of centuries in Europe, and no more was necessary in support of any controverted opinions, than to cite something favourable from them. The followers of Des Cartes received hardly less implicitly the philosophical creed of that new master of science; not so much because they had investigated, and were convinced in view of the evidence before them, as because Des Cartes had said it. There have been teachers in religion, also in politics and other subordinate departments of science, who have had their followers for no better reason. Such prejudices have been a great hinderance to free discussion and the progress of knowledge.

The influence of authority in giving a direction to people's opinions is not limited to persons, who can truly make pretensions to some superiour wisdom; it is also frequently exercised by mere riches, titles, and outward splendour. This is often seen in republican states, where the people have the right of choosing their rulers, and of expressing their opinions on a variety of public questions. It is well, if not more than half of the people in any of the smaller corporations do not, in giving their suffrages, fall in with the sentiments, however absurd they may be, of a few individuals, who have no other claim to influence, than what their greater affluence gives them. But this is a very unreasonable prejudice. The poorer classes of the community, deprived of the adventitious aids of wealth,should set a proper value on personal character, and let it clearly appear in all cases, where they are at all capable of judging, that they have understandings, and possess and value freedom.

§. 365. Prejudices of personal friendships and dislikes.

If man were to choose a state of apathy and indifference, he would be unable to obtain it, at least permanently; it would be refused to him by the very elements, the original laws of his nature. He is destined not only to act but to feel; and his feelings in respect to others will vary, according as he has been more or less in their company, as he has received from them greater or less favours or injuries. Hence he has his sympathies and his dislikes, his favourable and unfavourable sentiments, his friends and

his opposers. And here we have another source of prejudices. It is so well understood as to have become a common saying, that it is a difficult matter to judge, with perfect impartiality, either of friends or foes. A question arises, we will suppose concerning the merit or demerit, the right or wrong in the conduct of a friend; of one, in whose favour our sympathies are strongly enlisted. In the delib-' eration upon the facts before us, which we attempt to hold, the mind is continually interrupted by the remembrance of those kind acts and excellent qualities, which have laid the foundation of our favourable partialities. They come before the eye of the judgment; we attempt to remove them, and they return again; they interrupt and cloud the clearness of its perceptions. And hence, our judg

ments prove to be wrong.

We experience the same difficulty in forming a just estimate of the character and conduct of those, for whom we entertain a personal dislike.There is a continual suggestion of acts and of qualities, which are the foundations of that dislike. The effect of this is partly to divert the mind from the question properly before it, and partly to diffuse over it a misrepresentation, which has its origin solely in our own feelings of antipathy. Our dislike interposes itself, as in the other case, between the thing to be judged of, and the susceptibility of judging, and renders the mind unable to perceive so clearly the true merits of the question, as it otherwise would.

§. 366. Prejudices of custom or fashion.

The practices of different nations, and the prevailing notions in respect to them, differ from each other; nor are those of the same nation the same at different periods.The modes of salutation in France are different from those of Russia; and those of both nations are different from the forms, which are commonly received in Oriental countries. There is no less diversity among nations in the fashions of dress, than in the methods of civility, and of polite intercourse. The dress of a Turk or of a Chinese would make but an ill figure on an Englishman; and the English

man himself would reject with contempt the obsolete and neglected fashion of his own ancestors.The authori ty of fashions extends also to political and religious ceremonies, to the regulation and management of domestic affairs, and to methods of education. No two nations are alike in all these respects; and hardly one age, or one year agrees with another.

We find in the authority of fashion or custom a fruitful source of limited and erroneous judgments. Each nation passes its censure on the customs, that prevail abroad, but are not adopted at home; each age ridicules the practices of a preceding age, that have since become obsolete. We have great reason for considering these limited and premature judgments prejudices. We see no grounds, why one nation, especially where there is nearly an equal degree of mental improvement, should set itself up as an infallible judge of propriety and impropriety in the customs and ceremonies of another nation.-But the fallacy consists not merely in ignorantly censuring others. The great body of people are found to be not more unanimous in censuring the opinions and fashions of other ages and nations, than they are, in blindly and implicitly adopting those of their own, however trivial or absurd they may be. They do, as they see others do; this method they have followed from their youth up,without exercising their own judgment; and in this way custom has become to them a 'second nature.'

§. 367. Correctives of fashionable prejudices.

Something may perhaps be proposed to alleviate that tyranny of fashion,' which has now been spoken of. Three things, (says Watts.) are to be considered, in order to deliver our understandings from this danger and slavery.

(1.) That the greatest part of the civil customs of any particular nation or age spring from humour rather than reason. Sometimes the humor of the prince prevails, and sometimes the humor of the people. It is either the

great or the many, who dictate the fashion, and these have not always the highest reason on their side.

(2.) Consider also that the customs of the same nations in different ages, the customs of different nations in the same age, and the customs of different towns and villages in the same nation are very various and contrary to each other. The fashionable learning, language, sentiments, and rules of politeness, differ greatly in different countries and ages of mankind; but truth and reason are of a more uniform and steady nature, and do not change with the fashion. Upon this account, to cure the prepossessions which arise from custom, it is of excellent use to travel and see the customs of various countries and to read the travels of other men, and the history of past ages, that every thing may not seem strange and uncouth, which is not practised within the limits of our own parish, or in the narrow space of our own life-time.

(3.) Consider yet again, how often we ourselves have. changed our opinions concerning the decency, propriety, or congruity of several modes or practices in the world, especially if we have lived to the age of thirty or forty. Custom or fashion, even in all its changes, has been ready to have some degree of ascendency over our understandings, and what at one time seemed decent, appears obsolete and disagreeable afterwards, when the fashion changes. Let us learn, therefore, to abstract as much as possible from custom and fashion, when we would pass a judgment concerning the real value and intrinsic nature of things."

§. 368. Of guarding against prejudices in early education.

We conclude the subject of prejudices, which assumes such a variety of forms, and is not even yet fully exhausted, with one or two practical remarks, naturally flowing from it, on the education of the young. Ifthe human mind be exposed to the many undue influences, which have been mentioned, it is certainly an obvious consideration, that great pains should be taken in training up the young

False notions take root in the mind at an early period; and often, before they are supposed to be planted, have gained strength and permanency. A superstitious belief in the agenty of spiritual beings in the dark, which is early received, is only one of the many false notions, with which the mind is then liable to be impressed, by means of a wrong intellectual culture. A whole host of errours, to which we have found ourselves exposed in consequence of various influences operating upon us, may have their origin at the same time; even errours of a moral, political, and religious nature. Individuals can sometimes. state, as far back as their memory can reach, circumstances, (perhaps an accidental remark, perhaps an unimportant religious ceremony,) which have had a permanent influ

ence.

Prejudices so numerous and tenacious are introduced. into the mind in childhood, that it requires much pains and time in after life to unlearn the false notions, to which we have been accustomed to render an implicit belief. The struggle against the influence, which they have acquired over us, will be found to be a severe one; and oftentimes, it is quite unsuccessful. Many persons, who have been fully aware of the extent and evil nature of the tendencies, which were given to their minds in early life, have desired to counteract and annul their influence, and have made efforts to that purpose, but without effect. The seeds, that were sown in the nursery, and had borne their fruits in youth, had taken too deep root to be eradicated in the fulness of years. The hue of the mind, whether it be a tint of beauty or deformity, has contracted the unchangeableness of the Ethiopian's skin and of the leopard's spots. We infer, therefore, that it is a part of all right education, and the duty of all, who are engaged in instructing young minds, not only to guard against the admission of any thing other than the truth, but also to guard against all such influences of whatever kind as are unfavourable to the apprehension and reception of it.