were no such elementary states of mind, there could be no defining in any other case; it would be merely analysis upon analysis, a process without completion, and a labour without end; leaving the subject in as much darkness as when it was begun.

§. 123. Means of obtaining a knowledge of our simple

notions.

Although nothing is more clearly settled in Mental Philosophy, than the existence of simple ideas, characterized by their inseparableness and unity, and that they are of course undefinable, the objection is sometimes made, that this doctrine leaves that part of our knowledge in great obscurity. As we are utterly unable to make them. any clearer by definition, and by merely using other words, some persons may profess not to understand what is meant by the terms, extension, solidity, heat, cold, red, sweet, unity, desire, pleasure, existence, power, and other names of our simple thoughts and feelings.If there is a difficulty here, it will be likely to remain so; we must take our nature as it is, in all its essential and original features, and are unable to alter it. But the truth is, there is no difficulty; as a general statement, the simple mental states are more clear and definite to our comprehension than others, notwithstanding their undefinableness. They are the direct offspring of nature, and it is not often that she leaves her own work unformed, darkened, and indefinite.

In those few instances, however, (for such may perhaps be found,) where there happens to be a degreee of mental obscurity, resting on them, we are able to assist the conceptions of others, by a statement of the circumstances, as far as possible, under which the simple idea exists. And having done this, we can merely refer them to their own senses, their own consciousness and personal experience, as the only teacher, from which they can expect to receive any tolerable satisfaction. Simple ideas and feelings derive both their existence and character from the constitution of the mind itself; in the event and issue of

their inquiries, the mind alone, as it comes under their own inspection, can tell them, what they are.

§. 121. Origin of complex notions and their relation to simpli.

Our simple notions, which we have thus endeavoured to explain, were probably first in origin. There are reasons for considering them as antecedent in point of time to our complex mental states, although in many cases it may not be easy to trace the progress of the mind from the one to the other. The complex notions of external material objects embrace the separate and simple notions of extension, hardness, colour, taste, and others. As these clementary parts evidently have their origin in distinct and separate senses, it is but reasonable to suppose, that they possess a simple, before they are combined together in a complex existence. Simple ideas, therefore, may justly be regarded as antecedent in point of time to those, which are complex, and as laying the foundation of them

Hence we see, that it is sufficiently near the truth, and that it is not improper, to speak of our complex ideas, as derived from, or made up of simple ideas. This is the well known language of Mr. Locke on this subject; and when we consider how much foundation there is for it in the constitution and operations of the human mind, there is good reason for retaining it.

Although purely simple ideas and emotions are few in number, vast multitudes of a complex nature are formed from them. The ability, which the mind possesses of originating complex thoughts and feelings from elementary ones, may be compared to our power of uniting together the letters of the alphabet in the formation of syllables and words.

§. 125. Of the precise sense in which complexness is to be

understood.

But while we distinctly assert the frequent complexness of the mental affections, it should be particularly kept in mind, that they are not to be regarded in the light of a material compound, where the parts, although it may

sometimes appear to be otherwise, necessarily possess no higher unity than that of juxtaposition, and of course can be literally separated from each other, and then put together again. There is nothing of this kind; neither putting together, nor taking asunder, in this literal and material sense. But if our thoughts and feelings are not made up of others, and are not complex, in the material sense of the expressions, what then constitutes their complexness? This inquiry gives occasion for the important remark, that complexness in relation to the mind is not literal, but virtual only. What we term a complex feeling is in itself truly simple, but at the same time is equal to many others and is complex only in that sense. Thought after thought, and emotion following emotion, passes through the mind; and as they are called forth by the operation of the laws of association, many of them necessarily have relation to the same object. Then there follows a new state of mind, which is the result of those previous feelings, and is complex in the sense already explained. That is to say, it is felt by us to possess a virtual equality to those separate antecedent thoughts and emotions. Our simple feelings are like streams coming from different mountains, but meeting and mingling together at last in the common centre of some intermediate lake; the tributary fountains are no longer separable; but have disappeared, and become merged and confounded in the bosom of their common resting place. Or they may be likened to the cents and dimes of the American coinage, tens and hundreds of which are represented by a single EAGLE; and yet the eagle is not divided into a hundred or thousand parts, but has as much unity as the numerous pieces, for which it stands.

The language, which expresses the composition and complexity of thought, is, therefore, to be regarded as wholly metaphorical, when applied to the mind, and is not to be taken in its literal meaning. We are under the necessity of employing in this case, as in others, language which has a material origin, but we shall not be led astray by it, if we carefully attend to what has been said, and endeavour

to aid our conception of it by a reference to our internal experience.

§. 126. Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind.

The subject of the preceding section will be the better understood by the consideration of Analysis as applicable to the mind. As we do not combine literally, so we do not untie or separate literally; as there is no literal complexness, so there is no literal resolution or analysis of it. Nevertheless we have a meaning, when we speak of analyzing our thoughts and feelings. And what is it? What are we to understand by the term analysis?

Although this subject is not without difficulty, both in the conception, and in the expression of it, it is susceptible of some degree of illustration.-It will be remembered, that there may be analysis of material bodies. The chemist analyzes, when he takes a piece of glass which appears to be one substance, and finds, that it is not one, but is separable into silicious and alkaline matter. He takes other bodies and separates them in the like manner; and whenever he does this, the process is rightly called analysis.

same.

Now we apply the same term to the mind; but the thing expressed by it, the process gone through, is not the All we can say is, there is something like this. We do not resolve and separate a complex thought, as we do a piece of glass or other material body into its parts; we are utterly unable to do it, if we should seriously make the attempt; every mental state is in itself and in fact simple and indivisible, and is complex only virtually. Complex notions are the results, rather than the compounds of former feeling; and though not literally made up of parts, have the relation to them, which any material whole has to the elements composing it; and in that particular sense may be said to comprehend or embrace the subordinate notions. Mental analysis accordingly concerns merely this relation. We perform such an analysis, when, by the aid of our reflection and consciousness, we are able to indicate those separate and subordinate feelings, to which, in our conception of it, the complex mental state is virtually equal.

The term GOVERNMENT, for instance, expresses a complex feeling; we may make this feeling, which is in fact only one, although it is virtually more than one, a subject of contemplation, and we are said to analyze it, when we are able to indicate those separate and more elementary notions, without the existence and antecedence of which, it could not have been formed by the mind. We do not literally take the complex state in pieces, but we designate other states of mind which, every one's knowledge of the origin of thought convinces him, must have preceded it, such as the ideas of power, right, obligation, command, and the relative notions of superiour and inferiour.