BOOK longer the plea of natural defence and felf-preX. fervation. Chap. 3. What has led them into this miftake, is that they imagined a conqueror had a right to destroy the fociety from whence they inferred that he had a right to destroy the men that compose it; a wrong confequence from a falfe principle. For from the deftruction of the fociety it does not at all follow that the people who compofe it ought to be also destroyed. Society is the union of men, and not the men themselves; the citizen may perifh, and the man remain. From the right of killing in cafe of conqueft, politicians have drawn that of reducing to flavery; a confequence as ill grounded as the principle. There is no fuch thing as a right of reducing people to flavery, but when it becomes neceffary for the prefervation of the conqueft. Preferva tion, but never fervitude, is the end of conqueft; tho' fervitude may happen sometimes to be a neceffary means of preservation. Even in that cafe it is contrary to the nature of things that the flavery fhould be perpetual. The people enslaved ought to be rendered capable of becoming fubjects. Slavery in conquefts is an accidental thing. When after the expiration of a certain space of time all the parts of the conquering state are connected with the conquered nation, by cuftoms, marriages, laws, affociations, and by a certain conformity of fpirit; there ought to be an end of the flavery. For the rights of the conqueror are founded intirely on the want of those very things, and on the estrangement between the two nations which prevents their confiding in each other. A con A conqueror therefore who reduces the conquered people to flavery, ought always to reserve to himself the means (for means there are without number) of restoring them to their liberty. These are far from being vague and uncertain notions. Thus our ancestors acted, those anceftors who conquered the Roman empire. The laws they made in the heat of fire, action, impetuofity, and the pride of victory, were afterwards foftened; thofe laws were fevere, but they rendered them impartial. The Burgundians, Goths, and Lombards would always have the Romans continue a conquered people; but the laws of Euric, Gundebald, and Rotharis, made the Romans and Barbarians fellow-citizens (3). CHA P. IV. Some Advantages of a conquered People. INS NSTEAD of inferring fuch fatal confequences from the right of conqueft, much better would it have been for politicians to mention the advantages which this very right may fometimes give to a conquered people: advantages which would be more fenfibly, more univerfally felt, were our law of nations exactly followed, and established over all the earth. Conquered countries are, generally speaking, degenerated from their original inftitution. Corruption has crept in, the execution of the laws has been neglected, and the government is grown oppreffive. Who can queftion but fuch a state would be a gainer, and derive fome advantages from the very conqueft itself, if it did not prove deftructive. O 3 When Воок Chap. 4. (a) See the Code of Barbarian laws. X. Chap. 4. Book When a government is arrived to that degree of corruption as to be incapable of reforming itself, it would not lofe much by being new moulded. A conqueror that enters triumphant into a country, where the moneyed men have by a thousand wiles and artifices infenfibly practifed innumerable ways of ufurping; where the miserable people, who grieve to see abuses grow into laws, live under oppreffion, and think they have no right to complain; a conqueror, I fay, may make a total change, and then the masked tyranny will be the first thing exposed to his fury. We have seen, for instance, countries oppreffed by the farmers of the revenues, and eased afterwards by the conqueror, who had neither the engagements nor wants of the legitimate prince. Even the abuses have been often redreffed without any interpofition of the conqueror. Sometimes the frugality of a conquering nation has enabled them to allow the conquered thofe neceffaries, of which they had been deprived under a lawful prince. A conqueft may deftroy pernicious prejudices, and lay, if I may prefume to make use of the expreffion, the nation under a better genius. What good might not the Spaniards have done to the Mexicans? They had a mild religion to impart to them; but they gave them a mad fuperftition. They might have set slaves at liberty; they made free men flaves. They might have undeceived them with regard to the abuse of human facrifices; inftead of that they destroyed them. Never fhould I have done, were I to recount all the good they did not, and all the mischief they did. X. It is a conqueror's business to repair a part of the BOOK mischief he has committed. The right therefore of Ch.4,& 5. conqueft I define thus: a neceffary, lawful, and unhappy right, which leaves always an immense debt to discharge in order to clear the obligations of human nature. CHA P. V. Gelo King of Syracufe. T HE nobleft treaty of peace ever mention He infifted ed in hiftory is, in my opinion, that which Gelo made with the Carthaginians. upon their abolishing the custom of facrificing their children (b). Glorious indeed! After having de-) See M. feated three hundred thousand Carthaginians, he re- racs colquired a condition that was advantageous only to lection themselves, or rather he ftipulated in favour of hu man nature. Barbey Art. 112. I CHAP. VI. Of Conquefts made by a Republic. Tis alfo contrary to the nature of things, that in a confederate government one state should make any conqueft over another, as in our days. we have seen in Swifferland *. In mixt confederate republics, where the affociation is between fmall republics and small monarchies, this is not fo abfurd. Contrary it is also to the nature of things, that a democratical republic fhould conquer towns, that cannot enter into the sphere of its democracy. It is With regard to Tockenburg. X. Book neceffary that the conquered people fhould be caChap. 6. pable of enjoying the privileges of fovereignty, as was fettled in the very beginning among the Romans. The conqueft ought to be limited to the number of citizens fixt for the democracy. If a democratical republic fubdues a nation in order to govern them as subjects, it exposes its own liberty, because it intrufts too great a power to the magiftrates fent into the conquered provinces. How great would have been the danger of the republic of Carthage, had Hannibal made himself mafter of Rome? What would not he have done in his own country, had he been victorious, he who caused fo many revolutions after his defeat+? Hanno could never have diffuaded the fenate from fending fuccours to Hannibal, had he used no other argument than his own jealoufy. The Carthaginian senate, whose wisdom is so highly extolled by Ariftotle (and which has been evidently proved by the profperity of that republic) could never have been determined by other than fenfible reasons. They must have been ftupid not to fee, that an army at the distance of three hundred leagues would neceffarily be exposed to loffes that ought to be repaired. Hanno's party infifted that Hannibal should be delivered up to the Romans*. They could not at that time be afraid of the Romans; they were therefore afraid of Hannibal. It was impoffible fome will fay, for them to imagine that Hannibal had been fo fuccessful. But how was it poffible for them to doubt of it? Could +He was at the head of a faction. *Hanno wanted to deliver Hannibal up to the Romans, as Cato wanted to deliver up Cæfar to the Gauls, |