had merely been "wired on " from the brain of some living member of parliament who knew the deceased.

Thus telepathy cuts two ways. It is, if accepted, a singular discovery, but it throws an enormous burden of proof on a "ghost" who wants to establish his identity. In the same way telepathy cuts at the root of "clairvoyance," or lucid view of events remote in space or distant in time. The vision may have been "wired on 19 telepathically by a living person who knew the remote event. The "supranormal" can only be proved if the information conveyed by the hallucination is verified in the future, or is proved by the finding of documents not known to exist at the time of the hallucination, but afterwards discovered. A curious possible instance was the discovery in 1856 of a MS. inventory of the jewels of Mary Stuart (1566), verifying in some degree a clairvoyant vision about the jewels published some years earlier (see “Queen Mary's Jewels" in the writer's Book of Dreams and Ghosts). For the same reasons the information nominally given by "spirits" of the dead through the mouth or by the automatic writing of Mrs Piper (Boston, U.S.) and other mediums may be explained by telepathy from the living who know the facts. This theory was rejected, for example, in the case of Mrs Piper, by Myers and Dr Richard Hodgson, who devoted much time to the examination of the lady (see Proceedings, vols. vi., viii., xiii., xiv., with criticisms by Mrs Sidgwick and the present writer in vol. xv. pt: xxxvi). In the late Dr Hodgson's opinion, the dead do communicate through the automatic writing or speaking of Mrs Piper. The published evidence (much is unpublished) does not seem to justify the conclusion, which is not accepted by Mrs Piper herself! Dr J. H. Hyslop has published enormous and minute reports on Mrs Piper, convincing to himself but not to most readers.

66

'been especially examined by Myers, and by such psychologists as Ribot, Janet, Richet, Flournoy and many others.

The general result is a normal explanation, not yet complete, of the phenomena hitherto attributed to witchcraft, inspiration, possession, and so forth. Probably the devils, saints, angels and spirits who have communicated with witches, living saints, demoniacs and visionaries are mere hallucinatory reflections from the subconscious self, endowed with its store of latent memories and strangely acute percipient faculties. Thus a curious chapter of human history is at last within possible reach of explanation. Men regard phenomena as "supranormal" or "supernatural," or reject them altogether, till their modus is explained. But it would not be candid to say that the explana tion is complete, or nearly complete. The nature of the hypnotic trance itself remains a matter of dispute. The knowledge automatically revealed can by no means always be accounted for, either by latent memory or by the sharpening of the normal faculties of perception, while the limits of telepathy (if it be accepted) are vaguely conjectured. Even the results of simple experiments in crystal-gazing" are often very perplexing. Further experiment may reveal some normal explanation, while scepticism (which seldom takes the trouble to examine the alleged facts with any care) can always repose on a theory of malobservation and imposture. These, of course, are verae causae, while in this, as in all provinces of human evidence, bad memories and unconscious errors distort the testimony. Psychical research encourages, or ought to encourage, the cool impartiality in examining, collecting and recording facts, which is usually absent, in greater or less degree, from the work even of eminent historians. Men of equal honesty and acuteness may believe or disbelieve in the innocence of Mary Queen of Scots, or in the " spirits" which control Mrs Piper. As to alleged "physical phenomena" of unknown cause, one, the power of passing without lesion with naked feet over fire, has recently been attested by numerous competent observers and experimenters in the ritual of Fijians and other South Sea Islanders, Japanese, Bulgarians, natives of southern India and other races. (The evidence has been collected by the present writer in Proceedings S.P. R. vol. xv. pt. xxxvi. pp. 2-15. Compare a case examined and explained more or less by S. P. Langley, Nature, August 22, 1901.) The much more famous tales of movements of objects untouched have been carefully examined, and perhaps in no instance have professional performers proved innocent of fraud. Yet the best known living medium, Eusapia Palladino, though exposed at Cambridge, has been rehabilitated, after later experiments, in the opinion of many distinguished Continental observers, who entirely disbelieve in the old theory, the action of "spirits," and venture no other hypothesis.

This leads us to the chief field of research in "automatisms," or actions of the subconscious or "subliminal "self. The prototype of such things is found in the performances of natural somnambulists, who in all ages have seemed to exhibit faculties beyond their power when in a normal condition. The experiments of Mesmer, and of those who followed in his track, down to the psychologists of to-day, proved (what had long been known to savages and conjurers) that a state of somnambulism could be induced from without. Moreover, it is proved that certain persons can, as it were, hypnotize themselves, even unwittingly, and pass into trance. In these secondary conditions of trance, such persons are not only amenable to 'suggestion," but occasionally evolve what are called secondary personalities: they speak in voices not their own, and exhibit traits of character not theirs, but in harmony with the impersonation. The popular, savage and ancient theory of these phenomena was that the people thus affected were inspired by a god or spirit, or possessed" by a demon or a dead man. Science now regards the gods or demons or spirits as mere exhibitions of the secondary personality, which wakens when the normal personality slumbers. The knowledge and faculties of the secondary personality, far exceeding those exhibited in the normal state, are explained to a great extent by the patient's command, when in the secondary state, of resources latent in the memory. The same explanation is offered for other pheno-area of human faculty; and practical results, in the medical mena, like those of automatic writing, knocking out answers by tilting tables, or discovering objects by aid of the "divining rod." The muscular actions that tilt the table, or wag the rod, or direct the pencil or planchette, are unconsciously made, and reveal the latent stores of subconscious knowledge, so that a man writes or knocks out information which he possessed, but did not suspect himself of possessing. These processes were familiar to the Neoplatonists, and in one form or other are practised by Chinese, Tibetans, Negroes, Malayans and Melanesians. A similar kind of automatism is revealed in the inspirations of genius, which often astonish the author or artist himself. An interesting example has been studied by Myers in the feats of arithmetic recorded about " calculating boys," who are usually unconscious of their methods. The whole of this vast feld of the unconscious, or subconscious, or subliminal self has

The results of psychical research, after several years of work, are not really less than could be expected from toil in a field so difficult. The theory of alternating, or secondary, personalities is the key, as we have said, to a strange chapter in "the history of human error." The provisional hypothesis of telepathy puts a meaning into the innumerable tales of "wraiths" and of "second sight." It is never waste of time to investigate the

46

treatment of abnormal intellectual conditions, have already been obtained. The conduct of our witch-burning ancestors now becomes intelligible, a step on the way to being pardonable. With their methods and inherited prejudices they could scarcely have reasoned otherwise than they did in certain cases of hysteria and autohypnotization. Many "miracles" of healing and of stigmatization" become credible when verified in modern experience and explained by "suggestion "; though to "explain the explanation" is a task for the future. Such as it is, the theory was accepted by St Francis de Sales in the case of St Theresa. Results of wider range and of more momentous interest may yet be obtained. The science of electrical phenomena was not developed in a quarter of a century, and it would be premature to ask more from psychical research than it has achieved in a short period. The subject is not readily capable

total of objects to remain the same: the orange would still ceases too; had we been born blind, the world would for us have be round, yellow and fragrant as before. For the physicist had no colour; if deaf, it would have had no sounds; if idiotic, it whether aware of it or not-has taken up a position which for the present may be described by saying that phenomenon with him would have had no meaning. Psychology, then, never transcends means appearance or manifestation, or-as we had better say the limits of the individual. But now, though this Berkeleyan object, not for a concrete individual, but rather for what Kant called standpoint is the standpoint of psychology, psychology is not Bewusstsein überhaupt, or, as some render it, the objective consciousness, i.e. for an imaginary subject freed from all the limitations of pledged to the method employed by Berkeley and by Locke. actual subjects save that of depending on sensibility "for the Psychology may be individualistic without being confined exmaterial of experience, However, this is not all, for, as we shall see clusively to the introspective method. There is nothing to presently, the psychologist also occupies this position; at least if hinder the psychologist from employing materials furnished by he does not his is not a true science. But, further, the physicist his observations of other men, of infants, of the lower animals, leaves out of sight altogether the facts of attention, feeling, and so forth, all of which actual presentation entails. From the psycho- or of the insane; nothing to hinder him taking counsel with the logical point of view, on the other hand, the removal of the subject philologist or even the physiologist, provided always he can removes not only all such facts as attention and feeling, but all show the psychological bearings of those facts which are not presentation or possibility of presentation whatever. Surely, then, directly psychological. The standpoint of psychology is indito call a certain object, when we abstract from its presentation, a material phenomenon, and to call the actual presentation of this vidualistic; by whatever methods, from whatever sources its object a mental phenomenon, is a clumsy and confusing way of facts are ascertained, they must-to have a psychological imrepresenting the difference between the two points of view. For port-be regarded as having place in, or as being part of, some the terms material" and "mental seem to imply that the two one's consciousness or experience. In this sense, i.e. as presented so-called phenomena have nothing in common, whereas the same object is involved in both, while the term "phenomenon" implies to an individual, "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of that the point of view is in each case the same, when in truth what earth" may belong to psychology, but otherwise they are is emphasized by the one the other ignores. psychological nonentities. In defining psychology, however, 2. Paradoxical though it may be, we must then conclude that the propriety of avoiding the terms mind or soul, which it psychology cannot be defined by reference to a special subject-implies, is widely acknowledged; mind because of the disastrous dualism of mind and matter, soul because of its metaphysical Standpoint matter as such concrete sciences, for example, as associations. modern of Psycho- mineralogy and botany can be; and, since it deals in Hence F. A. Lange's famous mot: logy. But consciousness, which some sort with the whole of experience, it is obviously psychology is Psychologie ohne Seele. not an abstract science in any ordinary sense of that term. To be is the most frequent substitute, is continually confused with selfcharacterized at all, therefore, apart from metaphysical assumpconsciousness, and so is apt to involve undue stress on the subtions, it must be characterized by the standpoint from which this jective as opposed to the objective, as well as to emphasize the experience is viewed. It is by way of expressing this that cognitive as against the coative factors. Experience, it is widely different schools of psychology define it as subjective, maintained, is a more fundamental and less ambiguous term. all other positive sciences being distinguished as objective. Psychology then is the science of individual experience. The But this seems scarcely more than a first approximation to the problem of psychology, in dealing with this complex subjecttruth, and, as we have seen incidentally, is apt to be misleading. matter, is in general-first, to ascertain its ultimate constituents, The distinction rather is that the standpoint of psychology is and, secondly, to determine and explain the laws of their interaction. what is sometimes termed "individualistic," that of the so-called object-sciences being "universalistic," both alike being objective in the sense of being true for all, consisting of what Kant would call judgments of experience. For psychology is not a biography in any sense, still less a biography dealing with idiosyncrasies, and in an idiom having an interest and a meaning for one subject only, and incommunicable to any other. Locke, Berkeley and Hume have been severely handled because they regarded the critical investigation of knowledge as a psychological problem, and set to work to study the individual mind simply for the sake of this problem. But none the less their standpoint was the proper one for the science of psychology itself; and, however surely their philosophy was foredoomed to a collapse, there is no denying a steady psychological advance as we pass from Locke to Hume and his modern representatives. By "idea" Locke tells us he means "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks" (i.e. is conscious), and having, as it were, shut himself within such a circle of ideas he finds himself powerless to explain his knowledge of a world that is assumed to be independent of it; but he is able to give a very good account of some of these ideas themselves. He cannot justify his belief in the world of things whence certain of his simple ideas were conveyed" any more than Robinson Crusoe could have explored the continents whose products were drifted to his desert island, though he might perhaps survey the island itself well enough. Berkeley accordingly, as Professor Fraser happily puts it, abolished Locke's hypothetical outer circle. Thereby he made the psychological standpoint clearer than ever-hence the truth of Hume's remark, that Berkeley's arguments "admit of no answer "; at the same time the epistemological problem was as hopeless as before-hence again the truth of Hume's remark that those arguments "produced no conviction." Of all the facts with which he deals, the psychologist may truly say that their esse is percipi, inasmuch as all his facts are facts of presentation, are ideas in Locke's sense, or objects which imply a subject. Before we became conscious there was no world for us; should our consciousness cease, the world for us

General Analysis.

3. In seeking to make a first general analysis of experience, we must start from individual human experience, for this alone is what we immediately know. From this standpoint we must endeavour to determine the "irreducible minimum" involved, so that our concept may apply to all lower forms of experi ence as well. Etymologically experience connotes practical acquaintance, efficiency and skill as the result of trial-usually repeated trial-and effort. Many recent writers on comparative psychology propose to make evidence of experience in this sense the criterion of psychical life. The ox knoweth his owner and the ass his master's crib, and so would pass muster; but the ant and the bee, who are said to learn nothing, would, in spite of their marvellous instinctive skill, be regarded as mere automata in Descartes's sense. That this criterion is decisive on the positive side will hardly be denied; the question how far it is available negatively we must examine later on. But it will be well first briefly to note some of the implications of this positive criterion: Experience is the process of becoming expert by experi ment. The chief implication, no doubt, is that which in psychological language we express as the duality of subject and object. Looking at this relation as the comparative psychologist has to do, we find that it tallies in the main with the biological relation of organism and environment. The individuality of the organism corresponds to, though it is not necessarily identical with, the psychological subject, while to the environment and its changes corresponds the objective continuum or totum objectivum as we shall call it. This correspondence further helps us to see still more clearly the error of regarding individual experience as wholly subjective, and at the same time helps us to find some measure of truth in the naïve realism of Common Sense. As these points have an important bearing on the connexion of psychology and epistemology, we may attempt to elucidate them more fully.

Though it would be unwarrantable to resolve a thing, as some have done, into a mere meeting-point of relations, yet it is

perhaps as great a mistake to assume that it can be anything deter- | transsubjective and objective, as these occur in psychological or minate in itself apart from all relations to other things. By the physicist this mistake can hardly be made: for him action and reaction are strictly correlative: a material system can do no work on itself. For the biologist, again, organism and environment are invariably complementary. But in psychology, when presentations are regarded as subjective modifications, we have this mistaken isolation in a glaring form, and all the hopeless difficulties of what is called " subjective idealism are the result. Subjective modifications no doubt are always one constituent of individual experience, but always as correlative to objective modifications or change in the objective continuum. If experience were throughout subjective, not merely would the term subjective itself be meaningless, not merely would the conception of the objective never arise, but the entirely impersonal and intransitive process that remained, though it might be described as absolute becoming, could not be called even solipsism, least of all real experience. Common Sense, then, is right in positing, wherever experience is inferred, (1) a factor answering to what we know as self, and (2) another factor answering to what each of us knows as the world. It is further right in regarding the world which each one immediately knows as a coloured, sounding, tangible world, more exactly as a world of sensible qualities. The assumption of naïve realism, that the world as each one knows it exists as such independently of him, is questionable. But this assumption goes beyond individual experience, and does not, indeed could not, arise at this standpoint.

Answering to the individuality and unity of the subjective factor, there is a corresponding unity and individuality of the objective. Every Ego has its correlative Non-Ego, whence in the end such familiar saying as quot homines tot sententiae and the like. The doctrine of Leibnitz, that "each monad is a living mirror.. representative of the universe according to its point of view," will, with obvious reservations, occur to many as illustrative here. In particular, Leibnitz emphasized one point on which psychology will do well to insist. "Since the world is a plenum," he begins, "all things are connected together and everybody acts upon every other, more or less, according to their distance, and is affected by their reaction; hence each monad is a living mirror," &c. Subject and Object, or (as it will be clearer in this connexion to say) Ego and Non-Ego, are then not merely logically a universe, but actually the universe, so that, as Leibnitz put it, " He who sees all could read in each what is happening everywhere" (Monadology, § 61). Though every individual experience is unique, yet the more Ego is similar to Ego, the more their complementaries Non-Ego,, NonEgo, are likewise similar; much as two perspective projections are more similar the more adjacent their points of sight, and more similar as regards a given position the greater its distance from both points. No doubt we must also make a very extensive use of the hypothesis of subconsciousness, just as Leibnitz did, before we can say that the universe is the objective factor in each and every individual's experience. But we shall have in any case to allow that, besides the strictly limited " content rising above the threshold of consciousness, there is an indefinite extension of the presentational continuum beyond it. And the Leibnitzian Monadology helps us also to clear up a certain confusion that besets terms such as content of consciousness," or "finite centre of experience"-a barbarous but intelligible phrase that has recently appeared-the confusion, that is, with a mosaic of mutually exclusive areas, or with a scheme of mutually exclusive logical compartments. Consciousnesses, though in one respect mutually exclusive, do not limit each other in this fashion. For there is a sense in which all individual experiences are absolutely the same, though relatively different as to their point of view, i.e. as to the manner in which for each the same absolute whole is sundered into subjective and objective factors.

This way of looking at the facts of mind helps, again, to dispel the obscurity investing such terms as subjective, intersubjective, 'Principles of Nature and Grace, § 3.

epistemological discussions. For the psychologist must maintain that no experience is merely subjective: it is only epistemologists (notably Kant) who so describe individual experience, because objects experienced in their concrete particularity pertain, like so many idiosyncrasies, to the individual alone. In contrast with this, epistemologists then describe universal experience-the objects in which are the same for every experient -as objective experience par excellence. And so has arisen the time-honoured opposition of Sense-knowledge and Thoughtknowledge: so too has arisen the dualism of Empiricism and Rationalism, which Kant sought to surmount by logical analysis. It is in the endeavour to supplement this analysis by a psychological genesis that the terms intersubjective and transsubjective prove useful. The problem for psychology is to ascertain the successive stages in the advance from the one form of experience or knowledge to the other. "When ten men look at the sun or the moon," said Reid," they all see the same individual object." But according to Hamilton this statement is not philosophically correct... the truth is that each of these persons sees a different object. . . . It is not by perception but by a process of reasoning that we connect the objects of sense with existences beyond the sphere of immediate knowledge." Now it is to this "beyond" that the term transsubjective is applied, and the question before us is: How do individual subjects thus get beyond the immanence or immediacy with which all experience begins? By a "process of reasoning," it is said. But it is at least true in fact, whether necessarily true or not, that such reasoning is the result of social intercourse. Further, it will be generally allowed that Kant's Analytik, before referred to, has made plain the insufficiency of merely formal reasoning to yield the categories of Substance, Cause and End, by which we pass from mere perceptual experience to that wider experience which transcends it. And psychology, again, may claim to have shown that in fact these categories are the result of that reflective self-consciousness to which social intercourse first gives rise.

But such intercourse, it has been urged, presupposes the common ground between subject and subject which it is meant to explain. How, it is asked, if every subject is confined to his own unique experience, does this intersubjective intercourse ever arise? If no progress towards intellective synthesis were possible before intersubjective intercourse began, such intercourse, as presupposing something more than immediate sense-knowledge, obviously never could begin. Let us illustrate by an analogy which Leibnitz's If it were possible for the terrestrial astronomer to obtain observaassociation of experience with a "point of view at once suggests. tions of the heavens from astronomers in the neighbouring stars, he would be able to map in three dimensions constellations which now he can only represent in two. But unless he had ascertained would have no means of distinguishing them as near from the distant unaided the heliocentric parallax of these neighbouring stars, he myriads besides, or of understanding the data he might receive; and unless he had first of all determined the still humbler geocentric parallax of our sun, those heliocentric parallaxes would have been unattainable. So in like manner we may say "intersubjective parallax "presupposes what we may call "subjective parallax," and even this the psychological duality of object and subject. such subjective parallax or acquaintance with other like selves is the direct outcome of the extended range in time which memory proper secures; and when in this way self has become an object, resembling objects become other selves or ejects," to adopt with slight modification a term originated by the late W. K. Clifford. We may be quite sure that his faithful dog is as little of a solipsist as the noble savage whom he accompanies. Indeed, the rudiments of the social factor are, if we may judge by biological evidence, to be found very early. Sexual union in the physiological sense occurs in all but the lowest Metazoa, pairing and courtship are frequent among insects, while "among the cold-blooded fishes the battle of the stickleback with his rivals, his captivating manoeuvres to lead the female to the nest which he has built, his mad dance of passion around her, and his subsequent jealous guarding of the nest, have often been observed and admired." Among birds and mammals

Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 153.

But

two

And it is precisely for want of this mediation that Kant's stems of human knowledge, which perhaps may spring from a common but to us unknown root." leave epistemology still more or less hampered with the old dualism of sense and understanding

Evolution of Sex, by Geddes and Thomson, 1st ed. p. 265

we find not merely that these psychological aspects of sexual life are greatly extended, but we find also prolonged education of offspring by parents and imitation of the parents by offspring. Even language, or, at any rate" the linguistic impulse," is not wholly absent among brutes. Thus as the sensori-motor adjustments of the organism to its environment generally advance in complexity and range, there is a concomitant advance in the variety and intimacy of its relations specially with individuals of its kind. It is therefore reasonable to assume no discontinuity between phases of experience that for the individual are merely objective and phases that are also ejective as well; and once the ejective level is attained, some interchange of experience is possible. So disappears the great gulf fixed betwixt subjective or individual and intersubjective or universal experience by rival systems in philosophy.

ncss.

which make up its corporeal existence." And, inasmuch as its presentation to any one in particular is a point of no importance, the fact of presentation at all may be very well dropped out of account. Let us now turn to psychology: Why should we not here follow Huxley and take "the word soul' simply as a name for the series of mental phenomena which make up an individual mind"? Surely the moment we try distinctly to understand this question we realize that the cases are different. Series of mental phenomena "for whom? For any passer-by such as might take stock of our biological dog? No, obviously only for that individual mind itself; yet that is supposed to be made up of, to be nothing different from, the series of phenomena. Are we, then, (1) quoting J. S. Mill's words, "to accept the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series "? Or (2) shall we say that the several parts of the series are mutually phenomenal, much as A may look at B, who was just now looking at A? Or (3) finally, shall we say that a large part of the so-called series, in fact every term but one, is phenomenal for the rest-for that one?

4. From this preliminary epistemological discussion we may pass on to the psychological analysis of experience itself. As to this, there is in the main substantial agreement; the elementary facts of mind cannot be expressed in less than three As to the first, paradox is too mild a word for it; even contradiction propositions-"I feel somehow," "I know something," "I do will hardly suffice. It is as impossible to express "being aware of something." But here at once there arises an important ques- by one term as it is to express an equation or any other relation by tion, viz. What after all are we to understand by the subject one term: what knows can no more be identical with what is known of these propositions? The proposition "I feel somehow" is than a weight with what it weighs. If a series of feelings is what is known or presented, then what knows, what it is presented to, not equivalent to "I know that I feel somehow." To identify cannot be that series of feelings, and this without regard to the point the two would be to confound consciousness with self-conscious- Mill mentions, viz. that the infinitely greater part of the series is We are no more confined to our own immediate observa- either past or future. The question is not in the first instance one tions here than elsewhere; but the point is that, whether seeking of time or substance at all, but simply turns upon the fact that to analyse one's own consciousness or to infer that of a lobster, thing knowing or conscious of something. But it may be replied: knowledge or consciousness is unmeaning except as it implies somewhether discussing the association of ideas or the expression Granted that the formula for consciousness is something doing someof emotions, there is always an individual self or "subject" in thing, to put it generally; still, if the two somethings are the same question. It is not enough to talk of feelings or volitions: when I touch myself or when I see myself, why may not agent and what we mean is that some individual-man or worm-feels, why may I not know myself-in fact, do I not know myself? Cerpatient be the same when the action is knowing or being aware of; strives, acts, thus or thus. Obvious as this may seem, it has tainly not; agent and patient never are the same in the same act; been frequently either forgotten or gainsaid. It has been such terms as self-caused, self-moved, self-known, et id genus omne, forgotten among details or through the assumption of a medleyas, eg. touching oneself when one's right hand touches one's left. either connote the incomprehensible or are abbreviated expressions of faculties, each treated as an individual in turn, and among which the real individual was lost. Or it has been gainsaid, because to admit that all psychological facts pertain to an experiencing subject or experient seemed to imply that they pertained to a particular spiritual substance, which was simple, indestructible, and so forth; and it was manifestly desirable to exclude such assumptions from psychology as a science aiming only at a systematic exposition of what can be known and verified by observation. But, however, much assailed or disowned, the concept of a "mind or conscious Subject or subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all Ego. psychological writers whatever-not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction. This being so, we are far more likely to reach the truth eventually if we openly acknowledge this inexpugnable assumption, if such it prove, instead of resorting to all sorts of devious periphrases to hide it. Now wherever the word Subject, or its derivatives, occurs in psychology we might substitute the word Ego and analogous derivatives, did such exist. But Subject is almost always the preferable term; its impersonal form is an advantage, and it readily recalls its modern correlative Object. Moreover, Ego has two senses, distinguished by Kant as pure and empirical, the latter of which was, of course, an object, the Me known, while the former was subject always, the I knowing. By pure Ego or Subject it is proposed to denote here the simple fact that everything experienced is referred to a Self experiencing. This psychological concept of a self or subject, then, is after all by no means identical with the metaphysical concepts of a soul or mind-atom, or of mind-stuff not atomic; it may be kept as free from metaphysical implications as the concept of the biological individual or organism with which it is so intimately connected.

The attempt, indeed, has frequently been made to resolve the former into the latter, and so to find in mind only such an indiAttempts to viduality as has an obvious counterpart in this individuextrude the ality of the organism, i.e. what we may call an objective individuality. But such procedure owes all its plausi Ego. bility to the fact that it leaves out of sight the dif ference between the biological and the psychological standpoints. All that the biologist means by a dog is "the sum of the phenomena Cf. Darwin, Descent of Man, i. 56.

And so we come to the alternative: As one hand washes the other, may not different members of the series of feelings be subject and object in turn? Compare, for example, the state of mind of a man succumbing to temptation (as he pictures himself enjoying or dictates of prudence) with his state when, filled with remorse, he the coveted good and impatiently repudiates scruples of conscience sides with conscience and condemns this "former self "-the "better self" having meanwhile become supreme. Here the cluster of presentations and their associated sentiments and motives, which together played the rôle of self in the first situation, have-only momentarily it may be true, but still have-for the time the place of not-self; and under abnormal circumstances this partial alternation may become complete alienation, as in what is called "double consciousness." Or again, the development of self-consciousness might be loosely described as taking the subject or self of one stage as an object in the next-self being, e.g, first identified with the body and afterwards distinguished from it. But all this, however true, is beside the mark; and it is really a very serious misnomer to speak, as e.g. Herbert Spencer does, of the development of selfanything, a differentiation of object and object, .e. in plainer consciousness as a "differentiation of subject and object." It is, if words, it is a differentiation among presentations-a differentiation every step of which implies just that relation to a subject which it is supposed to supersede.

above

There still remains the alternative, expressed in the words of J. S. Mill, viz." the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them.' To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between Mind or Ego, meaning the unity or continuity of consciousness as a complex of presentations, and Mind or Ego as the subject to which this complex is presented. In dealing with the body from the ordinary biological standpoint no such necessity arises. But, whereas there the individual organism is spoken of unequivocally, in psychology, on the other hand, the individual mind may mean referred to; or (ii) the subject of these feelings for whom they are either (i) the series of feelings or "mental phenomena phenomena; or (iii.) the subject of these feelings or phenomena plus the series of feelings or phenomena themselves, the two being in that relation to each other in which alone the one is subject and the other a series of feelings, phenomena or objects. It is in this last sense that Mind is used in empirical psychology. Its exclusive use in the first sense is favoured only by those who shrink from the speculative associations connected with its exclusive use in the *T. H. Huxley, Hume, “English Men of Letters Series," (1879), P. 171. Huxley, op. cit. p. 172.

•Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, ch. xii. fin. 'A meaning better expressed, as said above, by experience.