II.

Воок Solon made a law at Athens that military employments fhould be conferred by choice, but that fenators and judges fhould be elected by lot.

Chap. 2.

Demof

The fame legiflator ordained, that civil magiftracies, attended with great expence, fhould be given by choice; and the others by lot.

But in order to amend the fuffrage by lot, he made a rule that none but those who prefented themselves fhould be elected; that the perfon elect(*) See the ed fhould be examined by judges (h), and that every oration of one fhould have a right to accufe him if he were thenes de unworthy of the office *: this participated at the falfa le- fame time of the fuffrage by lot, and of that by the orati- choice. When the time of their magiftracy was on against expired, they were obliged to fubmit to another judgment in regard to the manner they had behaved. People who were utterly unqualified, must by this means have been extremely backward in giving in their names to be drawn by lot.

gat. and

Timar

77

chus.

The law which determines the manner of giving the fuffrages is likewife fundamental in a democracy. 'Tis a question of fome importance, whether the fuffrages ought to be public or fecret. Cicero (1) lib. 1, observes (1), that the laws § which rendered them & 3. de fecret towards the clofe of the republic, were the caufe of its decline. But as this is differently practifed in different republics, I fhall offer here my thoughts concerning this fubject.

Leg.

They used even to draw two tickets for each place, one which gave the place, and the other which named the perfon who was to fucceed, in cafe the firit was rejected.

They were called Leges Tabulares; two tablets were prefented to each citizen, the first marked with an A, for Antiquo, or I forbid it; and the other with an U and an R, for Uti Rogas, or Be it as you defire.

The

II.

Chap. z.

The people's fuffrages ought doubtlefs to be Book public †; and this fhould be confidered as a fundamental law of democracy. The lower fort of people ought to be directed by thofe of higher rank, and reftrained within bounds by the gravity of certain perfonages. Hence by rendering the fuffrages fecret in the Roman republic all was loft; it was no longer poffible to direct a populace that fought its own deftruction. But/when the body of the nobles are to vote in an Ariftocracy §; or in a democracy, the fenate ;/as the bufiness is then only to prevent intrigues, the fuffrages cannot be too fecret.

Intriguing in a fenate is dangerous; dangerous it is also in a body of nobles; but not fo in the people whose nature it is to act thro' paffion. In countries where they have no fhare in the government, we often fee them as much inflamed on the account of an actor, as they could poffibly have been for state affairs. The misfortune of a republic is, when there are no more intrigues; and this happens when the people are corrupted by dint of money: in which cafe they grow indifferent to public concerns, and paffionately defirous of lucre. Careless of the government, and of every thing belonging to it, they quietly wait for their falary.

'Tis likewife a fundamental law in democracies, that the people fhould have the fole power to enact laws. And yet there are a thousand occafions on which is neceffary the fenate fhould have a pow

† At Athens the people used to lift up their hands.

As at Venice.

The thirty tyrants at Athens ordered the fuffrages of the Areopagites to be public, in order to manage them as they pleafed. Lyfias orat. contra Agorat. cap. 8.

C

er

Book er of decreeing; nay it is frequently proper to II. make fome trial of a law before it is established. Chap. 3. The conftitutions of Rome and Athens were ex-. (b) See tremely wife. The decrees of the fenate (b) had Dionyf. the force of laws for the fpace of a year, and did. lib. 4, & 9. not become perpetual till they were ratified by the confent of the people.

Halicarn.

CHA P. III.

Of the Laws relative to the nature of Aristocracy.

N an aristocracy the fupreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of perfons. These. are invested both with the legislative and executive authority; and the rest of the people are in respect to them, the fame as the fubjects of a monarchy in regard to the monarch.

They do not vote here by lot, for this would be attended only with inconveniences. In fact, in, a government where the most oppreffive diftinctions are already established, tho' they were to vote by lot, ftill they would not cease to be odious; 'tis the nobleman they envy and not the magistrate.

When the nobility are numerous, there must be a fenate to regulate the affairs which the body of nobles are incapable of deciding, and to prepare those they decide. In this cafe it may be said that the aristocracy is in fome measure in the fenate, the democracy in the body of the nobles, and the people are nothing at all.

It would be a very happy thing in an aristocracy, if by fome indirect method or another the people could be emancipated from their ftate of annihilation. Thus at Genoa the bank of St. George

II. Chap. 3.

being administered by the people, gives them a Воок certain influence in the government, from whence their whole profperity arises.

The fenators ought by no means to have a right of replacing the deficient members; for nothing would be more capable of perpetuating abufes. At Rome, which in its early years was a kind of ariftocracy, the fenate did not fill up the vacant places in their own body, the new fenators were nominated by the cenfors.

An exorbitant authority fuddenly conferred upon a citizen in a republic, produces a monarchy or fomething more than a monarchy. In the latter the laws have provided for, or in fome meafure adapted themselves to, the conftitution; the principle of government checks the monarch: but in a republic where a private citizen has obtain'd an exorbitant power, the abufe of this power is much greater, because the laws forefaw it not, and consequently made no provifion against it.

There is an exception to this rule when the conftitution is fuch as to have immediate need of a magiftrate invested with an exorbitant power. Such was Rome with its dictators, fuch is Venice with its ftate inquifitors; thefe are formidable magiftrates, who restore, as it were by violence, the state to its liberty. But how comes it that thefe magiftracies are fo very different in thefe two republics? 'Tis because Rome fupported the remains of her aristocracy against the people; whereas Venice employs her state inquifitors to maintain her ariftocra

They were named at firft by the confuls.

This is what ruined the republic of Rome: See Confider ations on the causes of the grandeur and decline of the Romans.

II.

Chap. 3.

Boox cy against the nobles. The confequence was, that at Rome the dictatorship could be only of a fhort duration, by reason the people act thro' paffion and violence, and not with defign. It was neceffary that a magiftracy of this kind fhould be exercised with luftre and pomp, because the bufinefs was to intimidate and not to punish the people. Neceffary it was also that the dictator fhould be created only for fome particular affair, and for this only. fhould have an unlimited authority, because he was always created upon fome fudden emergency. On the contrary, at Venice they have occafion for a permanent magistracy; for here it is that defigns may be commenced, continued, fufpended, refumed; that the ambition of a fingle perfon becomes that of a family, and the ambition of one family that of many. They have occafion for a fecret magiftracy, because the crimes they punish, are hatched in fecrecy and filence. This magiftracy muft have a general inquifition, by reafon their bufinefs is not to put a stop to known evils, but to prevent the unknown. In fine the latter magiftracy is appointed in order to punish fufpected crimes; and the former used rather menaces than punishment even for crimes that were openly avowed by their authors.

In all magiftracies, the greatnefs of the power must be compenfated by the brevity of the duration. This moft legislators have fixed to a year; a longer fpace would be dangerous, and a fhorter would be contrary to the nature of the thing. For who is it that in the management even of his domeftic affairs

would be thus confined? At Ragufa* the chief magiftrate of the republic is changed every month, the

*Tournefort's voyages.

other