not possibly feel the moral correctness of this. The latter command, though enforced with almighty power, could not fail to look dark, cloudy, and diabolical. Although it should be asserted with due reverence and caution, it is undoubtedly the fact that the mind of man may sit in judgment, not only on himself and his fellow men, but on his Creator also. God himself, who formed the human mind, has decided and chosen, that men should have this power. And in proof of what has been said, how often does that glorious Being appeal to men in his own Scriptures and invite them to sit in judgment on his own doings! "Oh, my people, what have I done unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? testify against me." “Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord" Such is the language, in which the most exalted of beings condescends to address the children of men. And again He says in a tone of authority and rebuke, "Yet ye say, the way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, Oh house of Israel, is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?"* He then goes on to state the great principles of his moral government, his punishment of the wicked and his preservation of the righteous, and appeals to them as judges, whether he is not just.Such language evidently appears to be unmeaning, unless we suppose there is in man a power of judgment,a susceptibility of moral emotions and of feelings of obligation. It is an important consideration, that these powers are thus solemnly recognized by God himself, who is the author of them. He has not only ap pealed to their decisions in the present life; but on a. more solemn occasion yet to come, at the last great day, the sentence will be passed by every del'nquent himself, and he will stand condemned by his own conscience.

§. 455. Further illustrations of the same subject.

We may perhaps receive some little illustration of this subject from the case of the Atheist. The doctrine, which we are controverting, is simply this,-the foundation of feelings of moral obligation is command or law; and as

* Ezekiel 18th, 29. Micah 6th, 3. Isaiah 1st, 18.

the will of God is paramount to all other command or law, we are to look to that will for the ultimate ground and source of the scntiment of obligation -But do we not find a difficulty here in this fact, that the atheist, who knows no God, and of course no will of God, still has the sentiment or feeling of duty, as well as other men. It would be essentially unjust and false, to assert, that the atheist is destitute of conscience, or exempt from moral obligation. On the contrary he feels himself, in a multitude of instances, to be morally bound, as we may clearly learn both from his own åcknowledgements and from his conduct, which evinces, that he is often subject to a moral control. It is true, that he has contrived, by a perversion of intellect, virtually to banish God from his own Creation, where his existence and glories are so clearly displayed; but he has not been able, by any contrivance or effort whatever, to destroy in his own bosom the sentiments of right and wrong, and annul the immutability of moral distinctions.

§. 45. Moral obligation not dependent on the results of

actions.

Again, the source of moral obligation is not founded in a perception of the good or evil results of actions.-There is no doubt of its being a common doctrine, that whatever action is attended with ultimate happiness is right; and that whatever action is attended with ultimate evil or misery, is wrong. That this may be the fact is not de-, nied. On the contrary, it is undoubtedly true, that there is an established and unshaken coincidence between right and happiness, between wrong and misery. Nevertheless it is not true, that the sense of obligation is founded necessarily on the antecedent perception of such coincidence. A few remarks will help to show this.

(1) The human mind is so limited in its range, that it cannot easily estimate all the consequences of actions, and is liable to constant mistakes whenever it makes the attempt. The process would often prove a long and perplexing one, when perhaps, in many cases, a prompt and im

mediate decision would be requisite.(2) This doctrine is not extensive enough, as it would not embrace and lay the foundation of moral conduct in all classes of men. There are some men, who do not believe in a future state; and there are thousands and hundreds of thousands, including those who live in. heathen as well as in Christian lands, who, if they believe in a future existence, do not believe in a future retribution. Of course, if, in judging of the morality of actions, they are governed solely by their good or evil results, their rule of right must be the good or happiness of the present state of being; and they themselves must be the judges of what this happiness consists in. Their rule of action, therefore, necessarily resolves itself into the expediencies of this short life.

But it must be very evident, that the influence of such a system would be evil beyond expression. It would soon involve the whole world in iniquity, confusion, and turmoil. And how unreasonable it is to suppose, since it is allowed, that no man is exempt from the discharge of his duty, that God should have made such feeble and defective provision for impulses and obligations of a moral

nature.

(3) Good and evil results of actions may be regarded in the light of rewards and punishments. But certainly it seems evident, that rewards and punishments, so far from constituting obligation, presuppose it as already existing. "Rewards and punishments, says an able and cautious writer, suppose in the very idea of them, moral obligation, and are founded upon it. They do not make it, but enforce it, or furnish additional motives to comply with it.. They are the sanctions of virtue, and not its efficients. A reward supposes something done to deserve it, or a conformity to obligations subsisting previously to it; and punishment is always inflicted on account of some breach of obligation. Were we under no obligations, antecedently to the proposal of rewards and punishments, and independently of them, it would be very absurd to propose

them, and a contradiction to suppose us subjects capable of them." *

§. 457. Feelings of obligation founded on the acts of the con

science.

In view, therefore, of what has been said, we come to the conclusion, that the feelings of obligation, as no other basis of them is discoverable, are founded on the dictates of an enlightened CONSCIENCE; and that they find their origin no where else. In other words, in the economy of the mind, the emotions of approval and disapproval, which are appropriately attributed to the conscience, precede,and lay the foundation of feelings of a morally obligatory nature. And as the constitution of the mind lays itself open in this respect, we cannot fail to see how perfect and admirable it is. The senses furnish knowledge, in the first instance; then the reasoning power is brought into action; moral emotions arise in view of the various objects, that are brought before the contemplation of the intellect; and these last, occupying a high and sacred place in the interiour of our nature, are followed by feelings of obligation, which, finding a still more elevated position in the sanctuary of the mind, constitute the noblest and often the most efficacious motive, that can be presented to the human volition. What a combination of powers, operating harmoniously in their support and guidance of each other; and securing the intelligence, freedom, accountability, and virtue of man! And with what propriety can the doctrine of Scripture be asserted and enforced, that man, by means of the principles of his own constitution, is a law to himself; being fully furnished, by the operation of his various susceptibilities, with the grounds of approval & disapproval, of condemnation and acquital, of degradation and glory!

Price's Review of Questions in Morals, 2d Lond. Ed.

P, 178.

CHAPTER THIRD.

NATURE OF RIGHT OR VIRTUE.

§. 458. Origin of ideas of right and wrong.

Having emotions of moral approval and disapproval, and feelings of obligation following from them, a foundation is thereby laid for the origin of those abstract con-ceptions or ideas, which are denominated right and wrong; and are otherwise expressed by such terms as rectitude and guilt, virtue and vice. It is hardly necessary to suggest, that these abstract ideas do not in themselves involve any thing like emotion, or desire, or any other modification of mere sensibility. The notions, which men form of right and its opposite, are purely intellectual; they are the creations of the Understanding; and are entirely different from any sentient states of the mind, although there is a close connection in this particular, that the various moral feelings furnish the occasions of their existence. More properly belonging to the head than the heart, to the Intellect than the Sensibility, they are introduced here, merely in consequence of this close and essential connection. Although they are properly regarded as the spontaneous and original creations of the INTELLECT, in the exercise of its power of Suggestion, it is very obvious, that they never could have existed, independently of the antecedent existence of moral emotions and feelings. of obligation.