crossed the Danube before the Transylvanian passes had been secured; on this point Falkenhayn and Ludendorff agree. The failure of the Austrians to force the passes leading into Moldavia probably saved the Russian army from destruction; but the results of the campaign, though short of German expectations, were important. Wallachia provided corn and oil, without which, Ludendorff confesses, the Germans would not have been able to exist, much less to carry on the war. The flank of the armies in the East found a secure position on the Black Sea, and submarines a safe route to the Mediterranean. But the lengthened line absorbed troops needed on the main fronts. Germany, says Ludendorff, was 'definitely weaker as regards the war-position as a whole.'

Hindenburg's accession to the chief command resulted in the adoption of Ludendorff's military policy, which may be described as a complete reversal of Falkenhayn's system of conducting the war. The careful husbanding of Germany's resources, and the avoidance of any measure which, by imposing an excessive strain on the German people, would weaken their resolution, were principles which Falkenhayn considered axiomatic. We have seen by what method he hoped to break the Allies' 'will to war' without contravening these principles. Ludendorff proposed the 'ruthless requisition' of Germany's whole man-power between the ages of fifteen and sixty. At once pessimistic and adventurous, he cherished visions of ending the war by a great victory— visions which the military and political situation, which he treats at great length almost in a despondent vein, held out little hope of realising. The army had been fought to a stand-still, and was utterly worn out. The warlike ardour of the nation was on the wane. Recruiting was at a low ebb; the system of exemptions was abused, and there were many shirkers. The Auxiliary Service Law, passed on Dec. 2, 1916, was 'neither flesh nor fowl.' War industries competed with the army, to the detriment of both. Ludendorff bewails the inertia of the German and Austrian Chancellors, their absorption in domestic politics, and their obsession by dreams of a peace of reconciliation. He was strangely wanting in

political instinct. His one idea was to carry through with a high hand such measures as he deemed necessary; and he was as reckless in his demands as Falkenhayn had been circumspect. It was the Chancellor's affair to counteract any evil consequences that might ensue, by sternly repressing revolutionary tendencies, and stimulating the failing national spirit by propaganda.

Various expedients were tried for carrying on the war with a prospect of success. An abortive attempt was made to raise a Polish army. The divisional establishment, already reduced, in April 1915, from twelve to nine battalions, was further weakened by lowering battalion strengths. A shorter line was prepared between Arras and the Aisne; and the army was trained for defensive war. But such measures, though they might suffice to postpone the decision, could not lead to victory; so recourse was had to unrestricted submarine warfare, combined with a defensive campaign in France, forces being held in readiness in case Holland and Denmark should prove hostile. America was regarded as a certain enemy; but the U-boats were expected to obtain a decision before she could take the field in appreciable force.

The German Naval Staff was confident that the ' warzone campaign' would prove decisive within six months. Ludendorff was sceptical, as Falkenhayn had been, about this forecast, doubting, it would seem, the possibility of reducing England to starvation; but they believed that the transport of troops and munitions by sea would be so hindered that in time (Ludendorff thought in twelve months) the armies would be paralysed. They differed, however, in one respect. Falkenhayn had considered offensive action in France the indispensable complement of the submarine campaign; but Ludendorff, believing that the latter could, of itself, bring about a decision, thought it would suffice to gain time for its consummation. With this object the retreat to the new Arras— Aisne (Hindenburg') line was ordered (March 1917), with the view of eluding the impending Allied offensive, and freeing reserves for the defensive campaign. The project of delivering a general counter-attack from the new positions was considered; but it was given up on account of the shortage of reserves, and the uncertainty

of winning 'a real victory on a battlefield rendered impassable.'

Ludendorff, however, was not long in coming round to his predecessor's way of thinking. He found that the waiting game did not pay, although the Allies did not make the most of their opportunities. The break-through on the Vimy ridge (April 9, 1917), might have had, he says, 'far-reaching and serious consequences if the enemy had pushed further forward'; at Messines, also (June 7), 'it was many days before the front was again secure.' Lack of concert between the Allies on the western and eastern fronts enabled him to send six divisions from France to stiffen the Austrians when the Russians attacked in July. But the Austrian troops 'showed a diminution of fighting power which was in the highest degree alarming'; and the moral resolution of the German people was disintegrating. 'It must be revived,' Hindenburg wrote to the Emperor on June 27, 1917, 'or we shall lose the war.' After the Reichstag 'peaceresolution' (July 19, 1917), Bulgaria and Turkey 'began to doubt' whether Germany would be victorious; so also, it appears, did several chiefs of staff of very cool judgment,' under the strain of the campaign in France and Flanders, which disclosed an ominous decline in the moral of the troops.

In fact, the submarine war was not acting quickly enough. After six months' experience Ludendorff began to have misgivings as to its success, unless supplemented be an offensive in France; but this could not be attempted while large forces were locked up on the eastern front. So he returned to his original thesis, that Russia must first be disposed of. To this end he resolved to carry out two offensive measures; the forcing of the Dwina, as a threat to Petrograd, and an advance from the Bukowina into Moldavia. The latter, delayed by the defective condition of the railways, ultimately fell through because troops had to be sent to Italy, to save Austria from collapse in consequence of the double defeat in the Carso and on the Bainsizza Plateau in August and September.

Thus we find that the offensive in Venetia, in October 1917, was an emergency measure, which had not been in the programme.

Ludendorff, evidently bent on heroic

exploits, adopted it in preference to providing a stiffening for the Austrian defence. Indeed, he seems to have burned to take the offensive, always and everywhere, if the situation held out any promise of local success. Falkenhayn, with a more consistent and far-seeing policy, had adhered, as closely as possible, to the defensive on fronts which offered no tangible objective important enough to justify the expenditure of resources already unequal to forcing a decision on the western front. Ludendorff's aim, on this occasion, was to re-animate the languishing Austrians, and to relieve the pressure in France. More than this, he says, was not expected—a statement of doubtful sincerity, in view of the desperate and costly efforts to press the advance beyond the Piave, the failure of which discouraged the Austrians.

*

Ludendorff seems to have realised that the situation prescribed simultaneous attacks on the Isonzo and Trentino fronts; but enough troops were not available for both. As a partial remedy he urged the Austrian Command, after Caporetto, to reinforce Conrad von Hötzendorff (commanding in the Trentino) from Boroevic's army, with a view to the attack being launched between the Brenta and the Adige; but the movement was delayed, as might have been foreseen, by bad railway communications. Even had this delay not occurred, the decisive moment was lost. To be fully effective, the attack should have synchronised with the main offensive, so that it might both enhance and profit by the first alarm; otherwise the comparatively small force which could be maintained by the Trentino railway could not hope to reach the Italian communications through Vicenza and Padua, and so cause the fall of Venice, and, possibly, force the Italian army to retreat behind the Adige. The loss of Venice would, of itself, have been a severe blow to Italy; its salvation, in the critical situation which had arisen, was acclaimed almost as a triumph. In fact, we may pronounce the campaign ill-judged. Like the Allies at the Dardanelles, Ludendorff thought to reduce the sphere of operations to the measure of his forces by cutting off an essential part. The offensive spent itself on the Piave because the Italians, with

* For a discussion of the strategical aspect of the Italian frontier vide 'Quarterly Review,' July 1915.

their allies, stopped Hötzendorff's advance, which would have made the river untenable; while the main armies could not prosecute the frontal attack without awaiting the repair of the communications-a delay which would have enabled the Italians to reorganise their forces and strengthen their defences.

Negotiations having, in the meantime, begun (December 1917) at Brest-Litovsk, it was possible to withdraw troops from Russia. We need not discuss Ludendorff's decision to stake all his resources on one throw. It was the outcome of his military policy; and he disarms criticism to some extent by declaring that there was no alternative, the Quadruple Alliance being 'held together only by the hope of a German victory.' By transferring from other fronts all the troops that could be spared, he expected to gain a superiority of some 20 or 30 divisions in France. Only a few hundred thousand' recruits being available, wastage would have to be made good chiefly by drafts from the eastern front as conditions there should become more settled. The Allies, however, were in no better case, their hopes being based on America. The American troops would be of little value; and their arrival in strength might be forestalled by a German victory. Such, broadly, was Ludendorff's view of the situation.

It remained to choose the objective. From 50 to 60 divisions would be available, sufficing for a frontage of 50 kilometres, with some 20 or 30 batteries per kilometre. Three sectors were considered: Ypres-Arras, Arras-La Fère, and the region of Verdun. Tactical reasons caused the choice to fall upon the centre sector; for, as Ludendorff remarks, it is futile to pursue strategical objects unless tactical success is possible. There the Allied

line was, at the moment, weak; and the country was easy, and little liable to be affected by bad weather. The design was, first, to cut off the force in the Cambrai salient; ultimately, to separate the French and British armies, and to throw the latter back on the sea.

The heroic resistance of the British troops between Croisilles and Moeuvres, where the main attack was directed (March 21, 1918), enabled the force in the Cambrai sector to extricate itself, and to close the gap which the Germans had evidently expected to find