by the most obvious and easy principles of association; for instance, contiguity in place and time. These people have been very much, we may say chiefly, in the practice of associating those things, which happened at the same time, or were proximate in position. It may be thought, that mere time and place are very unimportant relations, but however that may be, they most strongly seize the notice of persons of small education; and by means of them their overflowing multitude of remembrances is kept in place. Having by almost constant exercise greatly strengthened the tendency to those associations, which exist in consequence of mere contiguity, they can very readily tell you, not only the precise place, where any thing has happened, but almost every thing, which has happened in the immediate neighborhood; not only the time, when the event occurred, but many other things, which occurred about the same period.

§. 296. Memory of men of philosophical minds.

From speaking of the power of remembrance in the uneducated, we naturally turn to persons of a reflecting, and philosophic mental character. It has often been remarked of such, that they discover a want of readiness of recollection. The servant in the family of the philosopher will be likely to know much more about the fields, and fences, and cattle of the neighbours; will be more minutely acquainted with their individual dress, and manners, and habits, than the philosopher himself. More than this, he has an aptness, an ability at remembering things of this nature, which his philosophic master evidently does not possess.Again, we suppose a battle to have been fought; persons of limited intellectual culture will tell you the precise day of the month, the exact number of troops, the names of the regiments, the amount of killed and wounded, and many trifling incidents of individuals, whether solemn or ludicrous, which are fitted subsequently to enliven the narrations of the fireside. But the phi losopher, who has read the same accounts, does not remember these particulars, and finds it a very difficult thing

to do it. But we perceive, that his mind has been profitably employed in reflections on the causes of the battle, on various striking developements of human character in its heat and bustle, and on its effects upon the happiness or misery of families and nations.

Many have imagined, that the memory of the uneducated, because it deals so much in minute particulars, is intrinsically stronger, than of others. It is, no doubt, to the multitude a more imposing species of memory, and admirably answers the purpose of those, in whom it appears. But mere contiguity in time and place, which is almost the sole principle that binds together events in the recollection of such persons, is of but small consequence in the estimation of the philosopher. He looks more deeply into the nature of things; their mere outward and incidental circumstances do not particularly arrest his attention; and consequently his knowledge is connected together by less obvious and ready, but more important principles, such as analogy, contrast, and cause and effect.

§. 297. Of the memory of the aged.

A defect of memory is often noticed in persons, who are advanced in years. Very few retain those powers of recollection, which they possessed in early days. "Age, says Ossian, is now on my tongue, and my soul has failed; memory fails on my mind."-The failure of this mental susceptibility in the aged seems to be owing to two causes, viz. the impaired state of the organs of perception, and a defect of attention.

(1) Their organs of external perception are impaired.

We find it difficult, in consequence of the failure of their sense of hearing, to converse with people, advanced in years, and it requires a great effort, both on our part and theirs, to make them understand what we say. The most conclusive arguments, and flashes of wit, and rich strains of music have in a great measure ceased to excite in them any interest.-There is a like failure of the sense of seeing also. They no longer take pleasure in the delightful aspects of creation. The waving forest, and the

gay beams of the sun, although they have not ceased to have charms for others, have but little or none for them.

(2) The second cause of the weakness of memory, of which old people complain, is a defect of attention.That mentai exercise, to which we give the name of attention, always implies desire, an emotion of interest; and without an emotion of this description, it cannot exist. But the world. (including in the term what is beautiful in nature, and what is important in the duties and callings of life.) has at last ceased to excite the emotions, which it formerly awa kened. The aged are like the prisoner, released in the period of the French revolution, from the Bastille; they find themselves, as it were, in a new creation, which pass es before them with great indistinctness, and with which they feel but little sympathy. And why should it be thought unnatural, that they should neglect in some measure that scene of things, which has already learnt to forget and to neglect them? As their organs of external percep tion have failed them, and there has also been a defect of attention, the memory, as a natural consequence, has be come powerless and broken.

It should, however, be remarked here, that, notwithstanding what has been said, aged people often recal, with great readiness and precision, the feelings and the incidents of their youth. As when a man, who has been greatly prospered, but who at last meets with sudden and disas trous reverses of fortune, finds, in this new state of things, his obsequious attendants fleeing away and turning against him, while only a few early friends remain unmoved in evil and good report; so early feelings and early associations appear to cling with a faithful fondness to the shattered intellects of the aged. The old soldier, who had a share in the American Revolution, will sit down by his fireside and describe with great particularity the scenes, where he toiled and bled, and yet be quite unable to give an account of the incidents of the preceding week.

The explanation of this trait in the mental aspects of the aged seems to be this.As a general statement, our early feelings and our early associations are the strongest.

That they should be so is not strange, since we have then entered on a state of things, which, in its essential features, is new, and which, in all its diversities of duty, and -pleasure, and danger, attracts, and excites us by continual novelty. Who can forget the plains where he wandered in early life? Who can erase from his recollection the associates of those days of wonder, activity, and hope? Who can obliterate from his heart his toils, and his sufferings, and his joys, all of which assumed a peculiar emphasis and importance, being connected with future prospects, the adversities and the successes of after life?- -These things remain, while others vanish. Such feelings, so deeply fixed in the mind, and bound together and made permanent by the strength of a mutual association, are frequently recalled; they recur to the soul in the activity and bustle of life, and in those more favoured moments, when it is given up to silent and solemn meditations. The effect of this frequent recurrence can easily be imagined. The early impressions, which are the subjects of such recurrence, become in time, if one may be allowed the expression a part of the mind itself; they seem to be woven into its existence. Hence old men, who have no eye and no hearing for the events, that are passing around them, repeat, with the greatest animation, the stories of scenes, and actions, and friendships of fifty years ago.

§. 208. Memory of persons of a rich imagination.

It is a remark of Dr. Watts, that a fine genius is often found to have a feeble memory. By a fine genius he probably understood what we commonly mean by a person of a rich imagination; that is, one, who is furnished with a rich store of images, has readiness in the perception of their congruity or incongruity with each other, and of course has great power in the formation of various new combinations.

Such a person finds a luxuriance of wealth in himself. He is continually and happily entertained with the new pictures, which his imagination creates. Hence he does not so much entertain himself with outward events; many

facts, which are particularly noticed and retained by others, pass by him unregarded; and, therefore, quickly escape from his remembrance. Montaigne (§. S.) seems to have been a person of this description; acquainted with the general principles of the sciences, possessing an exuberance of intellectual riches, but utterly incapable of remembering dates, times, places, and the numerous matters-of-fact of every day's occurrence.

Weakness of memory in persons of a rich imagination is discovered also in their reading of books. The reason of it seems to be a too great confidence in their own ability. Conscious of their own resources, they are tempted to peruse books in a hasty and careless manner, and without due attention. The result of this careless manner, both in respect to events and the sentiments of authors, is that they are but imperfectly known at first, and are very speedily forgotten. This will not appear strange, in connection with the remark at § 238, on the connection existing be tween memory and attention. The weakness of memory, therefore, in persons of rich imagination is not constitutional and permanent, but a matter of mere accident; and, for this reason, the more discreditable. When such persons have habitually taken an interest in the common affairs of life, they are found to remember their details, however unpoetical; and in their reading of authors nothing seems to be wanting but interest and attention, in order to secure them from the reproach, under which they are thought to

labour.

§. 299. On the compatibility of strong memory and good judg

ment.

By JUDGMENTS we understand here nothing more than the opinions, which we form in view of evidence; in other words, they are the results or conclusions of moral reasoning. By a person of good judgment, we accordingly mean one, who examines subjects with caution, and whose results founded on such examination, for the most part prove correct. That persons may possess, in a very high degree, the susceptibility of memory, and still be incapa