CHAPTER THIRTEENTH.

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION.

§. 127. The mental states divided into intellectual and

ses, or states.

sentient.

WHAT has hitherto been said has aided in preparing the way for the consideration of the mental acts, exerciAnd with the consideration of this topic, is nccessarily connected the examination of the susceptibilities or powers, to which they owe their origin, or with the action of which they are intimately combined. This is a vast subject, beset with many perplexities, but which, it is hoped, will be rendered more easy and simple, by having taken out from it, and considered separately the topics, which have hitherto come under our notice.

One cause of perplexity in the inquiries, on which we are next to enter, is, that our mental states often closely resemble cach other in their characteristics, or are much intermingled in other ways and for other causes, and that hence it is often difficult to separate and class them. But it is obviously impossible to consider them in the mass, for that would lead to utter confusion; it is impossible also to consider them individually, for that would be labour without end; there must be a classification of some kind either more or less general. With this object, therefore, in view, we make the various exercises of the mind the subject of our contemplation, and the result of this

examination, is, that we find them susceptible of a generic arrangement, the outlines of which, whatever may be true in respect to its details, have been universally detected. The arrangement to which we refer, is that of the division of the mental states into Intellectual and Sentient.

§. 128. Evidence in favour of this classification from what we observe in men generally.

We find some evidence of the propriety of this general arrangement, of this purtitioning, if we may so speak, of our mental nature, in the conduct and characters of men, as they pass under our observation. The classification in question is not merely to be found in books; it is not the work of mere scholars; but it is clearly recognized in the language and conduct of men generally. Those men without education. who merely express what they feel, without any formal attempt at analyzing their feelings, have observed, and detected, and asserted it. How common it is for them to refer to occasions, where in their own method of expressing it, their understandings were convinced, but their hearts were not affected! And do they not unconsciously indicate in such language the line of demarcation, which the Creator of the mind has drawn between its intellectual and sentient nature? Nor is this remark of trifling consequence. It is no small evidence of the existence of the generic distinction under consideration, when we find it acknowledged by the unlettered, as well as by the mere scholar. The elements of human nature were not given stintedly and by measure ; they were not apportiohed out to those, on whom the favours of rank and learning happened to be conferred, to the exclusion of the poor and ignorant, but beam in every human countenance, and speak even in the language of the outcast and degraded slave.

But there are other men, who furnish a lesson on this subject. If we look among those, who are allowedly possessed of the highest intellectual attainments and culture, we shall not unfrequently observe in two men a per

fect likeness in the intellect, but an utter discrepancy in the heart. Both possess clearness of perception, resources of knowledge, eminent powers of reasoning, and all in equal degree. What then? The heart of the one, (the SENTIEnce, if it were allowed so to speak,) is all kindness, truth, and justice; he is an Aristides, a Washington, earnestly seeking to do good, and incapable of intentionally doing wrong; while that of the other is the den and loathsome lodging place for envy, falsehood, cruely, deceit, and every evil thing.

Look at the individuals whe compose Congresses and Parliaments, and other select and established congregations of great men; take the measurement of their knowledge, the guage of their intellectual invention; and many will be found, showing the sane compass, and bearing an equality of impress. Then turn from the intellect, and look into that better and higher sanctuary of the soul, which is the residence of the feeling, the hope, the desire, the moral sentiment, and it will require no remarkable gift of perception to discover a difference in those, who in the other respect were essentially equal. One is endeavouring to crush the powerless, another is too highminded to bruise a broken reed; one acts wholly for himself, another for his country; one feels for his country. and that is all, another adds to his love of country the love of mankind; one will sell his vote for two farthings, another will sooner part with his right hand or right eye, than break his agreement with his honour and conscience.

Now we feel at liberty to build up a conclusion in view of these facts. We deem ourselves warranted in deducing the inference, that there is in man's mind a combination of nature. Something is meant when we use the word UNDERSTANDING in distinction from the HEART. There is a sentient, as well as an intellectual constitution; there are cognitive powers, and there are susceptibilities of

emotion.

§. 129. This classification frequently recognized in writers.

Although on this subject we have looked to the unlettered multitude, and men of business and action first, we are by no means to exclude mere men of letters, and to hold their testimony, in whatever way it may be given, as unimportant. Literary writers of eminence for the most part clearly recognize, either directly or indirectly, the generic arrangement, which has been proposed. It is perhaps unnecessary to make the remark, that Locke, although he did not limit himself to one class of subjects, took for his principle and prominent topic the INTELLECT; the title page of his great work intimates this; it reads, An Essay concerning Human Understanding; but Edwards, who was animated with the hope of seeing men brought nearer to their Creator, selected the higher part of human nature as the great object of his inquiries, and treated of the Will and the Affections. Mr. Stewart professedly extended his inquiries, and at some length, to both parts of our constitution. He alludes in very clear terms to the distinction between them in the introduction of his Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers. In my former work on the Human Mind (he remarks) I confined my attention almost exclusively to Man, considered as an intellectual being; and attempted an analysis of those faculties and powers, which compose that part of his nature commonly called his intellect or his understanding."

But it is not to professed writers on these subjects, that we would refer in this case; the distinction is made by authors, who cannot be supposed to have ever studied the mind as a science. The Roman Historian indicates it, when he informs us, that Mutius Scævola purposely consumed his hand in the fire, and meanwhile exhibited outwardly as little sensibility to suffering, as if his intellect were separated from the power of feeling, (quam quum velut alienato ab sensu torreret animo.) It is indicated also by a later historian of the same great nation, when he says of Cataline, (fuit magna vi animi, sed ingenio malo pravoque.) that he possessed a vigorous intellect,

but in his disposition was evil and depraved. And we might ask, What historian or poet, of any age or people, has given a faithful sketch of man for any length of time, without being compelled to recognize the same distinction, in what they so uniformly inform us of the strivings of the judgment against the passions, and of the passions against the judgment?

§. 130. Languages referred to in proof of this generic

arrangement.

It is further worthy of notice, that there is a multitude of words in the various dialects of men, which have a relation to the arrangement before us. In our own language, when the discourse relates to our sentient constitution, we employ the terms, feelings, emotions, desires, passions, affections, inclinations, and the like; but when it relates to the understanding, we employ another set of words, viz, perceptions, thoughts, notions, ideas, intellectual states, &c.It is true, there are other terms of a more general nature, (as when we speak of the states, acts, or exercises of the mind,) which are applied to both classes indiscriminately, but those, which have been mentioned, are commonly restricted in their application, and are not, as a general statement, interchanged with each other.

Well may we conclude, therefore, inasmuch as language is designed by the framers of it to be a sort of representative of the mind, that the great distinction, which has now been laid down, is well founded. The existence of these distinct classes of terms, which were not framed without an object, and without an adequate reason, cannot be accounted for, except on the ground, that there is a corresponding distinction in the mind's acts. And if there be a distinction in the acts or exercises, there is of course a distinction in the mind itself, a twofold nature, the outlines of which, we again venture to assert, will not fail to discover themselves in every individual, in whom the elements of humanity exist in so high a degree as to render him an object of notice at all.

On any other grounds, what shall we make of the ex