played in concert, and, as I was informed, perfectly in tune, when I have been so absent, that, except at the beginning, I did not recollect that I had been playing at all.”

In this case it was necessary to establish an association between certain positions of the fingers and the emission of certain sounds, indicated by the musical notes. The union thus formed was at first both weak, and slow and lingering in its results. It gradually acquired strength and facility by repetition; that is, a HABIT of association was formed.

But there may be not only a habit of association, such as is evident in the instances, which have been now mentioned; the results of this law are found also in sensation and perception, in imagination and reasoning, and in other parts of our purely intellectual nature, as we shall be led to see in the progress of our inquiries.

§. 119. Application of this law to feelings or emotions.

The existence of the same great law of our nature may be detected also in the operations of the emotions and passions. An unfavourable suspicion is indulged by one individual in respect to another; this suspicion, instead of being effectually examined and checked, is permitted to return; it often arises, and is found to gain strength from the mere repetition, until it is converted, by the accession of strength it has received, into positive dislike, and sometimes into hatred.-The feeling of benevolence is subjected to the same general law. If this feeling be exposed to a continued system of repression, it becomes so broken down and weakened, that at last objects of suffering entirely cease to affect us. But on the contrary, if it be indulged, it will gain strength; it will become more and more ready and effective in its operation.-The case of the philanthropic Howard may be regarded as a proof of this. The feeling of benevolence was undoubtedly strong, when he first set out on his great and noble employment of visiting prisons and prisoners. But the record of his life is believed to justify the assertion, that the feeling increased by repetition, that it grew brighter and bright

er, more and more intense, until, like the fire of the Vestals, it burnt perpetually in his bosom.

It is happy for us, in the inquiries of mental philosophy, if we can confirm what inquisitive men have been able to discover in their closets by an insight into the mental history of common life; by a reference to the experiences, habits, and prejudices of those, who make no pretensions to skill in books. Nor are confirmations of the principles of this science less valuable, when they are given by scholars, whose calling it is to write upon other subjects, but who at times let fall an incidental testimony in respect to them. Thus in a work of the first President Adams is the following passage, which confirms the views of this section; "The passions are all unlimited; nature has left them so; if they could be bounded, they would be extinct, and there is no doubt they are of indispensible importance in the present system. They certainly increase too, by exercise, like the body; the love of gold grows faster than the heap of acquisition; the love of praise increases by every gratification, till it stings like an adder and bites like a serpent, till the man is miserable every moment he does not snuff the incense; ambition strengthens at every advance, and at last takes possession of the whole soul so absolutely, that the man, sees nothing in the world of importance to others, or himseff, but in his object."

*Adam's Defence of the Constitutions of the United States, Vol. I. p. 129-Philad. Ed.

CHAPTER TWELFTH.

SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OF MENTAL

STATES.

§. 120. Origin of the distinction of mental states as simple and complex.

BEFORE leaving the subject of those more general laws by which the action of the mind is so essentially sustained and guided, there remains one topic further to be briefly examined: it is the existence of our mental states as Simple and Complex. This subject, which has been more than once already alluded to, and which will hereafter be frequently made the basis of remarks, holds a prominent place in the writings of Mr. Locke. He early introduces it into the Essay on the Understanding, and seems to recur to it with peculiar pleasure; frequently separating thought and feeling into their elementary parts, balancing one state of mind with another, and estimating their comparative value. It cannot, therefore, be passed by without some examination, and perhaps no opportunity will present itself more favorable on all accounts than the present. And in truth, if the views which are to be maintained on this subject be correct, it is no misapplication of language, although it may have the appearance of being an uncommon phraseology, to speak of the principle involved in them, as a law of our mental

⚫ nature.

On entering into this subject, the first inquiry is, Whether the consideration of our mental states as simple

and complex is a just and a proper one? And in reference to this inquiry, it is an obvious remark, that, in looking at our thoughts and feelings, as they continually pass under the review of our internal observation, we readily perceive, that they are not of equal worth; we do not assign to them the same estimate; one state of mind is found to be expressive of one thing only, and that thing, whatever it is, is precise, and definite, and inseparable; while another state of mind is found to be expressive of, and virtually equal to many others. And hence we are led not only with the utmost propriety, but even by a sort of necessity, to make a division of the whole body of our mental affections into the two classes of SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Nature herself makes the division; it is one of those characteristics, which gives to the mind, in part at least, its greatness; one of those elements of power, without which the soul could not be what it is, and without a knowledge of which it is difficult to possess a full and correct understanding of it in other respects.

§. 121. Of the general nature of simple mental states.

We shall first offer some remarks on those mental states, which are simple, and shall aim to give an understanding of their nature, so far as can be expected on a subject, the clearness of which depends more on a reference to our own personal consiousness, than on the teachings of others.

Let it be noticed then in the first place, that a simple idea CANNOT BE SEPARATED INTO PARTS.-It is clearly implied in the very distinction between simplicity and complexity, considered in relation to the states of the mind, that there can be no such separation, no such division. It is emphatically true of our simple ideas and emotions, whether the remark will hold good of any thing else or not, that they are one and indivisible. Whenever you can detect in them more than one element, they at once lose their character of simplicity and become complex, however they may have previously appeared. Inseparableness consequently is their striking characteristic; and

it may be added, that they are not only inseparable in themselves, but are separate from every thing else. There is nothing, which can stand as a substitute for them where they are, or represent them where they are not; they are independent unities, constituted exclusively by the mind itself, having a specific and positive character, but nevertheless known only in themselves.

§. 122. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition.

Let it be observed, in the second place, that our simple notions CANNOT BE DEFINED.-This view of them follows necessarily from what has been said of their oneness and inseparableness, compared with what is universally understood, by defining. In respect to definitions it is undoubtedly true, that we sometimes use synonymous words for the same thing, and give it the name of defining, but it is not properly such. It is expected in defining, and is implied in the meaning of the term itself, that the subject will be made clearer, but this is never done directly by the use of synonymous terms, and oftentimes is not done by them in any way.

In every legitimate definition, the idea, which is to be defined, is to be separated, as far as may be thought necessary, into its subordinate parts; and these parts are to be presented to the mind for its examination, instead of the original notion, into which they entered. This pro

cess must be gone through in every instance of accurate defining; this is the general and authorized view of definition; and it is not easy to see, in what else it can well consist.

But this process will not apply to our simple thoughts and feelings, because if there be any such thing as simple mental states, they are characterized by inseparableness and oneness. And, furthermore, if we define ideas by employing other ideas, we must count upon meeting at last with such as shall be ultimate, and will reject all verbal explantion; otherwise we can never come to an end in the process.-So that the simple mental affections are not only undefinable in themselves; but, if there