Book foever to the prince. How then can we reconcile the fecurity of the government, with that of the prince's perfon?

ས.

Chap. 14.

Obferve how induftriously the Ruffian government endeavours to temper its arbitrary power, which it finds more burthenfome than the people themselves. They have broke their great bodies of troops, mitigated criminal punishments, erected tribunals, entered into a knowledge of the laws, and inftructed the people. But there are particular causes, that will probably oblige them to return to the very mifery which they now endeavour to avoid.

Синише

Religi

In those states religion has more influence than any where elfe; it is a fear added to fear. In Mahometan countries it is partly from their religion that the people derive the furprizing veneration they have for their prince.

It is religion that amends in fome measure the Turkish conftitution. The fubjects who have no attachment of honor to the glory and grandeur of the state; are attached to it by the force and principle of religion.

Of all defpotic governments, there is none that labours more under its own weight, than that wherein the prince declares himfelf the proprietor of all the lands and heir to all his subjects. Thence the neglect of agriculture arifes; and if the prince intermeddles likewife in trade, all manner of industry is ruined.

Under this fort of government nothing is repaired (See Ri- or improved (8). Houses are built only for the necaut, State of the Ot ceflity of habitation, there is no fuch thing as digging of ditches, or planting of trees; every thing Empire, p. is drawn from, but nothing reftored to the earth;

toman

195.

the

the land lies untilled, and the whole country becomes Book a defert.

Is it to be imagined that the laws which abolish the property of land and the fucceffion of eftates, will diminish the avarice and cupidity of the great? By no means. They will rather inflame this cupidity and avarice. The great men will be prompted to use a thousand vexatious methods, imagining they have no other property than the gold and filver which they are able to feize upon by violence or to conceal.

V. Chap. 14.

1

the inheri

To prevent therefore the utter ruin of the state, the avidity of the prince ought to be moderated by fome established cuftom. Thus in Turky the prince is fatisfied with the right of three per cent. on the value of inheritances (i). But as he gives the great- (i) See coneft part of the lands to his foldiery, and difpofes cerning of them as he pleases, as he feizes on all the eftates of the officers of the empire at their deceafe, as he the Turks, has the property of the eftates of those who die with- Ancient out male iffue, and the daughters have only ufufruct, it thence follows that the greateft part the property of the country is poffeffed in a pre- the Ottocarious manner.

the

tances of

and modern

Sparta. of see alio

Ricaut on

man Em

By the laws of Bantam † the king feizes on the pire. whole inheritance, even wife, children, and habitation. In order to elude the cruelleft part of this law, they are obliged to marry their children at eight, nine, or ten years of age, and fometimes younger, to the end that they may not be a wretched part of the father's fucceffion.

+ Collection of Voyages that contributed to the establishment of the Eaft India company, tom. 1. The law of Pegu is lefs cruel; if there happen to be children, the king fucceeds only to two thirds. ibid. tom. 3, P. I.

Воок
V.

Chap. 14

conftituti

In countries where there are no fundamental laws, the fucceffion to the empire cannot be fixt. The crown is then elective by the prince either in his own or in fome other family. In vain would it be to establish here the fucceffion of the eldest fon; the prince might always chuse another. The fucceffor is declared by the prince himself, or by a civil war. Hence a defpotic ftate is, upon another account, more liable than a monarchical government to diffolution.

As every prince of the royal family has an equal capacity to be chofen, hence it follows that the prince who afcends the throne, ftrangles immediately his brothers, as in Turky; or puts out their eyes, as in Perfia; ot bereaves them of their understanding, as in the Mogul's country; or if these precautions are not used, as in Morocco, the vacancy of the throne is always attended with a horrid civil war.

(f) See the By the conftitutions of Ruffia (f) the Czar may different chufe who he has a mind for his fucceffor, whether ons, efpe- in his own or in a ftrange family. Such a fetcially that tlement produces a thousand revolutions, and of 1722. renders the throne as tottering as the fucceffion is arbitrary.

The order of fucceffion being one of those things which are of most importance to the people to know; the beft is that which moft fenfibly ftrikes them, fuch as a certain order of birth.

A fettlement of this kind puts a ftop to intrigues, and ftifles ambition; the mind of a weak prince is no longer inflaved, nor is he made to fpeak his will as he is just expiring.

When the fucceffion is established by a fundamental law, only one prince is the fucceffor, and his brothers have neither a real nor apparent right to

difpute

difpute the crown with him. They can neither pretend to, nor take any advantage of the will of a father. There is then no more occafion to confine or kill the king's brother than any other fubject.

But in defpotic governments, where the prince's brothers are equally his flaves and rivals, prudence requires that their perfons be secured; especially in Mahometan countries where religion confiders victory or fuccefs as a divine decifion in their favour ; so that they have no fuch thing as a monarch de jure, but only de facto.

There is a far greater incentive to ambition in countries where the princes of the blood are sensible that if they do not afcend the throne they must be either imprisoned or put to death, than amongst us, where they are poffeffed of fuch a fituation, as may fatisfy, if not their ambition, at least their moderate defires.

BOOK

V. Chap. 14.

The princes of defpotic governments have always perverted the use of marriage. They generally take a great many wives, especially in that part of the world where abfolute power is in fome measure naturalized, namely Afia. Hence they come to have fuch a multitude of children, that they can hardly have any great affection for them, nor the children for one another.

The reigning family resembles the state; it is too weak itself, and its head too powerful; it seems very numerous and extenfive, and yet is fuddenly extinct. Artaxerxes (2) put all his children to death for con- (*) See Juffpiring against him. It is not at all probable that tin. fifty children should confpire against their father, and much less that this confpiracy fhould be owing to his having refufed to refign his concubine to his

Boox eldeft fon.

V.

Chap. 14,

& 15.

More natural is it to believe that the whole was an intrigue of thofe oriental feraglios, where artifice, treachery, and deceit reign in filence, involved in thick obfcurity; where an old prince, grown every day more infirm, is the first prisoner of the palace.

After what has been faid, one would imagine that human nature should perpetually oppofe a defpotic government. But notwithstanding the love of liberty, fo natural to mankind, notwithstanding their innate deteftation of force and violence, moft nations are fubject to this very government. This is eafily accounted for. In order to form a moderate government, it is neceffary to combine the feveral powers, to rule, temper, and fet them in motion, to give, as it were, ballaft to one in order to enable it to refift another. This is a master-piece of legislation, rarely produced by hazard, and feldom attained by prudence. On the contrary, a defpotic government offers itself, as it were, at first fight; it is uniform throughout; and as paffions only are requifite to establish it, this is what every capacity may reach.

CHAP. XV.

The fame Subject continued.

N warm climates, where defpotic power generally prevails, there is an earlier fenfibility, as well (*) See the as an earlier extinction of the paffions (); the underbook of ftanding is fooner ripened; they are in lefs danger of lative to fquandering away their fortunes; there is lefs facility the nature in diftinguishing themfelves in the world; lefs comof the cli- munication between young people who are confined

laws as re

mate.

at