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it self. It is the whole soul, and not a moiety or fraction of it, which is the subject of its various feelings.

§. 34. Opinions of Buffier on the soul's indivisibility.

The sentiments of Buffier on this topic are so well expressed, and come from a writer of so much wisdom, thatthey seem to be suitably inserted in this place.—“ I cannot, he says, without a degree of folly imagine, that my being or what I call me can be divided; for, were it possible that this me could be divided in two, it would then be me and not me at the same time it would be so, as it is supposed; and would not be so, since each of the two parties must then become independent of the other one might think, and the other not; that is to say, I might think and not think at the same time; which destroys every idea of me and of myself.

"Besides, this me, and all other beings similar to this me, in whom unity is necessarily conceived, and where I cannot suppose any division without destroying their very essence, and every idea I can entertain of them, is what I call an immaterial or spiritual being; so that, by destroying its unity, you destroy its entire essence, and every idea of its existence. Divide a thought, a soul, or a mind in two, and you have no longer either thought, soul, mind? This indivisibility is, moreover, evident to me by the interior sense of what I am; and, by the efficacy of the same sentiment, I likewise learn that what I call me is not properly what I call my body, as this body may be divided both from me, and in itself; whereas, with regard to me, I cannot be divided from myself."

§. 35. The soul's immateriality indicated by the feeling of identity.

There is another somewhat striking consideration, which may aid in evincing the immateriality of the soul. It is well known that the materials, of which the human body is composed, is constantly changing. The whole bodily system repeatedly undergoes in the course of the ordinary term of man's life, a complete renovation, and

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yet we possess, during the whole of this period and amid these utter changes of the bodily part, a conciousness of the permanency, as well as of the unity of the mind. "This fact, remarks Mr. Stewart, is surely not a little favourable to the supposition of mind being a principle essentially distinct from matter, and capable of existing when its connection with the body is dissolved.

Truly if the soul, like the body, were made up of particles of matter, and the particles were in this case as in the other, always changing, we should be continually roving, as an old writer expresses it, and sliding away from ourselves, and should soon forget what we once were. The new soul, that entered into the same place, would not necessarily enter into the possession of the feelings, consciousness, and knowledge of that, which had gone. And hence we rightly infer, from an identity in these respects, the identity or continued existence of the subject, to which such feelings, consciousness, and knowledge belong. And as there is not alike identity or continued existence of the material part, we may infer again, that the soul is distinct from matter.

§. 36. The material doctrine makes man an automaton or

machine.

The doctrine, that thought is the result of material organization, and that the soul is not distinct from the body, is liable also to this no small objection, that it makes the soul truly and literally a machine. If what we term mind be in truth matter, it is of course under the same influences. But matter, in all its movements and combinations, is known to be subject to a strict and inflexible direction, the origin of which is exteriour to itself. The material universe is truly an automaton, experiencing through all time the same series of motions, in obedience to some high and authoritative intelligence; and is so entirely subject to fixed laws, that we can express in mathematical formulas not only the state of large bodies, but of a drop of water or of a ray of light; estimating minutely extension and quantity, force, velocity, and resistance.

That the mind

It is not thus with the human mind. has its laws is true; but it knows what those laws are; whereas matter does not. This makes a great difference. Matter yields a blind and unconscious obedience; but the mind is able to exercise a foresight; to place itself in new situations; to subject itself to new influences, and thus control in a measure its own laws. In a word, mind is free; we have the best evidence of it, that of our consciousness. Matter is a slave; we learn that from all our observation of it. It does not turn to the right or left; it does not do this or that as it chooses; but the subject of an overpowering allotment, it is borne onward to the appointed mark by an inflexible destiny.-If these views be correct, we see here a new reason for not confounding and identifying these two existences.

§. 37. No exact correspondence between the mental and the

bodily state.

The train of thought in the last section naturally leads us to remark further, that there is an absence of that precise correspondence between the mental and bodily state, which would evidently follow from the admission of materialism. Those, who make thought and feeling the result of material organization, commonly locate that organization in the brain. It is there the great mental excrcises, in the phraseology of materialists, are secreted, or are developed, or are brought out in some other mysterious way, by means of purely physical combination and action. Hence, such is the fixed and unalterable nature of matter and its results, if the brain be destroyed, the soul must be destroyed also; if the brain be injured, the soul is proportionally injured; if the material action be disturbed, there must be an exactly corresponding disturbance of the mental action. The state of the mind, on a fair interpretation of this doctrine, is not less dependent on that of the body, than the complicated motions of the planetary system are on the law of gravitation. But this view, whether we assign the residence of the soul to the brain or to other part of the bodily system, does not appear to be

any

accordant with fact. It is not only far from being approved and borne out, but it is directly contradicted by well attested experience in a multitude of cases.

38. §. Evidence of this want of exact correspondence.

We are desirous not to be misapprehended here. We readily grant, that the mind, in our present state of existence, has a connection with the physical system, and particularly with the brain. It is, moreover, obviously a natural consequence of this, that when the body is injured, the mental power and action are in some degree affected; and this we find to be agreeable to the facts, that come within our observation. But it is to be particularly noticed, that the results are just such as might be expected from a merc connection of being; and are evidently not such as might be anticipated from an identity of being.

In the latter case the material part could never be affected, whether for good or evil, without a result precisely corresponding in the mind. But in point of fact this is not the case. The body is not unfrequently injured, when the mind is not so; and on the other hand the soul sometimes appears to be almost entirely prostrated, when the body is in a sound and active state. How many persons have been mutilated in battle in every possible way, short of an utter destruction of animal life, and yet have discovered at such times a more than common greatness of mental power! How often, when the body is not only partially weakened, but is resolving at the hour of death into its original elements, and possesses not a single capability entire, the mind, remaining in undiminished strength, puts forth the energy and beauty of past days!

We are now speaking of injuries to our corporeal part and of bodily debility in general, but if we look to to the brain in particular, that supposed strong tower and fortress of the materialists, we shall find ourselves fully warranted in an extension of these views there. According to their system the soul, (that is, what the materialists call the soul or what they substitute for it,) possesses

not merely a bodily habitation, but a fixed and local habitation in some selected part of the body and they are understood to be agreed upon the brain, as the particular place of its residence. But the objection to their views, which in its general form has already been made, exists here in full strength. If that organization, which they hold to result in thought and feeling, have its abode in the brain, it must be diffused through the whole of that organ, or limited to some particular part. But it appears from an extensive collection of well authenticated facts, that every part of the brain has been injured, and almost every part absolutely removed, but without permanently affecting the intellectual and sentient powers. "Every part of that structure, says Dr. Ferriar in a learned Memoir, the statements of which have not, as far as we know, been controverted, has been deeply injured or totally destroyed, without impeding or changing any part of the process of thought." He remarks again, after bringing forward a multitude of undoubted facts as follows; "On reviewing the whole of this evidence, I am disposed to conclude, that as no part of the brain appears essentially necessary to the existence of the intellectual faculties, and as the whole of its visible structure has been materially changed, without affecting the exercise of those faculties, something more than the discernible organization must be requisite to produce the phenomena of thinking."

§. 39. Comparative state of the mind and body in dreaming.

The views of the two preceding sections receive some confirmation from the comparative state of the mind and body in dreaming.-In sound sleep the senses sink into a state of utter and unconscious sluggishness; the inlet to every thing external, as far as we can judge, is shut up; the the muscles become powerless, and every thing in the body has the appearance of death. It is true, the soul appears

* See the Argument against the doctrine of Materialism, addressed to Thomas Cooper, Esq. by Dr. John Ferriar, and published in the 4th volume of Memoirs of the Manchester Philosophical Society.

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