Воок XIII. the people themselves fhall hardly know they pay them. For this purpose it is of the utmost confe- Chap. 7. quence that the perfon who fells the merchandize fhould pay the duty. He is very fenfible that he does not pay it for himself; and the consumer who pays it in the main, confounds it with the price. Some authors have observed that Nero had abolished the duty of the five and twentieth part arising from the sale of flaves *; and yet he had only ordained that it should be paid by the feller inftead of the purchaser this regulation, which left the impoft intire, feemed nevertheless to suppress it. : There are two kingdoms in Europe where there are very heavy impofts upon liquors; in one the brewer alone pays the duty, in the other it is levied indiscriminately upon all the consumers in the first no body feels the rigor of the impoft, in the second it is looked upon as a grievance. In the former the fubject is fenfible only of the liberty he has of not paying, in the latter he feels only the neceffity that compels him to pay." Farther, the obliging the confumers to pay, requires a perpetual rummaging and fearching in their houses. Now nothing is more contrary than this to liberty; and those who establish thefe forts of duties, have not furely been fo happy in this respect, as to hit upon the best method of administration. * Vectigal quinta & vicefimæ venalium_mancipiorum remissum Specie magis quam vi, quia cum venditor pendere juberetur, in partem pretii emptoribus accrefcebat. Tacit. Annal. lib. 13. CHA P. 302 Воок XIII. Chap. 8. IN CHA P. VIII. In what Manner the Deceit is kept up. N order to make the purchafer confound the price of the commodity with the impoft, there must be some proportion between the impoft and the value of the commodity; wherefore there ought not to be an exceffive duty upon merchandizes of little value. There are countries in which the duty exceeds feventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity. In this cafe the prince removes the deceit his fubjects plainly fee they are dealt with in an unreasonable manner; which renders them most exquifitely fenfible of their flavish fituation. Befides the prince to be able to levy a duty fo difproportioned to the value of the commodity, must be himself the vender, and the people muft not have it in their power to purchase it elsewhere : a practice fubject to a thousand inconveniences. Smuggling being in this cafe extremely lucrative, the natural and most reasonable penalty, namely the confifcation of the merchandize, becomes incapable to put a stop to it, especially as this very merchandize is intrinfically of an inconfiderable value. Recourse must be therefore had to extravagant punishments, fuch as thofe inflicted for capital crimes. All proportion then of punishments ceases. People that cannot really be confidered as bad men, are punished like villains ; which of all things in the world, is the moft contrary to the spirit of a moderate government. Again, the more the people are tempted to cheat the farmer of the revenues, the more the latter is enriched, enriched, and the former impoverished. To put Во ок XIII. a ftop to fmuggling, the farmer must be invefted Chap. 9, with extraordinary means of oppreffing, and then& 10. the country is ruined. W CHA P. IX. Of a bad kind of Impost. E fhall take here fome curfory notice of an impoft laid in particular countries on the different articles of civil contracts. As thefe are things subject to very nice difquifitions, a vast deal of knowledge is neceffary to make any tolerable defence against the farmer of the revenues, who interprets in that cafe, the regulations of the prince, and exercises an arbitrary power over people's fortunes. Experience has demonftrated that a duty on the paper on which the deeds are drawn, would be of far greater fervice. That the Greatness of Taxes depends on the Na ture of the Government. T AXES ought to be very light in defpotic governments; otherwife who would be at the trouble of tilling the land? Befides, how is it poffible to pay heavy taxes in a government that makes no manner of return to the different contri'butions of the fubject? The exorbitant power of the prince, and the extreme depreffion of the people, require that there fhould not be even a poffibility of the least mistake between them. The taxes ought to be fo eafy Book to collect, and fo clearly fettled, as to leave no Chap. 11.Opportunity for the collectors to increase or diminifh them. A portion of the fruits of the earth, XIII. a capitation, a duty of fo much per cent. on merchandizes, are the only taxes fuitable to that go vernment. Merchants in defpotic countries ought to have a perfonal fafeguard, to which all due refpect fhould be paid. Without this they would ftand no chance in the disputes that might arife between them and the prince's officers. W CHAP. XI. Of fifcal Punishments. ITH respect to fifcal punishments, there is one thing very particular, that contrary to the general custom, they are more fevere in Europe than in Afia. In Europe not only the merchandizes, but even fometimes the hips and carriages are confifcated; which is never practifed in Afia. This is because in Europe the merchant has judges, who are able to fhelter him from oppreffion; in Afia the defpotic judges themselves would be the greatest oppreffors. What remedy could a merchant have against a bafhaw that was determined to confifcate his merchandises? The prince therefore reftrains his own power, finding himself under a neceffity of acting with fome kind of lenity. In Turky they raise only a fingle duty for the importation of goods, and afterwards the whole country is open to the attended with confifIn China (") they ne (") Father merchant. Smuggling is not du Halde cation, or increase of duty. Tom. 2. P. 37. XIII. Chap. 12. ver open the baggage or bales of thofe who are Book not merchants. Defrauding the customs in the territory of the Mogul is not punished with confifcation, but with doubling the duty. The princes of Tartary (b) who refide in towns, impofe (b) History scarce any duty at all on the goods that pass thro' of the their country. In Japan, it is true, the defraud- part 3d ing of the customs is a capital crime; but this is p. 299. because they have particular reafons for prohibiting all communication with foreigners; wherefore the fraud is rather a contravention of the laws made for the fecurity of the government, than of those of commerce. CHA P. XII. Relation between the Greatness of Taxes and I T is a general rule, that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the fubject, and that there is & neceffity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of flavery. This has always been and always will be the cafe. It is a rule derived from nature that never varies. We find it in all parts, in England, in Holland, and in every state where liberty gradually declines till we come to Turky. Swifferland feems to be an exception to this rule, because they pay no taxes; but the particular reafon for that exemption is well Being willing to trade with foreigners without having any communication with them, they have pitched upon two nations for that purpose, the Dutch for the commerce of Europe, and the Chinese for that of Afia; they confine the factors and failors in a kind of prifon, and lay fuch a restraint upon them as tires their patience. VOL. I. X known, Tartars, |