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satisfying it, and secondly by the pressure to begin at once the extended submarine warfare. Herr Zimmermann telegraphed on Jan. 7, 1917:

'American intervention for definite peace negotiations is entirely undesirable to us owing to public opinion here. Also at the present moment we must avoid anything that might deepen the impression among our enemies that our peace offer is in any way the result of our finding ourselves in a desperate position. That is not the case. We are convinced that, economically and from a military point of view, we can bring the war to a victorious conclusion. The question of stating our conditions, therefore, your Excellency will handle dilatorily' (p. 281).

This telegram is most instructive; in reality, the Germans lost the advantage of American support simply because they were afraid of facing the outcry which would probably have been raised in Germany, where there was a strong anti-American feeling. The statement that they could bring the war to a victorious conclusion is directly contrary to all the other evidence that we have, except in so far as the use of unrestricted submarine war might have led to such a result. The pressure to avail themselves of this weapon came from the military authorities, and was supported on the ground that, unless it was used, a German defeat was ultimately unavoidable. Bernstorff's comment (p. 282) is interesting:

'Later, when I returned from America to Germany, I was struck by the small number of my countrymen who privately favoured the submarine war. I therefore still think that German public opinion could easily have been persuaded to accept Mr Wilson's mediation, if the terrorism of the supporters of submarine war had been dealt with in time.'

In fact, at the beginning of January 1917, the German Government were confronted by the fatal decision. They must take one course or the other. They must either accept the President's offer of mediation-in which case they must direct their whole policy and all their actions towards making mediation easy for him and meeting all his wishes, even though they might appear in some cases to be unreasonable; or they must determine on the unrestricted use of submarines-which would

inevitably bring about war with the United States. The decision which they made was taken in open opposition to the advice of their own representative in America, and it is to this that the ultimate defeat of Germany is due. Bernstorff's comment and conclusions, as given in his introduction, looking back on the whole transaction, are as follows:

"To this day I believe the policy of peace to have been the only right policy. A thorough prosecution of the U-boat campaign was also a feasible scheme. But the worst thing we could possibly do was to steer the zigzag course; for by so doing we were certain not only to cause constant vexations to America, but by our half-measures and partial pliancy also to drive Mr Wilson further and further into the inflexible attitude of a policy of prestige. Unfortunately, however, it was precisely this zigzag policy that we adopted; and thus, in addition to destroying the prospects which my policy had offered, we also, according to the view of the naval people, crippled the effects of the U-boat campaign' (p. 9).

The real fault, he declares, goes back to the first year of the war:

'After the first battle of the Marne we ought to have recognised in our heart of hearts that victory was out of the question, and consequently we should have striven to conclude a peace, the relatively unfavourable terms of which might perhaps have temporarily staggered public opinion in Germany and created some indignation' (p. 9).

For this, however, the rulers of the German Empire had not the requisite moral courage, and they were always impeded by the interference of the Military Command in political affairs; the soldiers ought to have been kept 'more thoroughly within bounds, just as they were by Bismarck.' They would, as Bernstorff adds, have been able to perform their own duties quite as well if they had not exercised excessive influence on policy. Always we reach the same conclusion:

"The era of William II perished owing to the fact that no definite objects were either selected or pursued in good time, and above all because, both before and during the war, two systems in the Government of the country were constantly at variance with each other and mutually destructive' (p. 10).

'The

Count Czernin takes precisely the same view. misfortunes of Germany and Austria (he says) arose from the acts which the military party imposed upon the Government.' The greatest disaster was the German entry into Belgium. This was 'a stroke of the Bismarckian policy of violence not carried out by politicians but by generals who were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating consequences.' And he continues (p. 17):

'It will always be particularly difficult, during a war, to define the limits of military and political spheres of action. These activities encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole; and, very naturally, in a war precedence is given to military needs. Nevertheless, the complete degradation of politicians to subordinate positions, which was effected in Germany and thereby made manifest the fact that the Supreme Military Command had possessed itself of all State control, was a misfortune. Had the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing, there would have been no invasion of Belgium, no ruthless U-boat warfare; and an abstention from these two courses would have saved the life of the Central Powers. But from the very first day the Emperor William resembled a prisoner in the hands of his generals.'

We have not left ourselves space for any examination of Count Czernin's book. It must suffice to point out here that it throws a flood of light on the relations between Austria and Germany, both political and military. The important subjects discussed by the author-the relations with Italy, the various proposals for a separate peace with Austria, the whole Polish problem and the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovskbelong to a separate chapter and must be reserved for a later occasion.

Art. 8.—A STRATEGICAL RETROSPECT.

PART II.*

EVENTS in the western theatre during 1915 had little immediate influence on the general course of the war. The limited success of the French and British attacks in the winter and early spring appears to have given Falkenhayn the assurance, without which he would not have ventured to embark upon the offensive campaign in Russia, that the German front in France could, for the time being, be held by reduced forces. Thus, in the period April-June 1915, he transferred 11 divisions from the western to the eastern front. Although the Allies were far from abandoning their belief in the possibility of breaking through the enemy's defensive zone, the operations had, in effect, already assumed the character of a war of attrition, which, except for the heavy losses incurred by both sides, had no definite result. It was not till after the fall of Lemberg (June 1915), when the Allies had exhausted their efforts, that Falkenhayn returned two divisions from the Galician front; and the balance was restored a month later by the counter-movement of an equivalent force from France to reinforce Gallwitz' army on the Narew. Mackensen's advance in the railless region between the Vistula and the Bug was impeded rather than assisted by the unwieldy size of his army-group, while it lay with Gallwitz to intercept the retreat of the Russian armies in Poland, these moves cannot be held to have prejudiced the German operations as a whole. The Allies' autumn offensive in Artois and Champagne (Sept. 25) affected neither the Russian campaign, which was already concluded, nor the invasion of Serbia.

As

The intervention of Italy (May 24, 1915), which the Germans had anticipated with grave anxiety, was too long deferred to be effective. Until Russia's offensive power was crippled it would have been scarcely possible (so Falkenhayn confesses) to hold another enemy at bay'; an admission which justifies the conclusion that, if Italy had declared war a month earlier, Germany would have had to abandon the campaign in Russia,

* Part I was published in the 'Quarterly Review' for April 1920.

and resort to the defensive on all fronts. The moral effect of such a confession of failure may be imagined. In its purely strategical aspect the situation would probably have obliged the Central Powers soon to abandon a contest which it would have been useless, if not impossible, to prolong unless one of their principal adversaries were put out of action before their own resources were seriously diminished. The Germans, alive to the impending danger, induced Austria, after prolonged negotiation, to offer territorial concessions in exchange for Italy's neutrality, in the hope that, at least, time might be gained. Ultimately, the break-through on the Dunajetz enabled the Austrian Command to release forces in time to confront the new menace, without detriment to the campaign in Russia.

Although Italy let slip the opportunity which might have proved decisive, her belated action had a greater influence on the course of the war than might have been expected to result from any merely military effort of which her resources, and the strategical disadvantages of her frontier, would admit. Whereas Falkenhayn saw clearly that the war with Italy was of secondary importance, and that it should be conducted defensively in order to husband the resources of the Alliance for decisive operations, Austria appears to have become obsessed by the idea of recovering Venetia. Thus, while Germany avoided becoming overtly implicated, Austria regarded Italy as her principal enemy-an attitude incompatible with Falkenhayn's designs for the conduct of the war. For the moment, the Austrian Command, acceding to the 'peremptory advice' of the German General Staff, abstained from offensive action against Italy; but an element of discord was introduced into the relations of the two Commands, which, as will be seen later, led to disastrous results.

With the close of the year 1915 the war entered upon a new phase. The campaigns in Russia and in the Near East had determined the main lines on which it was destined to run its course. The division of the theatre of war into a number of independent spheres of operation allowed the Allies little latitude in its conduct, which was sometimes determined less by their own Vol. 234.-No. 465.

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