truth, is, that the mind receives the earliest parts of its ideas by means of the senses, and that, in consequence of having received these elementary thoughts, all its powers become rapidly and fully operative.

And here we come to the SECOND great source of knowledge. The powers of the mind being thus fairly brought into exercise, its various operations then furnish us with another set of notions, which, by way of distinguishing them from those received through the direct mediation of the senses, may be called, in the language of Mr. Locke, ideas of reflection, or, to use a phraseology embracing all possible cases, ideas of INTERNAL ORIGIN.

These two sources of human thought the Internal and External, however they may have been confounded by the writers last alluded to, are entirely distinct. The ideas, which arise in the mind, solely from the fact of the previous existence of certain mental operations, could not have been suggested by any thing, which takes place in the external world, independently of those operations. Of this class, some instances, with illustrations of the same, may properly be mentioned here.

§. 258. Instances of notions, which have an internal origin.

Among other notions, which are to be ascribed to the second great source, are those, expressed by the terms, thinking, doubting, believing, and certainty.-It is a matter of internal observation, (that is, of consciousness or of reflection, which are synonymous with internal observation,) that the mind does not and cannot for any length of time remain inactive. Hence there is occasion given for the origin of that idea, which we denominate THINKING.

The notion which we thus call, is framed by the mind. under these circumstances; the name is given, and nobody is ignorant as to what is meant. But then it is to be marked that its origin is wholly internal; it is not an object of touch, or taste, or sight; it is to be ascribed to the mind. itself alone and to its inherent activity, unaided by the senses or by any thing operating upon them.

Again, in the examination of some topic, which is

proposed for discussion, a proposition is stated with little or no evidence attending it, and the mind, in reference to that proposition, is brought into a position, to which we give the name of doubting. It is by no means easy, or rather it is impossible, to trace this idea directly to the senses. All we can say of it, is, that it has its origin within, and necessarily exists immediately subsequent to certain other mental states, of which we are conscious.

But then in this very instance, if the evidence be considerably increased, the mental estimation, which we form, is altered in regard it, and to this new state of the nind we give the name of belief or believing. And in case the evidence of the proposition is of a higher and more decided character, there then arises another state of the mind, which we denominate certainty.

The ideas of virtue and vice, of justice and injustice, of order, proportion, similitude, truth, wisdom, obligation, succession, cause, effect, and many others, have a like origin; at least there are none of them to be ascribed directly and exclusively to the senses.-It is cheerfully granted, that, in determining this point, it is proper to refer to the common experience of mankind, and to rely upon it. But it is believed in all these instances, (certainly in the most of them,) such a reference will be amply decisive.

Let it then be left to the candid internal examination of each individual, to determine, Whether a distinction be not rightly drawn between the origin of these ideas, and that of those, which we attribute to the senses, such as red, blue, sweet, fragrant, bitter, hard, extended, &c.? On this question, it is thought, that in general there can be but one answer, although some minds of superior order have from time to time been betrayed into errour on this subject through the love of excessive simplification.

Hence it is distinctly to be kept in mind, that there are two sources of thought and knowledge. An affection of the senses by means of external objects is the immediate occasion of one portion; the constitution of the mind and its operations are the occasions or source of the other. The one source is called External; the other Internal,

CHAPTER SECOND.

SUGGESTION.

§. 259. Import of the term suggestion and its application in

Reid and Stewart.

SOME of the cases of thought and knowledge, which the mind becomes possessed of in itself, without the direct aid of the senses, are to be ascribed to Suggestion. This word, in its application here, is used merely to express a simple, but important fact, viz, That the mind, by its own activity and vigour, gives rise to certain thoughts. Without any mixture of hypothesis, or any qualifying intimation whatever, it gives the fact, and that is all. The use of this word, as applicable to the origin of a portion of human knowledge, is distinctly proposed by Dr. Reid. In his Inquiry into the Human Mind, (Chap. 11. §. 7,) he speaks of certain notions, (for instance, those of existence, mind, person, &c,) as the "judgments of nature, judg· ments not got by comparing ideas, and perceiving agreements and disagreements, but immediately inspired by our constitution." Pursuing this train of thought, he further remarks; "It is incumbent on those, who think that these are not natural principles, [that is, notions called forth within us, independently of reasoning,] to show how we can otherwise get the notion of mind, and its faculties. Again, immediately after, he ascribes those notions, which cannot be attributed directly to the senses

on the one hand, nor to the reasoning power on the other, to an internal or mental suggestion as follows.-"I beg leave to make use of the word SUGGESTION, because I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief. I shall endeavour

to illustrate, by an example, what I understand by this word. We all know that a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind, a coach passing in the street; and not only produces the imagination, but the belief, that a coach is passing. Yet there is here no comparing of ideas no perception of agreements or disagreements, to produce this belief: nor is there the least similitude between the sound we hear, and the coach we imagine and believe to be passing.

"It is true that this suggestion is not natural and original; it is the result of experience and habit. But I think it appears, from what hath been said, that there are natural suggestions; particularly, that sensation suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel, does now exist; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature suggests to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its existence. And in like manner, as shall be shown when we come to the sense of touch, certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion, which are nowise like to sensations, although they have hitherto been confounded with them."We find similar sentiments of this learned and cautious writer in various other places.

Mr. Stewart also in his Philosophical Essays, speaks of certain mental phenomena, as attendant upon the ob

jects of our consciousness, and as SUGGESTED by them. The notions of time, number, motion, memory, sameness, personal identity, present existence, &c. he ascribes neither to the external world on the one hand, nor to the internal mental operations, of which we are conscious on the other; except so far as they are the occasions, on which the mind brings them out, or SUGGESTS them from its own inherent energy. Of the notion of DURATION for instance, he would say, I do not see it, nor hear it, nor feel it, nor become acquainted with it by means of any other of the senses; nor am I conscious of it, as I am of believing, reasoning, and imagining, &c. but it is SUGGESTED by the mind itself; it is an intimation absolutely essential to the mind's nature and action.

It will be noticed that Dr. Reid has not limited the use of the word suggestion, exclusively to those cases, which are purely internal. Nor was this necessary. Those cases, however, where suggestion is brought into exercise by occasions chiefly external, (as for instance, in forming the notion of outness or externality,) are few in number, and naturally and almost necessarily come up for consideration in treating of the separate senses. As a general statement, the occasions of its exercise are either wholly of an interiour nature, or with only a slight mixture of outward circumstances.

§. 200. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal identity.

We shall now mention a few ideas, which have this origin, without undertaking to give a complete enumeration of them.

I.-EXISTENCE. Among the various notions, the origin of which naturally requires to be considered under the head of Suggestion, is that of existence. What existence is in itself, (that is to say independently any existent being,) it would be useless to inquire. word as expressive of a mental state, it is the

purely simple idea, and cannot be defined.

of

Using the name of a The history

of its rise is briefly this. Such is our nature, that we