IX.

to be joined with an air of contempt; who are ca- Book pable of fupporting wounds, perils, and fatigues, Chap. 8. but not the lofs of their pleasures; who love nothing so much as gaiety, and confole themselves for the lofs of a battle by finging a ballad on the general; thofe fubjects fay, would never have been able to compass an enterprize that cannot be defeated in one country, but it must be defeated every where else; nor miscarry for a moment without mifcarrying for ever.

Particular Cafe in which the defenfive Force of a
State is inferior to the offenfive.

T was a faying of the lord of Coucy to king
Charles V. that the English are never weaker,

nor eafier overcome than in their own country.

The

fame was observed of the Romans; the fame of the Carthaginians; and the fame will always happen to every power that fends armies to distant countries, in order to reunite by dint of discipline -and military power, thofe who are divided among themselves by political or civil interefts. The ftate finds itself weakened by the diforder that always continues, and still more by the remedy.

The lord of Coucy's maxim is an exception to the general rule, which difapproves of wars against distant countries. And this exception confirms likewise the rule, because it takes place only in respect to thofe by whom fuch wars have been undertaken.

CHAP.

Воок
IX.

A

CHA P. IX.

Of the relative Force of States.

LL grandeur, force, and power is relative. Care therefore must be taken that in endeaChap. 9, vouring to increase the real grandeur, the relative be not diminished.

& 10.

Under the reign of Lewis XIV. France was at its highest pitch of relative grandeur. Germany had not yet had fuch great monarchs as it has fince produced. Italy was in the fame cafe. England and Scotland were not yet formed into one united kingdom. Arragon was not joined to Caftile; the diftant parts of the Spanish monarchy were weakened by it, and weakened it in their turn; and Muscovy was as little known in Europe, as Crim Tartary.

CHA P. X.

Of the Weakness of neighbouring States.

W

HENSOEVER a ftate lies contiguous to another that happens to be in its decline, the former ought to take particular care not to precipitate the latter's ruin, because in this respect it is in the happiest fituation imaginable; nothing being fo convenient for one prince as to be near another who receives for him all the rebuffs. and infults of fortune. And it feldom happens that by fubduing fuch a ftate, the real power of the conqueror is as much increased, as the relative is diminished.

BOOK

Of Laws in the Relation they bear to offenfive Force.

CHAP. I.

Of offenfive Force.

X.

FFENSIVE force is regulated by the Boo K law of nations, which is the political law Chap. 1, of each country confidered in its relation to every & 2. other.

T

CHA P.. II.
of War.

HE life of governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defence; the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation.

In the cafe of natural defence I have a right to kill, because my life is in refpect to me, what the life of my antagonist is to him: in the fame manner a state wages war, because its preservation is like that of any other being.

Among citizens the right of natural defence does not imply a neceffity of attacking. Inftead of attacking they need only have recourse to proper tribu nals. They cannot therefore exercise this right of defence, but in fudden cafes, when immediate death would be the confequence of waiting for the affiftVOL. I.

ance

X.

Chap. 3.

.194 Book ance of the laws. But among focieties the right of natural defence carries along with it fometimes the neceffity of attacking; as for inftance, when one nation fees that a longer peace will enable another to deftroy it, and that to attack that nation instantly is the only way to prevent its own destruction.

From thence it follows, that small focieties have oftener a right to declare war than great ones, because they are oftener in the case of being afraid of destruction.

The right therefore of war is derived from neceffity and ftrict juftice. If those who direct the confcience or councils of princes do not hold by this, all is undone when they proceed on arbitrary principles of glory, conveniency, and utility; torrents of blood will overspread the earth.

But above all, let them not avail themselves of any fuch idle plea as the glory of the prince his glory is nothing but pride; it is a paffion and not a legitimate right.

It is true the fame of his power might increase the strength of his government; but it might be equally increased by the reputation of his justice.

CHA P. III. .

Of the Right of Conqueft.

ROM the right of war comes that of con

and ought therefore to follow its fpirit.

The right the conqueror has over a conquered people is directed by four forts of laws, the law of nature which makes every thing tend to the prefervation of the fpecies; the law of natural reafon,

X.

which teaches us to do to others what we would BoOK have done to ourselves; the law that forms po- Chap. 3. litical focieties, whofe duration nature has not fecured; and in fine the law derived from the nature of the thing itself. Conquest is an acquifition; acquifition carries with it the spirit of preservation and use, and not of deftruction.

A conquered nation is treated by the conqueror one of the four following ways. Either he continues to rule them according to their own laws, and affumes to himself only the exercise of the political and civil government; or he gives them a new political and civil government; or he destroys and disperses the fociety; or in fine, he exterminates the inhabitants.

The first way is conformable to the law of nations now followed; the fourth is more agreeable to the law of nations followed by the Romans: in respect to which I leave the reader to judge how far we have improved upon the ancients. We must give due praise to our modern times, to our present reafon, to our religion, philofophy, and manners.

The authors of our common law, guided by ancient hiftories, without confining themselves to cafes of ftrict neceffity, have fallen into very great errors. They have adopted tyrannical and arbitrary principles, by fuppofing the conquerors to be invefted with I know not what right to kill; from thence they have drawn confequences as terrible as the ve ry principle, and established maxims which the conquerors themselves, when poffeffed of the leaft grain of fenfe, never prefumed to follow. Clear it is that when the conqueft is completed, the conqueror has no longer a right to kill, because he has no longer

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