otherwise be able to pay it, or when I. S. (a) fhall marry, is no Bill or Note on account of the contingency to which the payment is fubjected. An order or promise to pay out of my (b) growing fubfiftence, or (c) fifth payment, when due, (d) or

out

held it was not a negotiable Note, because it was payable eventually and conditionally only, and not abfolutely and at all events, and a nonfuit was entered.

(a) Beardfley v. Baldwin, Str. 1151. A Note to pay money within fo many days after the Defendant fhould marry, was (on confideration) held not to be a negotiable note; and in Pearfon v. Garrett. Comb. 227. and Mod. 243. (which was before the Statute ;) an action having been brought upon a Note by which the Defendant promised to pay the Plaintiff fixty guineas if he (the Plaintiff) fhould be married within two months, the Court inclined against the Note, because it was to pay money on a mere contingency, and judgment was given on demurrer for the Defendant.

(b) Jocelin v. Laferre, Fort. 281. 10 Mod. 294. 316. Evans drew upon Jocelin, and required him to pay Laferre 71. a month out of Evans's growing fubfiftence. Laferre fued Jocelin, and had judgment, but upon a writ of error that judgment was reverfed, because this Draft was not a good Bill of Exchange, in as much as it would not have been payable, had Evans died, or had his fubfiftence been taken away.

(c) Haydock v. Linch, Lord Rayın. 1563. Rogers drew upon Linch and requested him to pay Haydock 141. 3s. out of the 5th payment when it should become due, and it fhould be allowed by Rogers. Linch accepted the Draught, and Haydock fued him, but the Court on demurrer to the declaration held this was no Bill of Exchange, and gave judgment for the Defendant.

(d) Dawkes v. Lord Deloraine, Blackft. 782.3 Wils. 207. A Draught was in these words, "8th of January, 1768, Seven weeks after date pay Mrs. Dawkes, 32l. 175. out of W. Steward's money as foon as you fhall receive it, for your humble fervant, Deloraine. To Timothy Brecknock, Efq." Brecknock accepted the Bill, but it not being paid, Mrs. Dawkes brought an action upon it against Lord Deloraine, who pleaded that Brecknock had not received W.. Steward's money, and upon demurrer to his plea infifted that this was not a Bill of Exchange. The Court after argument, held the objection good; because it was payable out of a particular fund, and on an event which was future and contingent, viz, the receipt of W. Steward's money, whereas a Bill ought to be subject to no event or contingency, except the failure of the general perfonal credit of the perfons drawing or negotiating

out of money when received, is no Bill or Note on account of the uncertainty whether the fubfiftence or payment will become due, or the money be received.

So an order to pay a fum out of (a) Rents or (b) other money in the hands of the perfon to whom it is addressed, is no bill, because it may be that he has not rent or other money in his hands fufficient to discharge it.

So an order from the (c) owner of a ship to the freighter to pay money on account of freight is no bill, because the quantum due for freight may be open to litigation, but fuch an order from the freighter (d) is, because it is an admiffion that fo much at least is due.

it.-In Wilson, 262. is a report from hearfay of a determination that a promise to pay a fum of money, on the receipt of the Payee's wages due from a fhip in Government fervice was a good Note; but that may perhaps be questioned, because the maker might never receive the wages.

(a) Lord Raym. 1362. Str. 592. Fort. 282.

(b) Jenney v. Herle, Lord Raym. 1361. 8 Mod. 265. Str. 591. Herle fued Jenney upon a Bill drawn by him upon Pratt, and payable to Herle to this effect "Sir, you are to pay Mr. Herle 19451. out of the money in Gi your hands belonging to the Proprietors of the Devonshire Mines, being * part of the confideration money for the purchase of the manor of West "Buckland." Herle had judgment in the Common Pleas, but upon a Writ of Error the Court of King's Bench held this was no Bill of Exchange, besaufe it was only payable out of a particular fund supposed to be in Pratt's hands, and the judgment was accordingly reversed.

(c) Banbury v. Liffett. Str. 1211. Gibson drew on the Defendants in favour of the Plaintiff "on account of freight of the Galley Veale, Edward Cham"pion, and this order shall be your fufficient discharge for the fame." The action was brought against the Defendants as acceptors, and they contended it was not a Bill of Exchange, because it was only payable out of a particular fund; and Lee, C. J. was of that opinion, but he left the point to the Jury, who found for the Defendants on another ground.

(d) Pierfon v. Dunlop, Cowp. 571. M'Lintot freighted a ship of which Nichol was Captain and Pierfon owner, and being unable to pay the freight

drew

And an order to pay money as (a) the Drawer's quarter's half-pay by advance before the pay will be due, is a good bill, becaufe it will be payable though the half-pay fhall never become due.

So an order or promise to pay money when (b) J. S. fhall come of age, specifying the day when that event is to happen, is a good Bill or note, because it is payable though J. S. die in the interim.

And an order or promife (c) to pay within a limited time after a man's death is a good bill or note, because

it

drew upon Dunlop and Co. in favour of Nichol on account of freight: Pierfon afterwards fued Dunlop and Co. as acceptors, and though other. objections were taken, it was never infifted that this was payable out of a particular fund.

(a) Macleod v. Snee, Lord Raym. 1481. Stra. 762. 1 Barnard. 12. Macleod was fued in the Common Pleas as acceptor of a Bill of Exchange drawn by Dundas and indorfed to the Plaintiff, dated 25th of May 1724, by which Dundas required him one month after date "to pay gl. 1os. as his "(Dundas's) quarter's half pay from the 24th June 1724, to 25th September "following, by advance," and obtained judgment. Macleod brought a Writ of Error, and infifted that this was fimilar to the cafes of Jocelin v. Laferre and Jenney v. Herle, but the whole court was of a contrary opinion; for per cur. this Bill was not payable upon a contingency, nor out of a particular fund, but is made payable at all events, and drawn upon the general credit of the drawer, and not out of the half pay, for it is payable as foon as the quarter begins, and the half pay was not to be due till three months afterwards.

(b) Gofs v, Nelfon, Burr, 226. Action on a Note payable to an infant "when he (the infant) shall come of age, to wit, 12th June 1750;” and it was objected in arreft of judgment that it was uncertain whether the money would ever have been payable, because the infant might have died under 21, but the court held it a good Note, becaufe it was payable at all events on the 12th June 1750, though the infant fhould have died before that time.

(c) Cooke v. Colehan, Str. 1217. On error from the Common Pleas, the Court held a Note payable fix weeks after the death of the Defendant's

it must become payable at fome time or other, though the exact period is uncertain

So an order or (a) promife to pay within a limited time after the payment of money due from government is a good bill or note, because it is morally certain that fuch payment will be made.

A Bill or Note payable to J. S. or order, is payable to order. A Bill or Note payable to J. S. or bearer, is (b) payable to the bearer; and in the latter cafe J. S. is a mere cypher.

It was for fome time unfettled whether it was not effential that a bill or note should be payable either to order, or to (c) bearer, but it is now decided that it is not.

father, a good negotiable Note, because there was no contingency, whereby it might never become payable, but it was only uncertain as to the time, which is the cafe with all bills payable so many days after fight.

(a) Andrews v. Franklin. Str. 24. A Note payable two months after a certain fhip should be paid off, was objected to, as depending upon a contingency which might never happen; but per cur. the paying off the ship is a thing of a public nature, and this is negotiable as a promiffory Note; Judgment for the Plaintiff. And in Evans v. Underwood, 1 Wills. 262. Where an action was brought by an Indorfee against the maker upon a Note payable on the receipt of the Payec's wages from his majefty's fhip the Suffolk, the Court thought the cafe like that of Andrews v. Franklin, and after looking into that cafe are faid to have given judgment for the Plaintiff. Quære tamen, because it was uncertain though the wages might be paid, whether the maker would receive them.

(b) Grant v. Vaughan, Burr. 1516. Vaughan gave Bicknell a draught upon his banker payable "to fhip Fortune or bearer." The draught came to the hands of Grant, who fued Vaughan upon it. The Defendant contended that this draught was a mere authority to receive the money, and not negotiable, and that point and another being left to the Jury they found for the Defen dant; but upon an application for a new trial and cause fhewn, the court held clearly that it was negotiable, and a new trial was granted, in which the Plaintiff recovered.

(c) Smith v. Kendall, 6 Term Rep. 123. In an action for money paid and lent, the Defendant pleaded the ftatute of limitations, and the Plaintiff

replied

It was alfo for fome time a matter of controversy, whether it was not necefsary that a Bill or Note fhould import to have been made for value received; but that (a) is now alfo fettled in the negative.

The (b) name of the perfon making it must be inferted in the body, or fubfcribed at the bottom of every

replied a latitat fued out 26th September, 1793. A Note was given in evidence dated 25th June 1787, and payable to the Plaintiff three months after date, but it was not payable either to order or to bearer, and the Court on confideration held that it was a good note within the ftatute, that it was intitled to three days grace, and confequently that the ftatute of limitations did not begin to run until those three days had expired, which was on 28th September 1787, and therefore within fix years of 26th September 1793. See also Chadwick v. Allen, ante p. 3, note (b) The old entries also describe the cuftom upon bills to be to pay to the Payee without adding any words to make them payable to order or to bearer. Lutw. 231. 277. 891. Vid. 17. Brownl. Red. 77. Clift. 916. and fee Lord Raym. 1545.

(a) White v. Ledwick, B. R. H. 25 G. III. A declaration upon a bill of exchange was demurred to, because it was not stated to have been given for value received, but the court faid, it was a fettled point, that it was not neceffary, and gave judgment for the Plaintiff. The fame point is ruled in Macleod v. Snee. Lord Raym. 1481. See alfo Fort. 282. 8 Mod. 267. 1 Barnard. 88. Lutw. 889. 1 Mod. Ent. 310. 1 Show. 497.

(b) Taylor v. Dobbins, Str. 399. The Declaration upon a Note ftated that the Defendant wrote it with his own hand, but did not allege that he figned it, and an exception was taken on that ground. Sed per cur. If the Defendant wrote it, his subscription to it was unnecessary, it is sufficient if his name appeared in any part. "I, J. S. promise to pay" is as good as I promise to pay, fubfcribed J. S.

Elliott v. Cowper, Str. 609. Lord Raym. 1376. 8 Mod. 307. It was objected on demurrer to a declaration on a Note, that it alledged only that the Defendant made it, but did not ftate that he figned it; but by the court, if he did not either write or fign it, he did not make it, for making implies figning, and making is alledged. Judgment for Plaintiff.

Smith v. Jarves, Lord Raym. 1484. The declaration upon a Note drawn by Jarves and Baily ftated that Jarves for himself and Partner made his Note in writing with his own hand fubfcribed, whereby he promised for himfelf and partner to pay. It was objected on demurrer, that it was not charged, that Jarves had figned the Note for himielf and Baily, but the

court