CHAPTER FIRST.

NATURE OF OBLIGATORY FEELINGS.

§. 443. The existence of these feelings evinced by con

sciousness.

UNDER the general head of the Sentient part of our constitution, we next proceed to consider a very important class of mental states, which, for the want of a single term expressive of them, we shall call feelings or sentiments of obligation. We cannot doubt of its being readily admitted, that these feelings belong to the Sentient constitution, in distinction from the Intellectual. It may be safely asserted on the testimony of consciousness, that they are different from the mere acts of the understanding, from mere thought, from mere intellectual perceptions. Independently of the intimations of consciousness in this particular, which of themselves decisively indicate the propriety of this arrangement, they have this important characteristic in common with other developements of the sentient nature, that they are most intimately and effectively connected with action. It must be obvious, that all intellectual states of the mind are inefficient in this respect, except so far as they arouse to action by the circuitous pro

cess of operating through the emotions, desires, volitions, &c.

Our first inquiry, although it will perhaps be considered an unnecessary waste of time, has relation to the actual and distinct existence of obligatory feelings. The existence of feelings of this description, is evinced, in the first place, by our own consciousness. We might safely appeal to the internal conviction and the recollections of any man whatever, and ask, whether there have not been periods in the course of his life, in which he has experienced a new and authoritative state of mind; a peculiar, but undefinable species of mental enforcement, which required him to perform some particular act, and to avoid doing some other act, even when his interests and his desires seemed to be averse to the requisition thus made upon him? And if so, we have here an instance of moral obligation, a feeling or sentiment of duty, the precise thing which is meant, when we say we ought to do, or ought not, to do.

Take a common, and simple illustration. A person, in passing along the streets, saw an old man sitting by the way side, who bore about him the most convincing marks of want, wretchedness, and sincerity in his applications for relief; he gave him bread, clothing, and money, conscious that it was done,not in view of any personal interest or gratification, or of any selfish object whatever, but under the impulse and guidance of this peculiar enforcement within; and if so, he then and there had a distinct knowledge of the moral sentiment or feeling under consideration. And this knowledge was from consciousness.

§. 444. Further proof from the conduct of men.

The existence of feelings of obligation is further shown by the general conduct of men.-It cannot be denied, that other motives, distinct from convictions of duty, often operate upon them. Their desires, hopes, fears, sympathies, their present and future interests all have an effect. But it would certainly argue an evil opinion of human nature altogether unwarranted, to maintain, that

they are never governed by motives of a more exalted kind. In a multitude of cases they are found to perform what is incumbent upon them, in opposition to their fears, in opposition to their sympathies, and their apparent interests. Different persons will undoubtedly estimate the amount of interested motives as greater or less, according as a greater or less portion of the good or evil of human nature has come within their own cognizance; but it is impossible, after a cautions and candid review of the principles of human action, to exclude entirely the elements of uprightness and honour. If there is any truth in histoty, there have always been found, even in the most corrupt periods of society, upright and honourable men. And if we are at liberty to infer men's character from their actions, as assuredly we are, we may assert with confidence, that there are such at the present time. But a man of true uprightness and honour is one, who acts from the sentiment of duty, the feeling of moral obligation, in distinction from motives of an inferior kind.

§. 445. Further proof from language and literature.

The existence of obligatory feelings is further proved, not only by each one's consciousness, and by the conduct of men generally, but by language and literature. In most languages and probably in all, there are terms expressive of obligation or a sense of duty. No account could be given of the progress of society, and of the situation and conduct of individuals without making use of such terms. If the words rectitude, crime, uprightness, virtue, merit, vice, demerit, right, wrong, ought, obligation, duty, and others of like import were struck out from the English tongue, (and the same might be said of other languages,) it would at once be found unequal to the expression of the phenomena, which are constantly occurring in the affairs of men. Now as these terms occur, it is rational to suppose, that they intimate something, that they have a meaning, that they express a reality. But it does not appear, how this can be said of them,

unless we admit the actual existence of obligatory feel. ings.

Turning our attention from single words and phra ses, if we enter into an examination of the literature of a language, we shall come to the same result.———A great portion of every nation's literature is employed in giving expression and emphasis to moral principles and sentiments. They find a conspicuous place in the most valuable speculations, not of professed moralists merely, but of historians, poets, orators, legislators, &c. But their frequent introduction would seem to be altogether misplaced, unsuitable, and unmeaning, if there were no real and permanent distinction between virtue and vice, between the sacred requisitions of duty and those of mere personal interest. One of the Roman historians* very happily remarks of the elder Cato, that he never performed an upright action, in order that he might have the appearance of being an upright person in the view of men, but because he could not do otherwise; (qui nunquam recte fecit, ut facere videretur, sed quia aliter facere non poterat.) Every one, who is familiar with the characteristic traits of Cato, will assent to the justness of the remark; but still it would be nugatory and unmeaning, without the existence of original principles, involving an internal and moral obligation. If any one will take the pains to peruse the writings of Tacitus in particular, he will fully see the bearing of these observations. That celebrated historian sketches, in colours dark and terrible, the pictures of cruelty and selfishness, treachery and deceit, but at the same time he diffuses over the nether horrors of flame and smoke the sunlike radiance of benevolence, patriotism,and truth. Now if you strike out from the human breast the emotions of approval and disapproval, and those feelings of obligation, which are subsequently built upon them, you necessarily strike out, not only from Tacitus, but from almost all historians of acknowledged merit, the most eloquent and ennobling passages; every thing in

Paterculus.