lieving, that such men as Hannibal and Caesar have ever ́existed.

With the great mass of mankind the exclusion of testimony as a ground of belief would be the means of depriving them of the greater part of what they now know. The vast world would be only what they themselves see, an ORBIS TERRARUM, bounded by the narrow range of their native hills; the renowned men and deeds of the world would be summed up in the persons and acts of the private circle of their acquaintances; myriads of human beings, tribes and nations of men, uncounted abodes of life and numberless works of genius would virtually pass away and be lost. Their condition would be less favourable than that of Virgil's shepherd, who believed in the existence of the Imperial City, the reports of which had reached him in his solitudes, and only mistook in comparing great things with small, and in supposing it to be like those humble villages of Mantua, where he had tended his flocks.

§. 87. Of the various explanations of the origin of confidence in testimony.

Admitting the fact, that men place great confidence in testimony, and that without such confidence one principal source of knowledge would be shut up, a question nevertheless arises here, What is the ground of this reliance? In some points of view this inquiry is probably of less importance than the mere question of the fact; still the subject cannot be wholly neglected, consistently with the desire of giving a succinct view at least of the mind in all its parts.

It is proper to remark first, however, that the credence or reliance in question exhibits itself at a date earlier than any period our recollection goes back to ; and, therefore, it is impossible to explain the grounds of it with absolute certainty. That provision has in some way been made for a belief in the declarations of our fellow beings, is a fact; and that it takes effect very early in life, is a fact

also; but further than this, we can only offer explanations more or less probable.

Having made this remark, we are prepared to observe, that a number of explanations, as might be expected, and differing more or less from each other, have been given. One is, that credence in testimony is natural or constitutional; in other words is an elementary and original tendency of our being. The advocates of this opinion maintain, that the very nature of our mental constitution, independently of the suggestions of reasoning and experience, leads us to believe what men assert. We are so constituted, that the very first sound of the human voice, which reaches us, calls into action a disposition on our part to admit the truth of whatever intelligence it con

veys.

In support of this view, which has in its favor the names of Reid and Campbell among others, reference is made to what we observe in children. In the earliest period of life, as soon as the first gleams of intelligence are visible, they look with hope and fondness to those, who support them; there seems to be no doubt, no suspicion, no want of confidence. This strong reliance discovers itself from time to time, as they advance towards youth; and, in the whole of the early part of our existence, is so distinct, strong, and operative, that men have given to it a specific name, in order to distinguish it from the more chastened credence of riper years. We speak of the caution and the convictions of manhood, and of the simplicity and CREDULITY of children.

It is further contended, that the principle of a natural reliance on the declarations of our fellow beings is involved in, and is indispensable to the propensity, which all philosophers admit man to have for society. This propensity will not be passed by without remark at some future time. It will suffice to observe here, that man is born in society, and is never out of it; society is his element; and a state of nature in the literal sense of the terms is only imaginary. When we think, therefore, of the wise Being, from whom man comes, and who cannot

be supposed to have placed him in his present situation without foresight and intention, we naturally conclude, that he is, and ever was designed for society, and that he is made meet for his destination.

But what is implied in a meetness for living together? What is requisite to preserve the bond, that binds in one families, and neighbourhoods, and states? Among other things, very evidently the principle in question; a confidence in men, a reliance on their statements.

§. 88. Connection of a reliance on testimony with a disposi

tion to utter the truth.

Another explanation of the origin of the principle of credence, and somewhat different, has been given. The train of thought is this.-It requires but a little examination of ourselves to become satisfied, that it is according to the nature of men to speak the truth. Every person must be supposed to feel, that lying is not accordant with the original principles of his being; that every falsehood he tells degrades and diminishes him in his own eyes; that truth is the natural and appropriate result of the mind. This conviction is one of the earliest we have? but there is another not less early, and perhaps still more so in its origin, viz. our belief in the uniformity of the laws of

nature.

Combining these two together, we are able to generalize, as it were, our own character. Sustained by the primary truth which has just been referred to, we are led to conclude, that what is humanity in ourselves is human nature in all, in whom we perceive the same outward likeness; in other words we promptly and unfailingly recognize in our own love of veracity a distinctive feature in the mental character of our fellow beings. Under these circumstances a reliance on human testimony is unavoidable. And it may be added, that this reliance, supposing it to have the origin, which has now been stated, exists and operates at a period so early as to answer all the purposes requisite in the forming and support of society.

§. 89. This reliance greatly confirmed by experience.

Others again ascribe the origin of the credence, which we give to testimony, to experience; that is to say, to our observation of a conformity in the reports of men to the facts alledged by thein. Men make assertions; we find them to be true, and in this way we learn or acquire a confidence. But the difficulty is in reconciling this explanation with the very early period of life, in which the credence in question is known, in a greater or less degree, to manifest itself.

But whether this explanation of the origin of our reliance on testimony be admissible or not; it is certain, that experience or observation has much to do in strengthening it. At a period further back than we can now remember, we heard declarations, which our experience but seldom, and perhaps never found to be untrue. The truth was poured into our ears by the voice of affection; it became associated with parental love; as we look back we find it interwoven with all our earliest recollections, and inseparable from whatever we enjoyed, honoured, and reverenced.

If, therefore, reliance on men's testimony be truly a plant, naturally springing up in the soil of the human heart, it will be found to be nourished and sustained not only by experience, but by the influence of the most sacred remembrances.

§. 90. Objections to our reliance on testimony.

After all it may be inquired, whatever may be the fact of our reliance on testimony or of the origin of the same, whether this reliance be justly and properly placed? · And in support of this inquiry, it may no doubt be asserted as an undeniable fact, that we are liable to be led into mistakes by the statements of our fellow men. This objection to the views, which have been given, merits some attention; and the answer to it may be summed up in two particulars.

FIRST the proportion of cases of deception, com

pared with those where we are not deceived, is very small. Few persons are perhaps fully aware, to what extent, and in what numberless instances we rely upon the information and the assertions of others. "Every hour of our lives, (says Dr. Paley, Moral Philos. Bk. III, CH. V.) we trust to, and depend upon others; and it is impossible to stir a step, or, what is worse, to sit still a moment, without such trust and dependence. I am now writing at my ease, not doubting, (or rather never distrusting, and therefore, never thinking about it,) but that the butcher will send in the joint of meat, which I ordered; that his servant will bring it, that my cook will dress it; that my footman will serve it up; and that I shall find it upon the table at one o'clock. Yet have I nothing for all this but the promise of the butcher, and the implied promise of his servant and mine. And the same holds of the most important, as well as the most familiar occurrences of social life."

But are we wrong in relying on the declarations, both implied and express, in such cases as this, and in others similar? Certainly not. We may be deceived and disappointed sometimes, but not often, in comparison with the whole number of cases where we place reliance. Men are naturally disposed to speak the truth; it is much easier than to speak what is not true, for truth is at hand, but the practice of prevarication and mis-statement requires labour, and invention, besides conflicting with the general estimate of human character, and jarring violently upon every honourable sentiment within us. So capable is this view of being sustained, that even those men, who have brought upon themselves the infamy of being considered liars, probably utter the truth an hundred times, where they utter a falsehood once.

§. 91. Further remarks on this objection.

SECOND; Admitting, that we are liable to be led astray by means of testimony, still it is in our power, and is our duty to take suitable precautions against this liability, as in other cases. The errours, into which we are some