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of the soul, attended with pleasure or pain, affecting both the mind and the body, and arising from the view of something which is, or appears

to be, good or evil.' If we rank admiration among the passions, which I think is commonly done, we must vary the last clause thus :- and • arising from the view of something which is, or appears to be, good, or evil, or uncommon.' In treating of the passions, I shall, first, make some general remarks upon them; secondly, I shall endeavour to arrange them in classes, and describe the more remarkable ones; and I shall conclude with some rules for the right management of this part of our moral nature. I do not promise, I will not even attempt, a complete enumeration. Some passions may, probably, occur to me, which yet I shall forbear to mention, because I would not put my hearers in mind of them.

280. These emotions have got the name of passions, probably, because in receiving the first impressions of them our mind is passive, being acted upon, or influenced, by the body, by external things, or by the imagination. We may distinguish between the cause of a passion and its ob ject. The cause is that which raises it; the object is that towards which it prompts us to act, or on which it inclines us to fix our attention. The cause and the object of a passion are often, but not always, one and the same thing. Thus pre

sent good is both the cause and the object of joy; we rejoice in it, and we rejoice on account of it. But of love or esteem, the cause is some agreeable quality, and the object is some person supposed to possess that agreeable quality: of resentment, in like manner, injury is the cause, and the injurious person the object.

281. That may be well enough understood which it is not easy to describe philosophically. This part of human nature is, in general, so well understood, that most people know what will draw forth the passions of men, and in what manner those passions operate; yet a complete analysis of them is still, if I mistake not, a desideratum in moral science. The following sketch (for the outline of which I am indebted to Dr. Watts) may have its use, but is very susceptible of improvement. The difficulties attending this subject arise from several causes: from the insufficiency of human language, which does not supply a name for each form and variety of human affection, and of course makes it necessary to express different affections by the same name; from the complex nature of the passions themselves, as they vary their appearance in men of different characters, and in the same man at different times and in different circumstances; and perhaps too from that partiality, which inclines us to think and speak too favourably of those passions that most easily beset M

VOL. I.

ourselves, and with too little favour of such as may seem to predominate in other men.

282. The passions have been variously arranged, according to the various views which have been taken of them. They may be divided into pleasant and painful. Criminal passions bring pain; virtuous affections pleasure. And, therefore, to cherish good affections makes a man happy, and to indulge evil passions makes him wretched: happiness being rather a habit of the mind, than a thing that depends on outward circumstances-for, amidst the greatest worldly prosperity, the state of a man's mind, who is haunted with the horrors of a guilty conscience, or with envy, jealousy, malice, and other evil passions, may make him completely miserable; and disease and poverty united will not make that person unhappy, who has a good conscience, and is piously resigned to the divine will. It may be objected, that some evil passions, as revenge, give pleasure; and that some good ones, pity for example, are painful. But the answer is easy. Of pity, as both a painful and a pleasurable emotion, I have spoken already (§ 190): and, with respect to revenge, I shall only observe at present, that though it may to an indelicate and inconsiderate mind give a momentary gratification, even as gluttony and excessive drinking may to a depraved appetite, it can never bring happiness along with it; because it is accompanied with many tormenting thoughts; because the promiscuous

perpetration of it would unhinge society, and, in time, exterminate the human race; and, because the opposite virtue of forgiveness is one of the most amiable and most delightful (I had almost said, most godlike) affections whereof rational nature is capable.

posses

283. Though the passions are justly reckoned principles of action, (indeed if we had no passions we should never act voluntarily, at least we should never act with alacrity or vigour), they may, however, be divided into such as do not prompt to action, and such as do. Of the former class, which incline rather to rest, by fixing the attention upon their causes or objects, are admiration, joy, and sorrow. Of the latter, which are properly active principles, are hope, fear, desire, aversion, benevolence, gratitude, anger, &c. If joy in the sion of good be blended with the fear of losing it, this will produce an active propensity, disposing us to exert ourselves in the preservation of it. In like manner, if sorrow be mixed with hope, as in the case of one whose friend is dangerously ill; or with fear, or with curiosity, as in the case of one who hears he has lost a friend, but is not informed of the person in these cases, sorrow will become active, and make a man exert himself in procuring relief for his friend in the one case, and in obtaining full information in the other. In all our active passions there is a certain degree of anxiety, restlessness, or desire; which, however, is not always painful. Benevolence is anxious to promote

another's good, and gratitude, to make acknow. ledgments and requite the favour; but these are delightful emotions notwithstanding.

284. The passions may be divided into selfish and benevolent: the former aim at our own good, the latter at the good of others. A rational desire of our own happiness, which may be called selflove, is a powerful and useful propensity, and when rightly managed tends to happiness universal. In this respect, true self-love and social are the 'same. For that must be beneficial to the species, which, without injury to any, promotes the good of the individual; even as that which removes disease from one of the limbs contributes to the health of the whole body. Self-love, when excessive, or when injurious to others, may be called selfishness, and is a hateful disposition.

285. With rational self-love we must not confound those desires which men take to particular worldly things, as power, pleasure, and riches: for so far are these from making a man happy, that they often make him miserable. And it is not so much with a view to happiness, that ambitious, covetous, and sensual men pursue their favourite schemes, as in order to obtain power, wealth, and pleasure; to the possession of which they must know, if they know any thing, that happiness is not annexed. But without power, pleasure, wealth, say they, we cannot be happy, and therefore we pursue them. Sots, in like manner, say, they can