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ticular sort of uneasy feeling in animals, returning at certain intervals, and demanding such gratification as is necessary to support the life of the individual, or to continue the species. The gratification being obtained, the appetite ceases for a while, and is afterwards renewed. Hunger and thirst are two of our natural appetites; their importance to our preservation is obvious; brutes have them as well as we; and the same remarks that are here made on the one, may, with a little variation, be made on the other. Hunger is a complex sensation, and implies two things quite different from each other, an uneasy feeling, and a desire of food. In very young infants it is at first only an uneasy feeling ; which, however, prompts the little animal instinctively to suck and swallow such nourishment as comes in his way, and without which he must inevitably perish. Afterwards, when experience has taught him that the uneasy feeling is to be removed by food, the one suggests the other to his mind, and hunger becomes in him the same complex feeling as in us. In the choice of food, the several species of irrational animals are guided, by instinct chiefly, to that which is most suitable to their nature: and in this respect their instinct is sometimes less fallible than human reason. The mariner in a desert island is shy of eating those unknown fruits, however delectable to sight and smell, which are not marked with the pecking of

275. Before we cease to be infants, our reason informs us that food is indispensable ; but through the whole of life appetite continues to be necessary, to remind us of our natural wants, and the proper time of supplying them : for as nourishment becomes more needful, appetite grows more clamorous; till at last it calls off our attention from every thing else, whether business or amusement; and, if the gratification be still with-held, terminates in delirium and death. Hunger and thirst are the strongest of all our appetites, being the most essential to our preservation : it is generally owing to criminal indulgence, when any other appetite acquires unreasonable strength. In obeying the natural call of appetite, in eating when hungry or drinking when thirsty, there is neither virtue nor vice; unless by so doing we intentionally promote some good purpose, or violate some duty. But rightly to manage our appetites, so as to keep them in due subordination to reason, is a chief part of virtue; as the unlimited or licentious indulgence of them degrades our nature, and perverts all our rational faculties.

276. Rest after motion is essential to life, as well as food after fasting; and, when rest becomes necessary, nature gives the sensation of weariness; which, like hunger and thirst, comes at last to be irresistible, is made up of an uneasy feeling and a desire of a certain object, goes off on being gratiGed, and after a certain interval returns. But we

must not call weariness an appetite, nor is it commonly called so. Appetite prompts to action, weariness to rest ; appetite rises though no action have preceded, weariness follows action as the effect follows the cause. We have a sort of appetite for action in general : it may be called activity : and, when excessive or troublesome to others, is termed restlessness : for, as action is necessary to our welfare both in mind and body, our constitution would be defective, if we had not something to stimulate to action, independently on the dictates of reason. This activity is very conspicuous in children ; who, as soon as they have got the faculty and habit of moving their limbs, and long before they can be said to have the use of reason, are, when in health and awake, almost continually, in motion. It is, however, through the whole of life, so necessary, that without it there can be no happiness. To a person of a sound constitution idleness is misery: if long continued, it impairs, and at last destroys, the vigour of both the soul and the body.

277. It were well for man, if he had no appetites but those that nature gave him ; for they are but few; and they are all beneficial, not only by ministering to his preservation and comfort, but also by rousing him to industry and other laudable exertions. But of unnatural or artificial appetites, if they may be called appetites, which man creates for himself, there is no end ; and the more he ac

quires of these, the more he is dependent, and the more liable to want and wretchedness. It behoves us, therefore, as we value our own peace, and the dignity of our nature, to guard against them. Some of the propensities now alluded to may, no doubt, have been occasioned in part by disease of body, or distress of mind; but they are, in general, owing to idleness and affectation, or to a foolish desire of imitating fashionable absurdity. They are not all criminal, but they all have a tendency to debase us; and by some of them men have made themselves disagreeable, useless, contemptible, and even a nuisance in society. When I mention tobacco, strong liquors, opiates, gluttony, and gaming, it will be known what I mean by unnatural appetite, and acknowledged that I have not characterised it too severely.

SECTION IV.

THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Passions and Affections,

278. The word passion properly means suffering ; but is seldom used in that sense, except when we speak of our Saviour's passion, as in the beginning of Acts of the Apostles. By passion the common people mean little more than anger ; and

anger is a passion, but it is only one of

many. Some philosophers have used the word to signify whatever moves us 'to action ; but this use of it is too extensive. The sense in which I here understand it will appear by and by. When we act voluntarily, it is in order to obtain what is, or appears to be, good, or to avoid what is, or appears to be, evil. Good, real or apparent, excites de sire ; evil, real or apparent, excites aversion : but in this acceptation, the words desire and aversion are used with great latitude. Desires and aversions are two copious classes of passions; and assume different forms, and are called by different names, according to the nature of the good or evil that draws them forth, and its situation with respect to us. For example ; present good gives rise to joy, probable good to hope, present evil to sorrow, probable evil to fear; good qualities in another person raise our love, or liking, evil qualities in another our dislike, &c.

279. Each variety of desire and aversion, as well as every other passion, is agreeable in the feeling, or is disagreeable; and, if in any degree violent, is attended with some commotion in the body as well as in the mind : for, by varying the human countenance and attitude, painters may express almost every passion, which could not be, if the passions did not make perceptible changes in the outward appearance of the body. A passjon, therefore, may be said to be a commotion

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