er or less degree of credence according to circumstances. But if the narrator asserts, that he saw or heard it with his own eyes or ears, that the affair actually came under the cognizance of his own senses, every body deems such an assertion enough; it is not thought important to inquire farther. But certainly if men believe in their neighbours for this cause, they would believe in themselves for the same cause; if they rely without hesitation on the sight and hearing of others, not less would, they rely on their

own.

§. 75. The belief arising from the senses may be considered in two respects.

But it is necessary, in order to have a correct conception of this subject, to make a more particular statement.

It will readily occur, that what we term the senses, without delaying to give a specific explanation of them here, are merely forms of bodily organization; they are in themselves utterly exclusive of any thing of an intellectual kind; and therefore, are to be regarded only as the instrument or medium of new mental states. Having premised this, we are prepared to remark further, that, by the constitution of our natures, every affection of the senses, whether from a material or any other cause, is followed by a corresponding affection or state of the mind. The belief, therefore, of which the senses are the law and the occasion, may be considered in two respects.

In the first place there is a belief attendant on the new feelings, which are thus occasioned, and which has particular reference to those feelings; we believe them to exist; and, as they are the direct subjects of our consciousness, there is neither doubt nor disagreement in this particular. From the nature of the case, all our sensations must be precisely such, both in kind and intensity, as we feel them to be. It is the actual feeling, and nothing else, which constitutes the sensation; and it bears a different name from a multitude of other feelings, not so, much in consequence of a difference in itself, as in its immediate cause or antecedent.

In the second place there is a belief also, and perhaps not less strong and decisive, which has relation not to the mere feelings themselves, but to external objects. It is this in particular, which we have reference to, when we speak of the senses as a law of belief. The new feelings, following an affection of the senses, are in some sense the occasions, on which the active and curious mind. moves out of the world of its own spiritual and immaterial existence, and becomes acquainted with matter. It is somewhat here as in the reading of a book. When we read, nothing but certain marks or lines, and arranged in a particular, order, are directly presented to our senses; but we find them connected with new states of mind utterly distinct from the direct impression they make. A piece of paper, written upon with these inky delincations, becomes to the soul a sign of the most various and exalted ideas; and in like manner, in the permanent ordering of our mental nature, it is found to be the case, that certain new affections of the mind, provided they are caused by means of the senses, become the signs of various existences, which are wholly diverse from the feelings themselves. We experience the feelings, which all admit to be in themselves neither archetypes nor resemblances of any thing whatever, which is external to the soul; and then at once we become acquainted with a vast multitude of objects, that would otherwise have remained unknown to us; with trees and fields and waters, with the melody of birds and the sounds of the elements, with the sun and moon and stars of the firmanent, and with all the forms and beauties and glories of creation.

§. 76. Objection to reposing confidence in the senses.

As has been remarked, the objects, of which our sensations are in this way the signs, are attended with belief. On the authority of such feelings as are immediately consequent on an affection of the senses, all mankind, if the evidence of their general conduct and of their express declarations is to be regarded, believe in those objects, as having a distinct and real existence, as having

forms, properties, and relations. Nevertheless without denying the fact of this general reliance on the senses as a ground of belief, an objection has been made to its being well placed. The objection, stated in a few words, is this; That our senses sometimes deceive us, and lead us into mistakes.

In support of the objection, such instances as the following are brought forward. The sun and moon appear to the spectator on the earth's surface to be a foot or two in diameter, and little more than half a mile high; a strait stick, thrust into the water, appears to us crooked, as seen by the eye in that position; a square tower at a distance is mistaken for a round one; a piece of ice for a stone; a brass coin for a gold one. Nor are such mistakes to be ascribed solely to the sense of sight; they are not unfrequently committed, when we rely on the inti- mations of the taste and smell, the touch and hearing.

Various facts of the above kind have been, brought forward to discredit the senses, and to prevent a reliance on them. It is not necessary to extend the enumeration of them, as these will serve for a specimen of the whole. It may be proper to add, however, that we are reminded also of our dreams, and of the acknowledged fact, that whatever is the subject of them often appears as well defined to our perceptions as what takes place, when we are awake; and yet there is nothing actually seen or heard.

§. 77. The senses imperfect rather than fallacious.

That there are some apparent grounds for the objection, which has been made to a full reliance on the testimony of the senses, it is not necessary to deny. Nevertheless the great mass of the alledged fallacies originating from this cause, notwithstanding the perplexities they have occasioned Malebranche and his predecessors and followers in the same path, admit of a satisfactory explanation.

But before entering into particulars, it is requisite to make the general remark, that the senses are more prop

erly imperfect than fallacious; and that they lead us astray, not so much by their own direct action, as in consequence of our expecting too much of them. Now if we keep this in view, and moderate and chasten our expectations by the evidently limited nature of the senses, we shall find less to complain of.

Among other things should it be kept in mind, that each sense acts in its own allotted sphere, and can be auxiliary to the enlargement of our knowledge only within the limits of that sphere. Accordingly, in order to a correct result in any particular case, there may sometimes be need of a combined action; there may be need of the testimony of other senses. In many cases, where we suppose ourselves to be led into mistakes by the sense of sight, we may obtain a more correct estimation by calling in the aid of the touch. And we are permitted, and we may say, required, to carry out and complete the intimations of the senses by the deductions of reasoning. If the bodily eye alone be unable to give us a correct idea of the sun and moon, the eye of the mind may rightly be called in to its assistance. By this means we cannot only indicate the size of those-bodies, but mark out the path of their motion; and thus not only seeing those things, which actually exist, but those, which are to be hereafter, we can predict their position and appearance, before that position and those appearances happen.

§. 78. Some alledged mistakes of the senses owing to
want of care.

If the course, pointed out in the last section, were always followed, the mistakes we are exposed to would be less frequent. But even when we refer to all the senses, and combine with this reference the deductions of reasoning, we may still err from want of care. Beyond all question some of the mistakes, ascribed to the senses, are owing topremature inferences from them; to a want of caution, discrimination, and full inquiry.

This particular subject is illustrated as follows by Dr.

Reid.-"Many things called the deceptions of the senses are only conclusions rashly drawn from the testimony of the senses. In these cases the testimony of the senses is true, but we rashly draw a conclusion from it, which does not necessarily follow. We are disposed to impute our errors rather to false information than to inconclusive reasoning, and to blame our senses for the wrong conclusions we draw from their testimony.

"Thus, when a man has taken a counterfeit guinea for a true one, he says his senses deceived him; but he lays the blame where it ought not to be laid: for we may ask him, did your senses give a false testimony of the colour, or of the figure, or of the impression? No. But this is all that they testified and this they testified truly. From these premises you concluded that it was a true guinea, but this conclusion does not follow; you erred therefore, not by relying upon the testimony of sense, but by judging rashly from its testimony. Not only are your senses innocent of this error, but it is only by their information that it can be discovered. If you consult them properly, they will inform you that what you took for a guinea is base metal, or is deficient in weight, and this can only be known by the testimony of sense.

"I remember to have met with a man who thought the argument used by Protestants against the Popish doctrine of transubstantiation, from the testimony of our senses, inconclusive; because, said he, instances may be given where several of our senses may deceive us: how do we know then that there may not be cases wherein they all deceive us, and no sense is left to detect the fallacy? I begged of him to know an instance wherein several of our senses deceive us. I take, said he, a piece of soft turf, I cut it into the shape of an apple; with the essence of apples, I give it the the smell of an apple; and with paint, I can give it the skin and color of an apple. Here then is a body, which if you judge by your eye, by your touch, or by your smell, is an apple.

"To this I would answer, that no one of our senses deceives us in this case. My sight and touch testify that it