gar mind, and to excite sedition in the countries in which it is ordered to be circulated. Indeed it is such, that if any of the lawful acknowledged sovereigns of Europe had publickly ordered such a manifesto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the ambassador of that power would instantly be ordered to quit every court without an audience.

The powers of Europe have a pretext for concealing their fears, by saying that this language is not used by the king; though they well know that there is in effect no such person, that the assembly is in reality, and by that king is acknowledged to be the master, that what he does is but matter of formality, and that he can neither cause nor hinder, accelerate nor retard any measure whatsoever, nor add to nor soften the manifesto which the assembly has directed to be published, with the declared purpose of exciting mutiny and rebellion in the several countries governed by these powers. By the generality also of the menaces contained in this paper (though infinitely aggravating the outrage) they hope to remove from each power separately the idea of a distinct affront. The persons first pointed at by the menace are certainly the princes of Germany, who harbour the persecuted house of Bourbon and the nobility of France; the declaration, however, is general, and goes to every state with which they may have a cause of quarrel. But the terrour of France has fallen upon all nations. A few months since all sovereigns seemed disposed to unite against her, at present they all seem to combine in her favour. At no period has the power of France ever appeared with so formidable an aspect. In particular the liberties of the empire can have nothing more than an existence the most tottering and precarious, whilst France exists with a great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greatest in the weakest ; but with neither power nor disposition to support the smaller states in their independence against the attempts of the more powerful.

I wind up all in a full conviction within my own breast, and the substance of which I must repeat over and over again, that the state of France is the first consideration in the politicks of Europe, and of each state, externally as well as internally considered.

Most of the topicks I have used are drawn from fear and apprehension. Topicks derived from fear or addressed to it, are, i well know, of doubtful appearance. To be sure, hope is in general the incitement to action. Alarm some menyou do not drive them to provide for their security; you put them to a stand; you induce them not to take measures to prevent the approach of danger, but to remove so unpleasant an idea from their minds; you persuade them to remain as they are, from a new fear that their activity may bring on the apprehended mischief before its time. 1 confess freely that this evil sometimes happens from an overdone precaution; but it is when the measures are rash, ill chosen, or ill combined, and the effects rather of blind terrour than of enlightened foresight. But the few to whom I wish to submit my thoughts, are of a character which will enable them to see danger without astonishment, and to provide against it without perplexity.

To what lengths this method of circulating mutinous manifestos, and of keeping emissaries of sedition in every court under the name of ambassadors, to propagate the same principles and to follow the practices, will go, and how soon they will operate, it is hard to say-but go on it will-more or less rapidly, according to events, and to the humour of the time. The princes menaced with the revolt of their subjects, at the same time they have obsequiously obeyed the sovereign mandate of the new Roman senate, have received with distinction, in a publick character, ambassadors from those who in the same act had circulated the manifesto of sedition in their dominions. This was the only thing wanting to the degradation and disgrace of the Germanick body.

The ambassadors from the rights of man, and their admission into the diplomatick system, I hold to be a new æra in this business. It will be the most important step yet taken to affect the existence of sovereigns, and the higher classes of life-I do not mean to exclude its effects upon all classes -but the first blow is aimed at the more prominent parts in the ancient order of things.

What is to be done?

VOL. IV.

54

THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.

It would be presumption in me to do more than to make a case. Many things occur. But as they, like all political measures, depend on dispositions, tempers, means, and external circumstances, for all their effect, not being well assured of these, I do not know how to let loose any speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated in my opinion as it exists. The remedy must be where power, wisdom, and information, I hope are more united with good intentions than they can be with me. I have done with this subject, I believe for ever. It has given me many anxious moments for the two last years. If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human affairs, will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself, than the mere designs of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but perverse

and obstinate.

HEADS

FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER,

1792.

THAT France, by its mere geographical position, independently of every other circumstance, must affect every state of Europe; some of them immediately, all of them through mediums not very remote.

That the standing policy of this kingdom ever has been to watch over the external proceedings of France, (whatever form the interiour government of that kingdom might take) and to prevent the extension of its dominion or its ruling influence, over other states.

That, there is nothing in the present internal state of things in France, which alters the national policy with regard to the exteriour relations of that country.

That there are, on the contrary, many things in the internal circumstances of France (and perhaps of this country too) which tend to fortify the principles of that fundamental policy; and which render the active assertion of those principles more pressing at this, than at any former time.

That, by a change effected in about three weeks, France has been able to penetrate into the heart of Germany; to make an absolute conquest of Savoy; to menace an immediate invasion of the Netherlands; and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetick body, which is in a most perilous situation. The great aristocratick cantons having, perhaps, as much or more to dread from their own people whom they arm, but do not choose or dare to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which against all publick faith has butchered their troops, serving by treaty in France, To this picture, it is hardly necessary to add, the means by which France has been enabled to effect all this, namely the apparently entire destruc

tion of one of the largest, and certainly the highest disciplined, and best appointed army ever seen, headed by the first military sovereign in Europe, with a captain under him of the greatest renown; and that without a blow given or received on any side. This state of things seems to me, even if it went no further, truly serious.

Circumstances have enabled France to do all this by land. On the other element she has begun to exert herself; and she must succeed in her designs, if enemies very different from those she has hitherto had to encounter, do not resist her.

She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at sea, by which she is enabled to give law to the whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact (and if not so known, it is in the nature of things highly probable) that she proposes the ravage of the Ecclesiastical state, and the pillage of Rome, as her first object; that next she means to bombard Naples ; to awe, to humble, and thus to command all Italy--to force it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence-to compel the Italian princes and republicks to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an open intercourse, and the sure concomitant, of that intercourse, the affiliated societies, in a manner similar to those she has established at Avignon, the Comtat, Chamberry, London, Manchester, &c. &c. which are so many colonies planted in all these countries, for extending the influence, and securing the dominion of the French republick.

That there never has been hitherto a period in which this kingdom would have suffered a French fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force ITALY to submit to such terms as France would think fit to impose--to say nothing of what has been done upon land in support of the same sysThe great object for which we preserved Minorca, whilst we could keep it, and for which we still retain Gibraltar, both at a great expense, was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France over the Mediterranean.

tem.

Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of that

armament upon the Italian states. The probable effect which that armament, and the other armaments preparing at Tou