Воок
V.

Chap. 8.

Every fort of afylum in oppofition to the execution of the laws deftroys ariftocracy, and is foon fucceeded by tyranny.

They ought always to mortify the pride of domineering. There should be either a temporary or perpetual magiftrate to keep the nobles in awe, as the Ephori at Sparta, and the state Inquifitors at Venice, magiftrates that are fubject to no formalities. This fort of government ftands in need of the strongest springs: thus a mouth of stone * is open to every informer at Venice, a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of that of tyranny.

These tyrannical magiftrates in an aristocracy bear fome analogy to the censorship of democracies, which of its own nature is equally independent. In fact, the cenfors ought to be fubject to no inquiry in relation to the conduct they obferved during their office; they should meet with a thorough confidence, and never be difcouraged. In this respect the practice of the Romans deserved admiration; magiftrates of all denominations were accountable for their administration †, except the cenfors || .

There are two very pernicious things in an ariftocracy; either excefs of poverty, or excefs of wealth, in the nobility. To prevent their poverty, it is neceffary above all things to oblige them

*The informers throw their fcrolls into it.

+ See Livy 1. 49. A cenfor could not be troubled even by a cenfor, each made his remark without taking the opinion of his collegue; and when it otherwife happened, the cenforship was in a manner abolished.

At Athens the Logifle, who made all the magiftrates accountable for their conduct, gave no account themselves.

to

V.

to pay their debts in time. To moderate the ex- Book cefs of wealth, prudent and infenfible regulations Chap. 8. fhould be made; but no confifcations, no agrarian laws, no expunging of debts, these are things that are productive of infinite mifchief.

The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles*, to the end that by a continual divifion of the inheritances their fortunes may be always upon a level.

There should be no intails, no powers of redemption, no rights of feniority, or adoption. The contrivances for perpetuating the grandeur of families in monarchical governments, ought never to be employed in ariftocracies +.

After the laws have compaffed the equality of families, the next thing they have to do, is to preserve a proper harmony and union amongst them. The quarrels of the nobility ought to be quickly decided; otherwise the contefts of individuals become those of families. Arbiters may terminate, or even prevent the rife of difputes.

In fine, the laws must not favour the distinctions raised by vanity among families, under pretence that they are more noble or ancient; pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weakneffes of private perfons.

We have only to caft our eyes on Sparta ; there we may see how the Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings, as well as those of the nobility and of the common people.

*It is fo practifed at Venice, Amelot de la Houffaye, p. 30, & 31. The main defign of fome ariftocracies feems to be less the fupport of the ftate than of what they call their nobility.

CHAP.

Book V. Chap. 9.

CHA P. IX.

In what manner the Laws are relative to their

A

Principle in monarchies.

S honor is the principle of a monarchical government, the laws ought to be relative to this principle.

They should endeavour to fupport the nobility, in respect to whom honor may be, in some measure, deemed both child and parent.

They should render the nobility hereditary, not as a boundary between the power of the prince and the weakness of the people, but as the bond and conjunction of both.

In this government, intails which preserve the eftates of families undivided, are extremely ufeful, though in others not fo proper.

Here the power of redemption is of fervice, as it restores to noble families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a parent.

The lands of the nobility ought to have privileges as well as their perfons. The monarch's dignity is infeparable from that of his kingdom; and the dignity of the nobles from that of their fief.

All these prerogatives must be particular to the nobility, and incommunicable to the people, unless we intend to act contrary to the principle of government, and to diminifh the power of the nobles together with that of the people.

Intails are a restraint to commerce; the power of redemption produces an infinite number of proceffes; and the whole landed eftate of the king

dom

V.

Chap. 10.

dom is in fome measure without a right owner for Book the space of a year. Prerogatives annexed to fiefs give a power that is very burthenfome to those governments that tolerate them. These are inconveniences peculiar to the nobility; inconveniences however that vanish when confronted with the general utility the nobility themselves receive from them: but when these prerogatives are communicated to the people, every principle of government is broke through to no manner of purpose.

In monarchies a perfon may leave the bulk of his eftate to one of his children; a permiffion improper in any other government.

The laws ought to favour all kind of commerce * confiftent with the conftitution of this government, to the end that the fubjects may, without ruining themselves, be able to fatisfy the continual cravings of the prince and his court.

They should establish some fixed regulation, that the manner of collecting the taxes may not be more burthenfome than the taxes themselves.

The weight of duties produces labor, labor weariness, and weariness the spirit of indolence.

СНАР. Х.

"Of the Expedition peculiar to the executive Power in Monarchies.

G

REAT is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a republic: as the state is conducted by a fingle perfon, the exe

*It is tolerated only in the common people. See the third law. Cod. de Comm. & Mercatoribus, which is full of good fense.

Chap. 11.

BOOK cutive power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition. But as this expedition might degenerate into rapidity, the laws fhould ufe fome contrivance to flacken it. They ought not only to favour the nature of each constitution, but likewise to remedy the abufes that might refult from this very nature.

Teftam.

rolit.

A

Cardinal Richelieu (") advifes monarchs to permit no fuch thing as focieties or corporations that raise difficulties upon every trifle. If this man's heart had not been bewitched with the love of def potic power, still thefe arbitrary notions would have filled his head.

The bodies intrufted with the depofitum of the laws, are never more obedient than when they proceed flowly, and when they ufe that reflection in the prince's affairs which can fcarce be expected from ignorance of the laws in the court, nor from the precipitation of its counfels*.

What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world, if the magiftrates by their delays, by their complaints, by their prayers, had not stopped the rapidity even of their princes virtues, when these monarchs confulting only the generous impulfes of great minds, wanted to give a boundless reward to fervices performed with a boundless courage and fidelity?

CHA P. XI.

Of the Excellence of a monarchical Government.

ONARCHY has a great advantage over a defpotic government. As it na

MON

* Barbaris cunctatio fervilis, flatim exequi regium videtur. Tacit. Annal. 1. 5.

turally