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defences of Taku cannot possibly be removed, even when the treaty shall have been exchanged.

(Then the demand for) indemnity under different heads, and for the restitution of guns, arms, and vessels, is yet more against decorum (4). The war expenses of China have been enormous. The cost of defending the coast from Kwang-tung and Fuh-kien up to Ticn-tsin, from first to last, has not been short of several millions of money. Were she to demand repayment of England, England would find that her expenses do not amount to the half of those of China.

As to restoring ships and guns, the year before last England destroyed the forts at Taku, and obtained possession of a number of guns belonging to China; ought she not, then, on her part to be considering how to make these good? But, besides this, half the British ships and guns (demanded) were sunk in the sea; they are not in the possession of China at all. The question may be dropped, therefore, by both parties alike.

Then there is (the announcement that) the compromise, the treaties once exchanged (the minister), was to have resided somewhere else, is at an end. The compromise by which once the treaties were exchanged (the minister) was either to select some other place of residence, or to visit (the capital) whenever there might be business of importance to transact, was definitely settled by the British Minister Elgin in negotiating with the imperial Commissioner Kwciliang and his colleagues. The revocation of this compromise now (announced) is even more unreasonable (than all the other propositions).

Last year when, after the Americans had exchanged their treaty, there was an alteration in the rate of tonnage dues, and the ports of Tai-wan and Cheng-chow (Swatow) were opened to trade, the British minister earnestly prayed for a like arrangement (in his favor). The English had not exchanged their treaty, but his majesty the emperor, liberal to foreign nations, and full of tender consideration for the interests of commerce, graciously sanctioned an extension of the boon to the English, for which they should be equally grateful (5). But, if the compromise duly negotiated is to be annulled, there will bo no impropriety on the part of China if she cancel the arrangement by which •he has conceded to the English (the same advantage of) the improvements in tonnage dues and trade that accrues to the Americans under their treaty.

To come to the (British minister's) request to be treated with courtesy when he comes north to exchange treaties. If he be sincere in his desire for peace, let the commissioner, when he shall have thought over all the cle

tails of the treaty, those which it will be proper to give effect to, and those respecting which compromise (or eirangement) is to be made, negotiate (with the British minister), and when both parties shall be perfectly agreed, if he come north without vessels of war, and with a moderate retinue, and will wait at Peh-tang to exchange the treaties, China will not take him to task for what is gone by. He must be directed to acquaint himself with the rules (observed or laid down) at the exchange of the American treaties, and the course to be pursued will be further discussed with him (by the commissioner). But if he be resolved to bring up a number of vessels of war, and if he insist in proceeding by way of Taku, this will show that his true purpose is not the exchange of treaties, and it must be left to the high officer ia charge of the coast (or port) defences to take such steps as shall be thereby rendered necessary (lit., as shall accord with reason).

The despatch written on this occasion (by the British minister) is, in much of its language, too insubordinate and extravagant (for the council) to discuss its propositions more than superficially (lit., to go deep into argument). For the future he must not be so wanting in decorum.

The above remarks will have to be communicated by the commissioner to the British minister, whom it will behoove not to adhere obstinately to his own opinion, as, so doing, he will give cause to much trouble hereafter.

A necessary communication.

[In copying this Chinese State Paper, we cannot refrain from saying that we think the KnglisU entirely in the wrong, and the Chinese entirely in the right. It makes one's heart ache to think of the misery which Barbarism is about to inflict upon Civilization.—Living Age.}

From The Saturday Review, 26 May. THE DIPLOMATIC HOKIZON. Among the motives which induced the Lords to take the very serious step of enforcing the retention of a tax repealed by the Commons, a prominent place is to be assigned to the conviction that the money will be needed for the defence of the country and of Europe. The war with China was on the lips of the speakers. A very different war was in their minds. Mr. Gladstone's Budget is justly condemned as tending — if not, as its judicious friends insinuate, actually meant—to cripple the nation on the eve, it may be, of a great struggle. It is too true that the cruel and profligate rapacity of the French Government still threatens Europe with war. Public accounts announce continued activity in the French arsenals, and new additions to the already enormous numbers of the French army. With these accounts our private information entirely corresponds. If, indeed, we were to believe all the statements that come to us, we should be driven to the conclusion that the immediate aim of the French Emperor's aggressive preparations was our shores. But it has never seemed, nor docs it now seem, to us probable that we shall be the next assailed. The trial which awaits us is not that of making up our minds to defend our own country, as to which we are all agreed. It is that of making up our minds to assist with our whole force the next European nation which may become the victim of an aggression sure, ultimately, to extend to ourselves. There is among us, as there has been in all nations bound to other nations by interest and duty, and threatened in common with them, a party anxious, from shortsighted selfishness, to desert the confederacy, and convinced—if wilful infatuation can be called conviction—that the insolent aggressor will be appeased by weakness and submission. On the co-operation of this party, which he has done his utmost to secure—as veil as on the personal connections which he has been unhappily able to form with our leading statesmen — Louis Napoleon probably calculates as a check, at any critical moment, upon what he must see to be the rising spirit of the English people. But he probably calculates still more, and certainly with much better reason, on the great fleet which he is creating — it may be, not for immediate purposes of maritime aggression, but as a screw on England, while Ms other designs are carried out, first, perhaps, in the East, then upon the Rhine.

We will go as far as any peacemonger in abusing war, and deploring the waste of national wealth in powder and shot. The present situation seems to us no more glorious than being waylaid by a highwayman or chased by a pirate. The only comfort we can draw from it is, that the nation may become—and, indeed, it has already become— greater under the trial, and that the issue of the contest may be to quell, once for all, the •pint of French ambition, and give to Europe, and to France herself, the blessing of secure and lasting peace. But it is idle to doubt the existence or the immincncy of the danger. It springs, as we have before said, from no personal or accidental cause, but from causes deeply seated in the history and temper of the French people. Fawning on the emperor to prevent French aggression, is like stroking the crater of Vesuvius to prevent an eruption. If Louis Napoleon is not the elect of the French people, he is their representative. With the exception of that: email party of Constitutionalists, which our j

statesmen have clone their best to alienate^ all France goes -with him heart and soul in his schemes. Not a twinge of shame was felt by the nation at the annexation of Savoy, or at the nefarious arts by which it was accomplished. The mendacity, the duplicity, the hypocritical pretexts, the insolent mockery of universal suffrage, as they led to the aggrandizement of France, were received with unalloyed satisfaction and universal applause. This proof of the utter absence of a controlling conscience in a nation armed with enormous powers of aggression, is the really formidable part of the Savoy affair. When our government, in manifest, though irregular, self-defence, seized the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, its act was arraigned, and has never ceased to-be arraigned by a large party in the nation, as contrary to the laws of morality and the national honor. Lord Palmerston was condemned by the House of Commons for his filibustering in China; and if a majority of the constituencies reversed the condemnation, they did so in the conviction that his act was reconcilable with honor, strengthened, perhaps, by the recollection of his conduct and that of his opponents during the Russian war. But in France, it is enough for the author of a hundred perfidies and treacheries to plead that he has added to the sacred territory of "the sun of nations," and his statue is at once crowned with laurels, and placed by French historians in the pantheon of everlasting fame. What has France left herself but military ambition? What hold, but the gratification of her military ambition, lias Louis Napoleon, or any adventurer who may climb into his place when he is gone, unon the heart of a nation which, to do it justice, has never been content with bread alone? Six hundred thousand Frenchmen are in arms, and a vast fleet has been collected for the indulgence of the ruling passion. Would the ruler of France be permitted, even if he were disposed, to send the men back to their homes inglorious, and leave the fleet to rot useless in the nortsP

The diplomatic horizon is everywhere dark, and in the east it portends storm. Yet, upon the whole, it is not unhopeful. The traditional object of French diplomatists is to surround France with weak and subservient nations. That object is now in a fair way to be completely frustrated by a course of events to which France herself has unwittingly contributed. The enterprise of Garibaldi tends to liberate Italy from the French as well as from the Bourbons and the Austrians. Of this fact the French government, through its journals, has shown itself well aware. An attempt will probably be made to set up a French satrapy in place of the expelled tyrant of Naples, as an attempt was made to set up a French satrapy in place of the expelled grand duke of Tuscany; but there is reason to hope that it will be made •with no better success. The real Muratist party at Naples consists of two or three surviving officials of the old Muratist regime; and an appeal to universal suffrage, managed by French agents and coerced by the French bayonets -which we are not surprised to hear are for the present to remain at Rome, is a scheme which, familiar as it may be to the imperial mind, it would surely not be very difficult to foil. We may venture to hope, therefore, that Italy -will be great and indc

, pendent. In Germany, matters look not so well. The Prussian regent's assurance of universal loyalty to the fatherland must, we fear, be read rather as an exhortation than as a statement of fact. Yet even in Germany all is at bottom tending the right way. After the blow which French vengeance has inflicted on her, Austria must reform thoroughly, and restore the independence of her different populations, or she must die. The issue of her wavering fate is now the grand point of interest iu European politics. But, be that issue what it may—whether Austria deceive all expectation by putting tyranny and Jesuitism finally behind her, and returning to the better path, or whether she go to pieces, as every thing now portends—she will cease to be a power of evil in German councils j and nothing but her influence prevents Germany from being, for defensive purposes as least, a united nation. No doubt, should a crisis immediately arrive, a road might be opened to the enemy by the treachery of the petty German princes whose meanness French diplomatists so thoroughly understand, and have so often turned to fatal account. The partial mediatization of petty principalities which took place after the war with Napoleon has, unfortunately, not proved a real approach to that great European object—the unity of the German nation. It has rather tended to create in the confederacy separate interests of a stronger and more uncontrollable kind. The old confederation, with as many independent states as there are days in the year, was in some respects more

• capable of being controlled by a Diet or a dictator in the hour of danger, and offered less facility to an intriguing enemy seeking to form a treacherous combination in his own favor. To expect self-sacrifice of the German princes would be imbecile. It is the misfortune of royalty, especially of petty royalty, to be reared in a fool's paradise oi consecrated selfishness, which shuts out all thoughts more noble than the preservation of dynastic interests. But across the boundaries of the petty states an intense desire

for union, and an intelligent sense of the common interests of the nation, have spread through the whole German race; and it may well be hoped that in case of extremity an effort would be made, under the leadership of Prussia, which would shake royal and serene traitors out of their thrones. French intrigue is indirectly accelerating German unity, as the seizure of Savoy has roused [he spirit of Italian independence. And with Germany united, Italy free, Spain restored to something of her pristine spirit, and England as she is, Europe and liberty will not have much cause to fear lest they should be piled into a pedestal for the vanity of Paris.

From The Saturday Review, 26 May. SPANISH AMERICAN REPUBLICS. The Spanish American republics have now for thirty years been the opprobrium of liberty, and the friends of free institutions have grieved over them too long not to be glad of any explanation which does away with the necessity of dwelling on their wild pell-mell of revolutions, constitutions, civil wars, and dictatorships. Such an explanation is furnished by an interesting paper in the Rente des Deux Mondes. The point of it is that the disturbances of Mexico and of South America proceed nearly exclusively from the Indian clement in those countries. Englishmen have been dimly conscious that the so-called Spanish Americans are a mongrel race, but they have probably had very inadequate ideas of the extent to which the Spanish blood has been diluted, and it is certainly a fact known to few that almost every revolutionary leader is a pure Indian. We are curiously misled by the Spanishsounding names of these Mexican and South American worthies. Many of us have the impression that Juarez, Vidaurri, and Dcgollado are as actual Spanish gentlemen as Sartorius, Narvaez, and O'Donncll. Yet the truth is, that the three persons named, who arc all Mexicans, generals, and Constitutionalists, are neither more or less than fullblooded Indians, and are therefore much nearer relations of the Ojibbcways who were exhibited in London a few seasons ago than of nny Hidalgo in Spain. It need not be said that this circumstance entirely destroys the importance of the Spanish American revolutions as precedents or illustrations. The king of Siam, according to Sir John Bowring, is a very intelligent sovereign, and the establishment of a Nepaulcse republic at Katmandoo would be a very singular event, but nobody would dream of basing nny political lesson on the intellect of the Siamese monarch or en the democratic institutions of Napaul. Consciously or unconsciously, ive regard no changes of government as political phenomena having interest for ourselves except such as occur among races which were reared in the religion and civilization of Western Europe. A revolution or civil war in Spanish America is at most curious. The only feeling stronger than curiosity which it should excite is pity for the minority of Europeans or semi-Europeans •which remains in most of these countries, and is oppressed or massacred at pleasure by masters who, though they speak Spanish and call themselves Christians, are, in reality, savages let loose.

The difference between a European and an Indian leader is well illustrated by the history of the rival presidents of the Mexican republic. Juarez, the so-called Constitutionalist president who was lately besieged in Vera Cruz, is, as has been stated, an Indian of unmixed blood. Miramon, who has been styled the president of the Church party, is, on the contrary, a Frenchman by the father's side end a Spaniard by the mother's—in other words, a European descended from two of the finest races in Europe. Of the merits of the contest in which these two leaders are engaged we shall only say that it has been grossly misapprehended in the United States and in England. It turns on the confiscation of Church property; and this circumstance has caused some degree of mild favor to be extended here and in America to Juarez, who is the champion of the anticlerical faction. But it is the most foolish of mistakes to institute a comparison between the pillage of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico and the curtailment of its excessive endowments in such a country as Sardinia. The Mexican clergy are certainly indolent end ignorant, according to European standards; but, with all their defects, they alone prevent the Mexican people from relapsing into the belief and practices of savage life. The Haytian negro, when the destruction of the whites relieved him from the control of his priests, went straight back to his Obi, which he scarcely deigns to overlay with a thin varnish of Christianity; and the Mexican, whether Indian or mongrtl.can scarcely even now be kept by all the vigilance of his spiritual pastor from throwing himself into sorcery and fetish-worship. The cause cf the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico is therefore for once the cause of civiliza.tion; and, if the truth were known, it would probably be found that Juarez, who is panegyrized'by the American papers as the liberal and enlightened antagonist of spiritual despotism, is simply the foe of the priests because he prefers some private enchantment of his own to the celebration of the i...-. It is not, however, in their views of

clerical influence that Miramon and Juarez are most advantageously contrasted. The writer in the Revue des Deux Mondes mentions several incidents in Miramon's career nrhich ore curiously characteristic of the European as distinguished from the Indian. He was originally called to the presidency while engaged in a campaign at a distance Vom the capital. A promtnciamiento had jeen successfully accomplished ill the city of Mexico, and the revolutionists thought to strengthen themselves by placing at their dead a young and victorious general. Miramon, immediately on his return to Mexico, disavowed the entire revolution, and refused to accept the distinction proffered to him. This unheard-of disinterestedness naturally caused him to be looked upon as a very different sort of Conservative from any hitherto known in that corr.try, and is the foundation of all his political influence. Other actions of his mentioned in the Ecvue are his immediate restoration of large sums of money seized by his lieutenants, and his repeated refusals to shed more blood than could be helped. The virtues thus indicated would not be extraordinarily remarkable in Europe, and it is evident that in Mexico they might have proceeded quite as much from calculation as from character; but the thing to be noted is, that these actions of Miramon's are just those which no man of Indian breed is capable of practising. No politician of the native race ever yet sacrificed the opportunity of elevating himself to station, or gave back money which he could spend, or spared an enemy whom it was safe to kill. Juarez sold his country to the Americans without a pang; but civilized men have done this before him, and the fatal symptom about him is not his treason, but his absolute inability to forego an immediate for an ultimate advantage, or to disappoint for one day his savage instincts of cupidity and revenge.

In all Central and South America there are only two countries — Brazil end Chili— which are not governed by absolute dictators under the forms of a Republic. With hardly one exception, these dictators are pure Indians, or mulattocs in whom the Indian and negro are mixed, or men with some Spanish blood in their veins, who, like the early Norman settlers in Ireland, have contracted a taste for savage life, and have abjured the habits of civilization. Of this last class there are some curious samples in South America — such as Urquiza in the Argentine Confederation, Castilla in Peru, and the Monagas family, who, though now displaced, all but succeeded in founding a dynasty in Venezuela. All these dictators have one peculiarity in ccmmon. Though they have all commenced their reign by expean tongue. Uniiarianism

pelling the legislature of their country at to understand, that there should be a " double the point of the bayonet, they invariably marriage" between the royal families of belong to the Constitutionalist or Liberal' Great Britain and of Hohenzollern: such party. This party has its newspapers and double marriage as was seriously contemits pamphlets, on looking into which the plated a century ago by the then monarchs reader sees the maxims of extreme French of England and Prussia, but unfortunately socialistic democracy enforced in stately '• broken off at the eleventh hour, to the great Castilian. Is there, then, a leaven of socialism in Spanish America P Not a bit of it. It is all a sham and a pretence, like the Christianity, the civilization, and the Euro

The true contest is between

and Federalism, a dispute which, in form, involves the question whether the State shall be governed from its capital or shall be split into nearly independent provinces, but which, in reality, resolves itself into a struggle between the European and the Indian—the man of culture and the savage. All the enlightenment and education of Spanish America is confined to the older cities, the seats of Spanish dominion under the monarchy. If the Unitarians proTail, it is the comparatively civilized capital which governs the wild men of the provinces. If the Federalists have their way, the savage of the open country rules the civilized man of the city. As a fact, the controversy has universally ended in the triumph of the Federalists; and as the Indians and mongrels, who arc the strength of this faction, have no idea of freedom and no capacity for rule, their success has always resulted in the boldest or bloodiest among them seizing the reins of government and proclaiming himself dictator. We have said that if these events excite any emotion in us, it should be compassion for the unhappy inhabitants of such places as Lima, Quito, Caraccas, Buenos Ayrcs, Montevideo, or the city of Mexico. Their civilization is but a poor one at best, but they have had their age of heroism, and a short era of freedom, and they have sensibility enough to feel the humiliation, as well as the other consequences, of ;overned by men who always conduct

ives like savages, and sometimes like

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jrief of a certain crown-prince, Frederick, no less than of his latest British biographer. Indeed, history tells us that German princes have always been very fond of arranging these cross-alliances as we might call them; and that it is owing to the principle which they involve, that the whole of European royalty is at the present moment one vast Family of brothers, sisters, and cousins. The Emperor Napoleon is, we believe, the only monarch of the western world not directly related to this august family; though even he, by means of more or less distant cousin ship, is somewhat drawn towards the mystic circle. With this single exception, if it is such, the whole of the royal houses of Europe form but one family, all the members of which are blood relations. The stock or root of this family is in Germany—the "fatherland" pre-eminently—and it is there, apparently, that a continual desire is felt more and more to unite the branches of this tree, more and more to engraft like on like. The title of courtesy of " mon frere," by which European sovereigns address each other, is to become ultimately a complete reality.

This progressive tendency towards a close family union of all the irresponsible rulers of the civilized world is a rather important fact in modern history, and one deserving the attention of others than heralds and pursuivants at arms. Like every thing else in this sublunary world of ours, there are at least two sides from which this question may be envisaged, a favorable and an unfavorable. On the one side, there is an undoubted advantage in these family alliances of kings for the general peace of Europe. Though, as we all know, brothers do sometimes quarrel and have disagreeable misunderstandings, yet on the whole, the contrary is the case, nature having made the wise provision that of all ties which keep men together, none shall be so strong and so poweri'ul as the tie of blood. A mere glance over the political events of the last four or five centuries shows that international wars have almost invariably been guided, if not actually planned by sovereigns not connected by family alliances; and, that these wars have diminished in Europe in a direct ratio to the increase of relationship between the different princes. It would be easy to adduce examples of this proposition, even during so recent a period as that from the Congress of Vienna, and the establishment of the Holy Alliance up to

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