Empire from destruction. It is deplorable that, at so grave a crisis, there should be any uncertainty as to the means requisite to ensure success, or any hint of opposition to National Service if it should be deemed necessary to adopt such a measure for the duration of the war. The prolonged deliberation of the Government suggests doubt or divided counsels; and the delay in announcing their decision is causing disquietude to the more thoughtful part of the community, and giving time for proGerman influences to work to the detriment of the national safety. It is to be hoped that their decision will soon be announced, and that if, as seems likely, it should involve the temporary abandonment of the voluntary system, there may be no half-measures which, besides operating unfairly and causing dissatisfaction, would fall short of developing the full power, military and industrial, of the nation. For we believe, with many others who have had opportunities, in recent years, of acquiring some knowledge of German organisation, and of the spirit which pervades and actuates the German army and people, that nothing less than the full development of the national resources will ensure the decisive victory which can alone lead to a lasting peace. Those who, during the past half-century, have guided the destinies of Germany, were well aware that in a war of nations it is the spirit of the people that makes the army formidable; and, while perfecting the military organisation, they did not neglect to imbue the people with national aims and aspirations. The fruit of their labours has ripened during war to a degree that, probably, no one anticipated. As a recent neutral visitor to Germany remarked (Times,' Aug. 18), Germany at war has an intensity about it almost impossible to realise. The country is at war, and is doing nothing else, and thinking of nothing else.'

Art. 16. THE WAR.

I.-BY LAND.

At the beginning of July, the period at which we resume our review of the war, the Russian army in Courland was in occupation of the line of the rivers Windawa, Wenta, and Dubissa. West of the Middle Niemen the continuation of the line lay approximately through Kalvaria and Augustovo to Ossowetz, and thence, on the Narew front, through Kolno and Przasnysz to the Vistula. On the Vistula front, north of the Pilitza, the Russians continued to occupy the positions on the rivers Bzura and Rawka which they had taken up in December. Between the Pilitza and the Upper Vistula they were falling back slowly in conformity with the movement of the armies in South-Eastern Poland, which were retiring from the Galician frontier towards the Ivangorod-Kovel railway; and on July 1 Austrian troops occupied Josefor. Between the Vistula and the Bug heavy fighting was proceeding on the line Josefov-Krasnik-Zamosc. In Galicia the Russians were retiring towards the Upper Bug and the Zlota Lipa; and, below the confluence of the latter river with the Dniester, they held the left bank of the Dniester except at Zaleszyki, which had been occupied by the Austrians on June 11.

The operations had just entered on a new phase, of which the principal scene lay in Eastern Poland. Mackensen, after occupying Lemberg on June 22, had | wheeled his right wing to the left so as to come into line with his left wing, which, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, had been covering the advance on Lemberg from a possible flank attack from the north. In the general advance which followed, the River Wieprz formed the line of demarcation between the right and left wings, Cholm and Lublin being the respective objectives. Concurrently with this movement the army of Woyrsch, operating between the Pilitza and the Upper Vistula, pressed forward towards Ivangorod; the effect of these combined movements being to threaten the connexion between the Russian armies operating in Southern and Eastern Poland, separated, as they were by the broad stream of the Vistula. Ivangorod, the

permanent defences of which had long been obsolete, was the critical point, as it guards the only permanent bridges over the Middle Vistula above Warsaw. Its capture by Woyrsch would lay open the rear of the Russian army east of the river, while, if it should fall to Mackensen, the army opposing Woyrsch would be similarly exposed. Moreover, it formed a connecting link between the German strategic railways and the Russian system in Eastern Poland. Its capture would therefore be an important step towards gaining possession of the line of the Vistula.

It soon became apparent, however, that the Germans cherished more ambitious projects than the acquisition of the line of the Vistula. Reports published towards the end of June indicated that considerable hostile forces were assembling on the Narew front between Kolno and the Mlawa railway. An army under Gallwitz captured a position north of Przasnysz on June 25; and on July 6 a second army under Scholtz, composed of reserve and landwehr troops, took the offensive in the Orzec valley. By the middle of July the Russians had fallen back to the Narew on the front between Lomza and Pultusk. In the meantime the army of Below in Courland, having been reinforced, began offensive operations on the entire front between the Baltic and the Lower Niemen. Before the end of July Below's left wing had occupied Windau, and had reached the line of the rivers Aa and Eckau, within twenty miles of Riga on the west and south; and his right wing had advanced to within forty miles of the Petrograd-Wilna railway between Dwinsk and Swentsiany. About the same time there was a renewal of activity on the Niemen front, the objective of which was the fortress of Kovno. These operations, considered as a whole, pointed to the design of occupying the whole of Poland as far as the line of the Bug, and of gaining possession of the line of the Niemen and the Dwina, including the important port of Riga, which would be used as a fresh base of supply.

Mackensen's advance, and the Russian retreat towards the Ivangorod-Kovel railway, tended to separate the armies in Eastern Poland from those in Galicia and to weaken the link which connected them on the Bug. This, together with the transfer of the principal scene

of operations to Poland, led to a considerable withdrawal of the forces of both sides from Galicia to the north, followed by a lull in the fighting on the Upper Bug, the Zlota Lipa, and the Dniester. This pause continued, with minor interruptions, till the end of August. The whole of Linsingen's command, which had formed the backbone of the Austro-German armies on the Dniester, appears to have been gradually withdrawn and brought into line on Mackensen's right, leaving only the armies of BoehmErmolli, Bothmer, and Pflanzer, which consisted chiefly of Austrian troops with a stiffening of Germans, to hold the front in Galicia. The ultimate effect of this transfer of troops, together with the progress of events, has been to concentrate the bulk of the Russian forces, and nearly all the German army corps, on the north of the Pinsk Marshes, whither the Austrian armies under Woyrsch and the Archduke have also been drawn by the course of the operations.

The simultaneous advance of Gallwitz and Scholtz from the north, and of Mackensen from the south, seriously threatened to intercept the retreat of the Russian army west of the Vistula, and to envelop the central group of Russian armies in the great salient between the Vistula and the Bug. The Russians, however, had the advantage of operating on interior lines, which conferred on them the power of moving their troops freely within the salient, and of concentrating either on the Narew, the Vistula, or the Lublin front more speedily than the enemy. The distance to be covered, the lack of communications, and the obstacle offered by the Vistula, made it practically impossible for the Germans to reinforce any of the three fronts by transferring troops from the others. Mackensen and Gallwitz, who sustained the brunt of the operations, were, in fact, unable to render mutual assistance. Each was obliged to work out his own salvation with the forces originally under his command, aided by such reserves as might be available in the rear.

The Russians appear to have taken advantage of these circumstances by concentrating the bulk of their forces against Mackensen, while availing themselves of the strong defensive line of the Narew and the difficult country between it and the Bug, to keep Scholtz and

Gallwitz in check. If they could defeat Mackensen, and throw his army back in disorder into Galicia, they might then contain him with an inferior force, and throw their weight on the side of the Narew with a view to dealing similarly with Scholtz and Gallwitz. If, on the other hand, their offensive against Mackensen should fail, they would be in danger of being driven back on both fronts and of being hemmed in by the hostile armies advancing from the south, west, and north. The disaster of Sedan might be reproduced on a much larger scale in Poland.

The disadvantage at which the Germans were placed by operating on exterior lines was accentuated by the dearth of railway communications in rear of their armies on the northern and southern fronts. It used to be accepted as an axiom that large armies could not be kept supplied without an efficient railway service, by which food, forage, and ammunition could be brought up within short distance of their front. The general correctness of this view has been supported by the fact, referred to in previous articles, that the principal operations during the present war have invariably followed lines of railway. The armies of Gallwitz and Scholtz, when they reached the Narew, were for the most part forty miles from the frontier railway of East Prussia; and the difficulty of bringing forward supplies by road doubtless hampered their operations between the Narew and the Bug, where they were held in check for three weeks by a vigorous Russian offensive. The case of Mackensen was still more difficult, because his forces were more numerous, and the supplies had to be transported across a wider belt of railless country.

The experience of the war has dealt somewhat rudely with many ideas which used to be generally accepted. This is no new phenomenon, for on other occasions the effect of fundamental changes in the conditions under which war was waged has not been clearly anticipated. Among the changes which have materially affected operations during the present war is the introduction of motor transport; and the Germans, partly through foresight and partly by promptly reaping the fruit of experience, have taken full advantage of its possibilities. Still, with the few and inferior roads available, the supply of Mackensen's large forces during a month of strenuous Vol. 224.-No. 445.

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