to the weapons of the primitive hunter; and against which the Socratic wit would batter in vain. Thus we are enabled to dispose of those who would disturb our mental peace and complacency, by simply refusing to listen to them, and by extolling our own idols,-like the Ephesians; who, in answer to the preaching of the apostles, "all with one voice, about the space of two hours, cried out: Great is Diana of the Ephesians." By these two means which have been aptly called "the conspiracy of silence," and "the society of mutual admiration "-our opinions are now impregnably buttressed. Thus we live in a sort of Fools' Paradise; though, as Bacon says, "the apotheosis of error is the greatest evil of all, and when folly is worshipped, it is, as it were, a plaguespot upon the understanding" (Nov. Org., bk. i., aph. lxv.).

D-S II

The disuse of Logic must necessarily affect the teaching of Moral and Political Science, Metaphysics, and the Science of Human Nature generally;