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tions, support by turns all substances out of each other, so that, as Hamlet says, from the idea of this rotation,

Imperial Cæsar, dead and turn'd to clay,

May stop a hole, to keep the winds away.

The question, in short, is, whether, in this world which we inhabit, there be not an universal mutation of all things into all.' there be, then must there be some one primary matter, common to all things; I say, some one primary matter, and that common to all things, since, without some such matter, such mutation would be wholly impossible.

But if there be some one primary matter, and that common to all things; this matter must imply, not (as particular and subordinate matters do) a particular privation, and a particular capacity, but, on the contrary, universal privation, and universal capacity."

If the notion of such a being appear strange and incomprehensible, we may further prove the necessity of its existence from the following considerations.

Either there is no such general change, as here spoken of, which is contrary to fact, and would destroy the sympathy and

The Peripatetics, according to the erroneous astronomy by them adopted, supposed the fixed stars, the planets, the sun, and the moon, to move all of them round the earth, attached to different spheres, which moved and carried them round, the earth itself being immoveable, and placed in the centre of the universe. This motion, purely and simply local, was the only one they allowed to these celestial bodies, which in essence they held to be perfectly unchangeable. Things on the surface of this earth, (such as plants and animals,) and things between that surface and the moon, (such as clouds, meteors, winds, &c.) these they supposed obnoxious to motions of a more various and complicated character; motions which changed them in their qualities and quantities, and which even led to their generation and dissolution, to life and to death. Hence the whole tribe of these mutable and perishable beings were called sublunary, because the region of their existence was beneath the sphere of the It was here existed those elements which, as Milton tells us,

moon.

in quaternion run Perpetual circle, multiform, and mix And nourish all things. Par. Lost.

It was here that Aristotle held-ör av ἐκ παντὸς γίνεσθαι πέφυκε, “ that every thing was naturally formed to arise out of every thing." Lib. de Ortu et Int. p. 39. edit. Sylb.

Ocellus Lucanus (from whom, and from Archytas, Timæus, and the other Pytha

goreans, both Plato and Aristotle borrowed much of their philosophy) elegantly calls this imaginary sphere of the moon's orbit, ἰσθμὸς ἀθανασίας καὶ γενήσεως, “ the isthmus of immortality and generation ;" that is, the boundary which lies between things immortal and things transitory. Gale's Opusc, Mythog. p. 516.

The Stoics went further than this isthmus. They did not confine these changes to a part only of the universe; they supposed them to pass through the whole; and to continue without ceasing, till all was at length lost in their ἐκπύρωσις, οι general conflagration;" after which came a new world, and then a new conflagration, and so on periodically. Diog. Laert. vii. 135, 141, 142.

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" Τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, δυνάμενον ἁπάσας δέχεσθαι τὰς μορφὰς, ἐν στερήσει μév éσTI àñаσŵv: "The primary subject or matter, having a capacity to admit all forms, exists in a privation of them all." Themist. in Aristot. Physic. p. 21.

Themistius well distinguishes between two words, expressing the same being; I mean, ὑποκείμενον and ὕλη. The first he makes the subject or substratum of something actually existing; the other, that matter which has a capacity of becoming many things, before it actually becomes any one of them.

This is that one being, mentioned by Diogenes, whose words we have quoted in the preceding chapter, p. 263, note k.

congeniality of things; or if there be, there must be a matter of the character here established, because without it (as we have said) such change would be impossible.

Add to this, however hard universal privation may ap pear, yet had the primary matter in its proper nature any one particular attribute, so as to prevent its privation from being unlimited and universal, such attribute would run through all things, and be conspicuous in all. If it were white, all things would be white; if circular, they would be circular; and so as to other attributes, which is contrary to fact. Add to this, that the opposite to such attribute could never have existence, unless it were possible for the same thing to be at once and in the same instance both white and black, circular and rectilinear, &c. since this inseparable attribute would necessarily be everywhere, because the matter, which implies it, is itself everywhere; at least, may be found in all things that are generated and perish

able.

Here, then, we have an idea (such as it is) of that singular being, un πрorn, the "primary matter;" a being which those philosophers, who are immerged in sensible objects, know not well how to admit, though they cannot well do without it; a being, which flies the perception of every sense, and which is at best even to the intellect but a negative object, no otherwise comprehensible than either by analogy or abstraction.

* This argument is taken from Plato. Speaking of the primary matter, he says, Ομοιον γὰρ ἐν τῶν ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ, τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας, τά τε τῆς παράπαν ἄλλης φύσεως, ὁπότ ̓ ἔλθοι, δεχόμενον, κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὐτοῦ παρεμφαίνων ὄψιν: “Were it like any of those things that enter into it, in such case, when it came to receive things of a nature contrary and totally different from itself, it would exhibit them ill, by shewing its own nature along with them at the same time." Plat. Tim. p. 50.

Thus Chalcidius, in commenting the passage here quoted: Si sit aliquid candidum, ut ψιμμύθιον, deinde oporteat hoc transferri in alium colorem, vel diversum, ut ruborem sive pallorem, vel contrarium, ut atrum; tunc candor non patietur introeuntes colores synceros perseverare, sed permixtione sui faciet interpolatos. Chalcid. in Tim. Com. p. 434.

Hence we see the propriety of those de scriptions which make the primary matter to be "void of body, of quality, of bulk, of figure,” &c.: ἀσώματος, ἄποιος, ἀμεγέθης,

ἀσχημάτιστος, ἄμορφος, κ. τ. λ.

So strange a being is it, and so little comprehensible to common ideas, that the Greeks had no name for it in their language, until "An came to be adopted as the proper word, which was at first only assumed by

way of metaphor, from signifying "timber" or "wood," the common materials in many works of art. Hence it was that Ocellus, Timaeus, and Plato employ various words, and all of them after the same metaphorical manner, when they would express the na ture of this mysterious being. Ocellus calls it, πανδεχὲς καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον τῆς γενέσεως, "the universal recipient, and impression of things generated," as wax receives impres sions from various seals. Timæus uses the word λa in the Doric dialect, and explains it (like Ocellus) by kuayeĵor, to which he adds the appellations of parépa Kai Tiodrar, "mother and nurse." Plato calls it, first, πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν, οἷον τιθήνην, "the receptacle of all generation, as its nurse,” then, παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ rodox, "the mother and receptacle of every sensible object." Gale's Opuse. My tholog. p. 516. 544. Platon. Tim. p. 47. 51. edit. Serr. See Hermes, p. 205, note c

Aristotle also observes, consistently with one of the above expressions, aèv yàp ὑπομένουσα, συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γινομέ νων ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ : " that the matter, by remaining, is in concurrence with the form, a cause of things generated, under the character of a mother." Phys. 1. i. c. 9. p. 22. edit. Sylb.

We gain a glimpse of it by abstraction, when we say that the first matter is not the lineaments and complexion, which make the beautiful face; nor yet the flesh and blood, which make those lineaments, and that complexion; nor yet the liquid and solid aliments, which make that flesh and blood; nor yet the simple bodies of earth and water, which make those various aliments; but something which, being below all these, and supporting them all, is yet different from them all, and essential to their existence."

We obtain a sight of it by analogy, when we say, that as is the brass to the statue, the marble to the pillar, the timber to the ship, or any one secondary matter to any one peculiar form; so is the first and original matter to all forms in general."

• Abstraction appears to have been used by Plato: Διὸ τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γὴν, μήτε ἀέρα, μήτε πῦρ, μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μήτε ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ ̓ ἀόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πη τοῦ νοητοῦ, καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες, οὐ ψευσόμεθα: “ Let us therefore say, that the mother and receptacle of every visible, nay, of every sensible production, is neither earth, nor air, nor fire, nor water, nor any of the things which arise out of these, nor out of which these arise, but a certain invisible and formless being, the universal recipient; concerning which being, if we say it is in a very dubious way intelligible, and something most hard to be apprehended, we shall not speak a falsehood." Plat. Tim. p. 51. edit. Serr.

Thus Chalcidius: Sublatis quæ sunt singulis, quod solum remanet, ipsum esse, quod quæritur. In Tim. Com. p. 371.

a The method of reasoning on this subject by analogy was used by Aristotle. 'H δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατὰ ἀναλο via is yàp πрòs àvdpiávтa xaλds, πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει, πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν· οὕτως αὕτη *pòs ovσlav exei, kai tò tóde ti, Kal Tò v. Phys. 1. i. c. 7. p. 20. edit. Sylb. "The subject, nature, (that is, the primary matter,) is knowable in the way of analogy: for as is the brass to the statue, the timber to the bed, or the immediate and formless material to any of those things which have form before it assumes that form, so is this [general and primary] matter to substance, and to each particular thing. and to each particular being."

Not that Aristotle rejected the argument from abstraction. Λέγω δ ̓ ὕλην ἡ καθ' αἱ τὴν μήτε τι, μήτε ποσόν, μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γάρ τι, καθ ̓ οὗ

κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον, καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστη: “Ι mean, by matter, that which of itself is not denominated either this particular substance, or that particular quantity, or any other of those attributes, by which being is characterized. It is indeed that, of which each one of these is predicated, and which has an essence different from every one of the predicaments." Metaph. Z. p. 106. edit. Sylb.

And here we may observe, that as abstraction and analogy are the two methods by which this strange being (as it has been called) was investigated by the ancient philosophers, so for that reason Timæus tells us, that it was made known to us, λoyoμ vółw, “by a spurious kind of reasoning," p. 545. Plato says the same, only he is more full. Matter, according to him, was μετ ̓ ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν, λογισμῷ Tivì vółw μóyis miotóv: "Something tangible without sensation, something hard to be believed, and that by means of a spurious kind of reasoning." Tim. Plat. p. 52. edit. Serr.

This spurious reasoning is explained by Timæus, who says, that matter is so comprehended, τῷ μήκω κατ ̓ εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι, “by its not being understood in a direct way, but only obliquely, and by implication." Opusc. Myth. Gale, p. 545.

As to the being "tangible without sensation," this means, that though it be an essential to body, which appears to make it tangible, yet the abstraction makes it stand under the same character to the touch, as darkness stands to the sight, silence to the hearing; we cannot be said to see the one, nor to hear the other; and yet without the help of those two senses we could have no comprehension of those two negations, or, perhaps more properly, those two sensible privations.

Both Timæus and Plato drop expressions, as if they considered matter to be place.

And here, if a digression may be permitted, let us reflect for a moment on the character of old Proteus.

Omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum,
Ignemque, horribilemque feram, fluviumque liquentem.
Thus Virgil: thus, before him, Homer;

Πάντα δὲ γιγνόμενος πειρήσεται, ὅσσ ̓ ἐπὶ γαῖαν
Ερπετὰ γίνονται, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ.
"Made into all things, all he'll try; become
Each living thing, that creeps on earth; will glide
A liquid stream, or blaze a flaming fire."b

Georg. iv.

Οδυσσ. Δ. 417.

What wonder, if this singular deity suggests to us that singular being, which we have been just attempting to describe? The allegory was too obvious to escape the writers of any age, and there are many, we find, by whom it has been adopted.c

Timæus calls it τόπος and χώρα; Plato calls it χώρα and ἕδρα. Opusc. Myth. p. 544. Plat. Tim. p. 52.

Chalcidius elegantly shews, how in this negative manner it attends all the predicaments, and serves for a support to each. Essentia est, ut opinor, cum cam species, &c. See Com. in. Tim. p. 438.

To the poets here quoted may be added, Horace Sat. lib. ii. s. 3. v. 73. Ovid. Metam. viii. 730.

That great parent of mythology as well as poetry, Homer, not only informs us concerning Proteus, but concerning his daughter Eidothea, who discovered her father's abode. We shall perceive in the explanations which follow, how this fable applies itself to the subject of the present chapter.

"Some," says Eustathius, when he comments the passage above cited from Homer, hold "Proteus to be that original matter, which is the receptacle of forms; that, which being in actuality no one of these forms, is yet in capacity all of them; which Proteus (they add) Eidothea, his daughter, is elegantly said to discover, by leading him forth out of capacity into actuality; that is, she is that principle of motion which contrives to make him rush into form, and be moved and actuated."

Heraclides Ponticus, having adopted the same method of explaining, subjoins: "That hence it was with good reason, that the formless matter was called Proteus; and that providence, which modified each being with its peculiar form and character, was called Eidothea."

The words of Eustathius, in the original, are-Πρωτέα τὴν πρωτόγονον εἶναι ὕλην, τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν δεχάδα, τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν οὖσαν μηδὲν τῶν εἰδῶν, δυνάμει δὲ τὰ πάνταὃ δὴ Πρωτέα καλῶς λέγεται ἡ Εἰδοθέα ἐκφαίνειν, διὰ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν προαγωγῆς ἤγουν ἡ

κίνησις, ἡ εἰς εἶδος θέειν αὐτὸν, καὶ κινεῖ σθαι μηχανωμένη. Eustath. in Hom. Odyss. p. 177. edit. Basil.

We shall only remark, as we proceed, that the etymology here given of Eidothea, eis eidos Oée, "to rush into form," is invented, like many other ancient etymologies, more to explain the word philosophically, than to give us its real origin. It is, perhaps, more profitable, though not equally critical, to etymologize after this manner; and such appears to have been the common practice of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.

The words of Heraclides areὭστε ην λογον, τὴν μὲν ἄμορφον ὕλην Πρωτέα και λεῖσθαι, τὴν δ ̓ εἰδωλοπλαστήσασαν ἕκαστα Пpóvoiav Eidoléav. Heraclid. Pontic. p. 490. Gale's Opusc. Mythog. 8vo.

To these Greeks may be subjoined a respectable countryman of our own.

Lord Verulam tells us of Proteus, that he had his herd of scals, or sea-calves; that these it was his custom every day to tell over, and then to retire into a cavern, and repose himself. Of this we read the following explanation: "That under the person of Proteus is signified matter, the most ancient of all things, next to the Deity; that the herd of Proteus was nothing else, than the ordinary species of animals, plants, and metals, into which matter appears to diffuse, and, as it were, to consume itself; so that after it has formed and finished those several species, (its task being in a manner complete,) it appears to sleep and be at rest, nor to labour at, attempt, or prepare any species further." De Sapientia Vet. c. 13.

The author's own words are, Sub Protei enim persona materia significatur, omnium rerum post Deum antiquissima. Pecus autem, sive grex Protei non aliud videtur esse, quam species ordinaria animalium, plantarum, metallorum, in quibus materia

CONCERNING FORM-AN

CHAPTER V.

IMPERFECT DESCRIPTION OF IT. PRIMARY FORMS, UNITED WITH MATTER, MAKE BODY. BODY MATHEMATICAL -BODY PHYSICAL-HOW THEY DIFFER. ESSENTIAL FORMS. TRANSITION TO FORMS OF A CHARACTER SUPERIOR TO THE PASSIVE AND ELEMENTARY.

FORM is that elementary constituent in every composite substance, by which it is distinguished and characterized, and known from every other. But to be more explicit.

d

The first and most simple of all extensions is a line. This, when it exists united with a second extension, makes a superficies; and these two, existing together with a third, make a solid. Now this last and complete extension we call the first and simplest form; and when this first and simplest form accedes to the first and simplest matter, the union of the two produces body, which is for that reason defined to be "matter triply extended." And thus we behold the rise of pure and original body.

videtur se diffundere, et quasi consumere; adeo ut, postquam istas species effinxerit, et absolverit, (tanquam penso completo,) dormire et quiescere videatur, nec alias amplius species moliri, tentare, aut parare.

4 See the first note in the preceding chapter, and page 275.

• Original body, when we look downwards, has reference to the primary matter, its substratum; when we look upwards, becomes itself a λn, or "matter to other things;" to the elements, as commonly called air, earth, water, &c.; and in consequence to all the variety of natural productions.

Hence it is, that Ammonius, speaking of the first matter, says, auтn obv, oykw θεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ποιεῖ τὸ dεÚTEрov aоLOV owμa: "this [that is, the first matter] being embulked with three extensions, makes the second matter or subject, that is to say, body void of quality. After having shewn how natural qualities and attributes stood in need of such a subject for their existence, he adds, (which is worth remarking,) oux öтi v TоTE EVEργείᾳ ἡ ὕλη ἀσώματος, ἢ σῶμα ἄποιον, ἀλλὰ τὴν εὔτακτον τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν θεωροῦντες φαμὲν, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διαιροῦντες ταῦτα, Tà tỷ qúoei áxplora: "not that there ever was in actuality either matter without body, or body without quality; but we say So, as we contemplate the well ordered

generation of things, dividing those things in imagination, which are by nature inseparable." Ammon. in Præd. p. 62.

Συνεχὲς μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά· σῶμα δὲ, τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετόν μεγέθους δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐφ ̓ ἕν, γραμμή· τὸ δ ̓ ἐπὶ δύο, ἐπίπεδον· τὸ δ ̓ ἐπὶ τρία, σῶμα· καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο μέγεθος, διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τρὶς Távτy: “Continuous is that, which is divisible into parts infinitely divisible; body is that which is every way divisible. Of extensions, that which is divisible one way, is a line; that which is divisible two ways, is a superficies; that which is divisible three ways, is body; and besides these there is no other extension, because three are all, and thrice [divisible] is every way [divisible.] Aristot. de Cœlo, 1. i. c. 1.

In support of this last idea, (that the term three implies all,) Aristotle refers to the common practice of his own language— Τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ἀμφὼ λέγομεν, καὶ τοὺς δύο ἀμφοτέρους, πάντα δ ̓ οὐ λέγομεν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν paμèν прŵтоν: “We call (says he) two things, or tuo persons, both; but we do not call them all, it is with regard to three that we first apply this appellation," (viz. the appellation of all.) Arist. in loc.

This is true likewise in Latin; and is true also in English. Even the vulgar, with us, would be surprised were they to

T

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