BOOK II.

Of Laws directly derived from the Nature of Government.

CHAP. I.

Of the Nature of the three different Governments.

T

II.

Chap. 1.

HERE are three fpecies of government; Book republican, monarchical, and defpotic. In order to discover their nature, 'tis fufficient to recol- & 2. lect the common notion, which fuppofes three definitions or rather three facts, that the republican government is that in which the body or only a part of the people is poffeffed of the fupreme power: Monarchy that in which a fingle perfon governs but by fixt and established laws a defpotic government, that in which a fingle perfon directs every thing by his own will and caprice.

This is what I call the nature of each government; we muft examine now which are those laws that follow this nature directly, and confequently are the firft fundamental laws.

CHAP. II.

Of the republican Government, and the Laws relative to Democracy,

W

HEN the body of the people in a republic are poffeffed of the fupreme power, this is called a democracy. When the fupreme power

is

Book is lodged in the hands of a part of the people, 'tis II. then an aristocracy.)

Chap. z.

(a) Declam. 17,

& 28.

In a democracy the people are in fome respects the fovereign, and in others the subject.

There can be no fovereign but by fuffrages, which are their own will; and the fovereign's will is the fovereign himself. The laws therefore which establish the right of fuffrage, are fundamental to this government. In fact, 'tis as important to regulate in a republic, in what manner, by whom, to whom, and concerning what, fuffrages are to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince and after what manner he ought to govern. Libanius (*) fays, that at Athens a stranger who concerned himself in the affemblies of the people, was punished with death. This is becaufe fuch a man ufurped the rights of fovereignty.

'Tis an effential point to fix the number of citizens that are to form the public affemblies; otherwise it might be uncertain whether the whole body or only a part of the people have voted. At Sparta the number was fixt to ten thousand. But at Rome, a city defign'd by providence to rife from the weakeft beginnings to the highest pitch of grandeur; Rome, a city fated to experience all the viciffitudes of fortune; Rome, that had fometimes all its inhabitants without its walls, and fometimes all Italy and a great part of the world within them; at Rome, I (b) See fay, this number was never fixed (b), which was the confi- one of the principal caufes of its ruin.

derations

on the cau- The people in whom the fupreme power refides, fes of the ought to do of themfelves whatever conveniently grandeur

and de- they can and what they cannot well do, they must cline of commit to the management of minifters.

the Ro.

mans.

The

The ministers are not properly their's, unless they Boox have the nomination of them: 'tis therefore a fun- II. damental maxim in this government, that the peoChap. 2. ple fhould chufe their minifters, that is, their magiftrates.

They have occafion as well as monarchs, and even more than they, to be directed by a council or fenate. But to have a proper confidence in them, they should have the chufing of the members; whether the election be made by themselves, as at Athens; or by fome magiftrate deputed for that purpose, as was customary at Rome on certain occafions.

The people are extremely well qualified for chufing thofe, whom they are to intruft with part of their authority. They have only to be determined by things which they cannot be strangers to, and by facts that are obvious to fenfe. They can tell when a person has been often in battle, and has had particular fuccefs; they are therefore very capable of electing a general. They can tell when a judge is affiduous in his office, when he gives general fatiffaction, and has never been charged with bribery: this is fufficient for chufing a prætor. They are ftruck with the magnificence or riches of a fellow citizen; this is as much as is requifite for electing an edile. These are all facts of which they can have better information in public forum, than a moBut are they able to manage an affair, to. find out and make a proper ufe of places, occafions, moments? No, this is beyond their capacity

narch in his palace.

Should we doubt of the people's natural ability in refpect to the discernment of merit, we need on

ly

Book ly caft our eyes on the continual series of furprizing
II. elections made by the Athenians and Romans; which
Chap. 2.
no one furely will attribute to hazard.

We know that tho' the people of Rome affumed to themselves the right of raifing plebeians to public offices, yet they could not refolve to chuse them; and tho' at Athens the magiftrates were allowed by the law of Ariftides, to be elected from all the different claffes of inhabitants, yet there never was a (4) Page cafe, fays Xenophon (), that the common people pe691, and titioned for employments that could endanger their Wechel. fecurity or glory.

692. Edit.

Ann.

1576.

As most citizens, tho' they have a capacity of chufing, are not however fufficiently qualified to be chosen; fo the common people, tho' capable of calling others to an account for their administration, are incapable of the administration themselves.

The public business must however be carried on, with a certain motion neither too quick nor too flow. But the action of the common people is always either too remifs or too violent. Sometimes with a hundred thousand arms they overturn all before them; and fometimes with a hundred thoufand feet they creep like infects.

In a popular state the inhabitants are divided into certain claffes. 'Tis in the manner of making this divifion that great legiflators have fignalized themselves; and 'tis on this the duration and profperity of democracy have always depended.

Servius Tullius followed the fpirit of ariftocracy in the distribution of his claffes. We find in Livy (e) lib. 1. () and in Dionyfius Halicarnaffeus (f), in what () lib. manner he lodged the right of fuffrage in the 4, Art. hands of the principal citizens. He had divided

15, &

Leq.

the

the people of Rome into a hundred and ninety three Book centuries, which formed fix claffes; and ranking the II. Chap. z. rich, who were in fmaller numbers, in the first centuries; and those in middling circumftances, who were more numerous, in the following centuries; he flung the indigent multitude into the laft; and as each century had but one vote, * 'twas property rather than numbers that decided the elections. Solon divided the people of Athens into four claffes. In this he was directed by the fpirit of democracy, his intention not being to fix those who were to chufe, but those who were capable of being chofen; wherefore leaving to each citizen the right of election, he made (8) the judges eligible from each of those four claffes; but the magif-() Diotrates he ordered to be chofen only out of the only out of the nyfius Hathree firft, which confifted of citizens of eafy for- elogium of

tunes.

licarn.

Ifocrates,

P.97, tom.

of 2. Edit.

As the divifion of those who have a right fuffrage is a fundamental law in a republic; fo Wechel. the manner alfo of giving this fuffrage is another fundamental law.

The fuffrage by lot is natural to democracy; as that by boice is to aristocracy.

The fuffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one; it lets each citizen entertain reafonable hopes of ferving his country.

But as this method is naturally defective, it has been the glorious endeavour of the most eminent legiflators to regulate and amend it.

* See in the Confiderations on the caufes of the grandeur and decline of the Romans, how this fpirit of Servius Tullius was preferved in the republic.

Solon

Pollux lib.

8. cap. 10. Art. 130.

3