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by any cause impelling from without; nor that something may be added to God himself, but that it may be well with him on whom the good is bestowed and who is beloved, which may also receive the name of "Liberality:" According to this, God is said to be "rich in Goodness, Mercy," &c.

IX. The affections which spring from these, and which are exercised about good or evil as each is present or absent, are considered as having an analogy either in those things which are in the concupiscible part of our souls, or in that which is irascible.

X. In the Concupiscible part are, First, Desire and that which is opposed to it. Secondly, Joy and Grief. (1.) Desire is an affection of obtaining the works of righteousness from rational creatures, and of bestowing a remunerative reward, as well as of inflicting punishment if they be contumacious. To this is opposed the affection according to which God execrates the works of unrighteousness, and the omission of a remuneration.-(2.) Joy is an affection from the presence of a thing that is [convenientis] suitable or agreeable: Such as, the fruition of himself, the obedience of the creature, the communication of his own goodness, and the destruction of his rebels and enemies.-Grief, which is opposed to it, arises from the disobedience and the misery of the creature, and in the occasion thus given by his people for blaspheming the name of God among the Gentiles. To this, Repentance has some affinity; which is nothing more than a change of the thing willed or done, on account of the act of a rational creature; or, rather, a desire for such change.

XI. In the Irascible part are, Hope and its opposite Despair, Confidence and Anger, also Fear which is affirmatively opposed to Hope. (1.) Hope is an [attenta] earnest expectation of a good work due from the creature, and performable by the grace of God: It can easily be reconciled with the certain foreknowledge of God. (2.) Despair arises from the pertinacious [malitia] wickedness of the creature, opposing himself to the grace of God, and resisting the Holy Spirit. (3.) Confidence is that by which God with great [spiritu] animation prosecutes a desired good, and repels an evil that is hated. (4.) Anger is an affection of depulsion in God, through the punishment of the creature that has transgressed his law, by which He inflicts on the creature the evil of misery for his unrighteousness, and takes the vengeance which is due to Him, as an indication of his love towards justice, and of his hatred to sin: When this affection is vehement, it is called "Fury." (5.) Fear is from an impending evil to which God is averse.

XII. Of the second class of these derivative affections, [See Thesis XI,] some belong to God per se, as they simply contain in themselves perfection; others, which seem to have something of imperfection, are attributed to Him after the manner of the feelings of men, on account of some effects [ipsius] which He produces analogous to the effects of the creatures, yet without any passion, as He is simple and immutable; and without any disorder and repugnance to right reason. But we subject the use and exercise of the first class of these affections [see Thesis X] to the infinite Wisdom of God, whose property it is to prefix to each of them its object, means, end and circumstances, and to decree to which, in preference to the rest, is to be conceded the province of acting.

DISPUTATION XXI.

ON THOSE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD WHICH HAVE SOME ANALOGY TO THE MORAL VIRTUES, AND WHICH ACT LIKE MODERATORS OF THE AFFECTIONS CONSIDERED IN THE PRECEDING DISPUTATION.

I. BUT THESE Attributes preside generally over all the affections, or specially relate to some of them. The General is Justice, or Righteousness, which is called "universal" or "legal," and concerning which it was said by the ancients, that it contains in itself all the virtues. The Special are, Particular Justice, Patience, and those which are the moderators of anger, and of castigations and punishments.

II. 1. The Justice of God, considered universally, is a virtue of God according to which He administers all things correctly and [decenter] in a suitable manner, according to that which his Wisdom dictates as befitting Himself. In conjunction with Wisdom, it presides over all his acts, decrees and deeds: And according to it, God is said to be "just and right," his way "equal," and himself to be "just in all his ways."

III. 2. The particular Justice of God is that by which He consistently renders to every one his own: To God himself that which is His, and to the creature that which belongs to itself. We consider it both in the words of God and in his deeds. In this, the method of the decrees is not different; because whatever God does or says, he does or says it according to his own eternal decree. This Justice likewise contains a moderator partly of his love for the good of obedience, and partly of his love for the creature, and of his goodness.

IV. Justice in Deeds may be considered in the following order: That the First may be in the communication of good, either according to the first creation, or according to regeneration. The Second is in the prescribing of duty or in legislation, which consists in the requisition of a deed, and in the promise of a reward and the threat of a punishment. The Third is in the judging about deeds, which is retributive, being both communicative of a reward and vindicative: In all these, the magnanimity of God is to be considered. In communication, in promise and in remuneration, His Liberality and Magnificence are also to come under consideration; and they may be appropriately referred partly to distributive, and partly to commutative Justice.

V. Justice in Words is also threefold: (1.) Truth, by which He always enunciates or declares exactly as the thing is; to which is opposed falsehood. (2.) Sincerity and Simplicity, by which He always declares as He inwardly conceives, according to [sensum et propositum] the meaning and purpose of his mind; to which are opposed hypocrisy and duplicity of heart. And (3.) Fidelity, by which He is constant in keeping promises and in [communicationibus] communicating privileges; to which are opposed inconstancy and perfidy.

VI. Patience is that by which [toleranter suffert] He patiently endures the absence of that good, that is, of the prescribed obedience which He loves, desires, and for which He hopes, and the presence of that evil which He forbids; sparing sinners, not only that He may execute [judicia] the judicial acts of his mercy and severity through them, but that He may also lead them to repentance, or that He may punish the contumacious with greater equity and severity. And this attribute seems to attemper the love [which God entertains] for the good of justice.

VII. Long-suffering, Gentleness or Lenity, Clemency and [facilitas] Readiness to pardon, are the moderators of anger, castigations and punishments.

VIII. Long-suffering is a virtue, by which God suspends his anger, lest it should instantly hasten to the depulsion of the evil, as soon as the creature has by his sins deserved it.

IX. Gentleness or Lenity is a virtue, by which God preserves [mediocritatem] moderation concerning anger in taking vengeance, lest it should be too vehement; lest the severity of the anger should certainly correspond with the magnitude of the wickedness perpetrated.

X. Clemency is a virtue, by which God so attempers the castigations and punishments of the creature, even at the very time

when He inflicts them, that by their weight and continuance they may not equal the magnitude of the sins committed; indeed, that they may not exceed the strength of the creature.

XI. Readiness to forgive is a virtue, by which God shews himself to be exorable to his creature, and which fixes a measure to the limits of anger, lest it should endure for ever agreeably to the demerit of the sins committed.

COROLLARIES.

Does the Justice of God permit Him to destine to death eternal a rational creature, who has never sinned? We reply in the negative.

Does the Justice of God allow that a creature should be saved who perseveres in his sins?-We reply in the negative. Cannot Justice and Mercy, in some accommodated sense, be considered as in a certain respect opposed? We reply in the affirmative.

DISPUTATION XXII.

ON THE POWER OR CAPABILITY OF GOD.

I. WHEN entering on the consideration of the Power or Capability of God, as we deny the passive power which cannot [cadere] belong to God who is a pure act, so we likewise omit that which is occupied with internal acts through necessity of nature; and at present we exhibit for examination that power alone which consists in [vi] the virtue of acting, and by which God not only is capable of operating beyond himself, but actually does operate whenever it is his own good pleasure.

II. And it is a faculty of the Divine Life, by which, (subsequently to the understanding of God that shews and directs, and to his will that commands,) He is capable of operating externally what things soever He can freely will, and by which He does operate whatever He freely wills.

III. The measure of the Divine [Potentia] Capability is the free will of God, and that is truly an adequate measure; so that the object of the Capability may be, and indeed ought to be, circumscribed and limited most appropriately from the object of the free will of God. For whatever cannot fall under his Will, cannot fall under his Capability; and whatever is subject to the former, is likewise subject to the latter.

IV. But the Will of God can only will that which is not opposed to the Divine Essence, (which is the foundation both of his under

standing and of his will,) that is, it can will nothing but that which exists, is true and good: Hence neither can his Capability do any other. Again, since under the phrase, "what is not opposed to the Divine Essence," is comprehended whatsoever is simply and absolutely possible; and since God can will the whole of this; it follows that God [posse] is capable of every thing which is possible.

V. Those things are impossible to God which involve a contradiction, as, to make another God, to be mutable, to sin, to lie, to cause something at once to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been, &c., that this thing should be and not be, that it and its contrary should be, that an accident should be without its subject, that a substance should be changed into a pre-existing substance, bread into the body of Christ, that a body should possess ubiquity, &c. These things partly belong [impotentia] to a want of power to be capable of doing them, and partly to insanity to will to do them.

VI. But [potentia] the Capability of God is infinite; and this not only because it can do all things possible, which indeed are innumerable, so that as many cannot be enumerated as it is capable of doing, [or after all that can be numbered, it is capable of doing still more, nor can such great things [ponderari] be calculated without its being able to produce far greater; but likewise because nothing can resist it. For all created things depend upon Him as upon the efficient principle, both in their being and in their preservation: Hence omnipotence is justly ascribed to Him. VII. This can be communicated to no creature.

DISPUTATION XXIII.

ON THE PERFECTION, BLESSEDNESS AND GLORY OF GOD.

I. NEXT in order follows the Perfection of God, resulting from the simple and infinite [complexu] circuit of all those things which we have already attributed to God, and considered with the mode of pre-eminence; not that Perfection by which He has every individual thing most perfectly, (for this [præstiterunt] is the office of Simplicity and Infinity,) but that by which He has all things simply denoting some perfection in the most perfect manner: And it may be appropriately described thus, It is the interminable, and at the same time the entire and perfect possession of essence and life.

II. And this perfection of God infinitely transcends every VOL. II.

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