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in the acquisition of new truths or in the appreciation of original thought in others. Hence it has happened, throughout the history of mankind, that the results of original thought meet with almost insuperable obstacles to their reception; and that, even where they have established their footing, they pass into the hands of commonplace thinkers, who treat them after their own methods. Hence the original works of great thinkers, with their methods of thought and expression, and the vivifying effect of actual example, are submerged by the newer and inferior literature.
On the other hand, where the Analytical Method is rigorously applied to all forms of discourse, and especially when it is applied to the notions or concepts embodied in terms, numerous delicate and important but unsuspected relations between the notions thus determined suggest themselves. For in this also logical is like chemical analysis, where, by the resolution of compound substances, thousands of relations between them and between the elements of which they are composed are developed and disclosed. The perception of these unsuspected relations constitutes originality, which is but another name for logical power. Nor is this originality anywhere more conspicuously displayed than where men of original genius, as, e. g., Bacon
in his Essays, deal with commonplace subjects.' Hence the use of Logic as an Instrument of Invention cannot be too highly appreciated, for in the capacity to use Logic in this way, or, in other words, in the capacity to apprehend the whole significance of terms by resolving them into their elements, lies the essential difference between the Original and the Commonplace Thinker.'
$115 (2) CRITICISM.-In this aspect Logic may be likened to the touch of Ithuriel's spear.'
Where terms are clearly defined and analyzed into their constituent elements,-that is to say, thoroughly apprehended, -innumerable relations between them are intuitively perceived; and thus, by the use of this method, we are led on, as Locke says in a passage cited (supra § 6, n.), "from very plain and easy beginnings, by gentle degrees and a continued chain of reasonings, to the discovery and demonstration of truths that appear, at first sight, beyond human capacity." This it was, probably, that inspired the beautiful hymn of Newman:
"Lead on, Heavenly Light; amid the encircling gloom, Lead Thou me on ";
which may be very properly regarded as in reality an ode to the divine gift of Intuition- the only source of perfect knowledge.
2 "Him there they found
Squat like a toad at the ear of Eve.
Him thus intent Ithuriel with his spear
Touched lightly; for no falsehood can endure
Touch of celestial spear, but returns
Of force to its own likeness; . .
So started up in his own shape the fiend."
Commonly the reasoning processes operate unconsciously and automatically, and the reasoning is more or less inaccurate, and hardly ever consecutive or logically coherent. As observed in the Introduction, proposition follows proposition in our minds, suggested by various principles of association, such, e. g., as experience, habit, authority, inclination, etc.; and thus the great mass of our opinions and beliefs-which we very erroneously call our knowledge-comes to us we know not how. Nor, however firmly we may be convinced of them, or however passionately we may assert them, have we any just assurance of their truth; nay, it is matter of familiar knowledge that they are all mingled with error. Hence, we concluded, the necessity is apparent for some test or criterion by which to judge them; and this, except the sometimes painful test of experience, can be nothing else than Logic. In its critical aspect, therefore, Logic is indispensable, not only to save us from errors and absurdities, but to distinguish real from unreal knowledge, and to give us assurance of the former (7 et seq.). Without it, except in concrete matters, no man can know whether he is right or wrong; and while some, happily born, learn by practice the application and use of the logical processes, the great mass of mankind, for the lack of Logic, go through life
mistaking falsehood and even nonsense for knowledge, and yet firmly convinced of their wisdom and of the folly of those who differ from them. Hence, in the critical aspect of Logic, the order of applying the logical processes is the reverse of what it is in the use of Logic as an organon or instrument of invention. There the order is to commence with the analysis of the term, and then to proceed to the synthesis of terms in propositions, syllogisms, and extended discourse; here we commence with the complex result, and by analysis resolve it into its elements.
§ 116. OF THE USE OF ANALYSIS GENERALLY. In the use of Logic, whether for invention or for criticism, analysis and synthesis are equally indispensable; but the latter, after the former has been effected, is largely a natural and spontaneous process, and presents but little difficulty in its performance. On the other hand, analysis, while to a certain extent also spontaneous, requires, for its efficient performance, the most vigorous and protracted exertion of the mental faculties,- as, e. g., in the mathematics, and hence is at once the most important and the most difficult of the logical processes. It will therefore require our special attention.
We have distinguished between the inventional and the critical functions of Logic, and
also with reference to the use of the logical processes as applied in the performance of the one or the other function; and with reference. to invention, we have regarded the function of analysis as limited to the analysis of terms, with a view to an apprehension of the notions expressed by them. In practice, however, it is difficult to distinguish between the uses of analysis for invention and for criticism. For, as we have observed, the human mind is so constituted that the synthetical process is performed spontaneously and involuntarily. Hence there is no subject that can present itself for our investigation which we can approach unembarrassed by opinions already formed; and, indeed, until such opinions or theories are formed, the process of investigation cannot commence. Hence, as is generally recognized, the method of scientific investigation must consist largely in the forming of theories and their subsequent investigation. We may distinguish, however, between our own theories, either accidentally formed or formed for the purpose of the investigation of a proposed subject, and the theories formally propounded by others, either in writing or speech; and we may conveniently regard the former as belonging to the function of invention, and the latter to that of criticism. The latter, as being the simpler subject, will be first considered.