some sense exterior, inasmuch as they have special relation to the duties of mankind, and their external conduct in general. But when, at a subsequent period, men turned their attention from the outward to the inward, they were not long in clearly discovering the marks of an interiour uniformity and order; they detected in every mental state a complete history, its beginning and progress, its relations and end ; and thus gradually became assured of a set of subjective laws, giving guidance and support to the mind itself. And it is these, which we are now more particularly to attend to. §. 47. Mental laws may be divided into two classes. The term Law, when applied to our mental nature, is merely a designation or statement of those circumstances, according to which the general action of the mind, and the more definite exercise of its particular susceptibilities are regulated.—If we are right in giving this account of mental laws, they naturally, although they may sometimes approximate and even run into each other, resolve themselves into two classes. The first class are those, included in the first clause of the above definition, viz. such as restrict and limit the general action of the mind. We find, when we resolve our complex states of mind into their parts, that we at last arrive at certain elementary thoughts, beyond which we cannot proceed; the nature of the mind itself will not permit it to go further. All those ultimate truths also, which we come upon at almost every step in the mind's history, and which we are equally unable to explain and to analyze further, are to be reckoned among the permanently restrictive laws of our spiritual being. The same may be said of whatever can be ascertained to be necessary and exclusive conditions of the mind's action in the whole progress of its inquiries, such as the well known and indispensable conditions of time and space. The second class are those, which regulate in particular the separate susceptibilities of the mind; such, for example, as sustain and limit the associating principle, belief, and reasoning. The first class relate to the mind in gen- 48. §. Distinction between the susceptibilities and the laws It may conduce to the better understanding of this general subject and of its numerous applications, to point out here particularly the distinction between laws and susceptibilities. Although they have sometimes been confounded together, it has been owing to mere inadvertence, since a distinction so clearly exists between them. This difference may be illustrated in the case of mental association. The fact, that one state of mind is succeeded by another, that one idea calls up another, indicates a mental power or susceptibility; while the circumstances, whether more or less general, under which the exercise of this susceptibility is regulated, are more commonly and properly termed laws. The former mode of expression indicates. that inherent energy, sometimes known as the power or faculty of association, which pervades and characterizes our mental nature; the latter indicates the particular limits, within which this form of the soul's power is restrained and governed. Again, what we term belief is undoubtedly a distinct state of the mind, and of course implies the mental power. or susceptibility of believing. But is is a matter sufficiently.well known, that this power is not exerted at all times, and under all circumstances; in other words, one state of things is followed by belief, while another is not. Now LAWS OF BELIEF, in distinction from the power or susceptibility, are only general statements of those circumstances or perhaps more properly of those occasions, in which belief is found necessarily, and, as it were, from our very constitution to exist. CHAPTER THIRD. LAWS THAT LIMIT THE MIND. §. 49. Evidence of the general fact of the mind's being limited. We shall first consider the mind in those respects, in which its general action appears to be naturally and permanently limited. That there are such natural limitations and obstructions in the progress of knowledge, it is presumed, will not be doubted. Every one must be conscious of this, in some degree for himself; feeling, as we do, from time to time the struggles within us, repressed and driven back by the embankments of our nature, like the imprisoned bird, that beats the bars of its cage, and seeks flight in vain. As might be expected also, all languages bear witness to this restricted intellectual ability; for we never fail to find in them abundance of such terms as these, UNKNOWABLE, INCONCEIVABLE, INCOMPREHENSIBLE, IGNORANT, FOOLISH, and the like. Now we may be assured, that men would not have invented terms of this description, and in such numbers, unless they had been satisfied of the existence of a sound and ample cause for them. But it is not necessary to debate at length a point, on which there can hardly be supposed to be a difference of opinion. Believing, therefore, although there may be no end to the mind's journey in the practicable and allotted direction, that the pathways of knowledge are hedged up by impassible barriers in various places on the right hand and left, it will be the object of the present chapter to ascertain some of these limitations. And it may be added here, that this is the precise topic, referred to in a former section, which Mr. Locke thought of so much practical importance, and which first led him to direct his powerful intellect to the systematic study of human nature. We enter, therefore, into this discussion with the twofold encouragement of its own obvious utility, and of that philosopher's weighty authority. §. 50. Objection to this inquiry from the incompleteness of the mind's history. Nevertheless we are not ignorant of the objection, which is sometimes måde even by those, who would be disposed to admit the general correctness of what has been said, to entering at all into this subject: viz. that it is too early a period in the mind's history to determine what are its boundaries, and what are not. The mind, it is said with truth, is essentially active and inquisitive; its own nature forbids its remaining stationary, but compels it, as it were, to make constant advances even on the present theatre of being; and hence it is contended, we are utterly unable to foresee what depths it may fathom, what heights it may ascend, and what limits it may pass in future times. That there is some weight in this objection, cannot be denied; but when rightly considered, it is valid only in part. It may justly require us to be cautious in our investigations, but should not compel us to give them up altogether. We do not find, that objections of this sort deterred Locke from undertaking this inquiry. How affecting it is, to hear a man of such vast capacity, compared with the intellects of other men, acknowledging with the utmost simplicity and sincerity his mental weakness! "He, that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things, that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of matter." The distinguished metaphysician, who expresses himself in this humble way, ever sought the truth with the greatest earnestness; and what he noticed without, combined with what he felt within, sufficiently satisfied him, that some obstacles in the way of the mind's progress, although many might in the course of time be overcome, would remain insurmountable. Nor has the progress of knowledge since his time shown that conclusion to be a mistaken one. On the contrary, the history of mental efforts in all past ages, from the beginning to the present period, have tended to confirm his opinion of the mind's restricted power, and have shown, in some few instances at least, how far we may advance, and where our exertions are brought to a stand.* §. 51. The mind limited as to its knowledge of the essence or interiour nature of things. We may sometimes find ourselves unable to describe the laws, which restrict the general action and progress of the mind, with so much precision as we can those, which have relation to its particular susceptibilities; but there The whole fourth book of Mr. Locke's Essay relates to grounds of belief and the limits of our capacities. There is some reason to believe also, from the account which he gives of the way, in which he was led in these inquiries, that this book was the first written by him. On this subject, Mr. Stewart, in his Historical Dissertation, (Pr. II, §. 1,) has the following interesting remarks-" On comparing the Essay on Human Understanding with the foregoing account of its origin and progress, it is curious to observe, that it is the fourth and last book alone, which bears directly on the author's principal object In this book, it is further remarkable, that there are few, if any, references to the preceding parts of the Essay; insomuch that it might have been published separately, without being less intelligible than it is. Hence, it seems not unreasonable to conjecture, that it was the first part of the work in the order of composition, and that it contains those leading and fundamental thoughts which offered themselves to the author's mind, when he first began to reflect on the friendly conversation, which gave rise |