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INTRODUCTION.

ON TASTE.

ΟΝ

Na fuperficial view, we may feem to differ very widely from each other in our reasonings, and no less in our pleasures: but notwithftanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the ftandard both of reason and tafte is the fame in all human creatures. For if there were not fome principles of judgment as well as of fentiment common to all mankind, no hold could poffibly be taken either on their reafon or their paffions, fufficient to maintain the ordinary correfpondence of life. It appears indeed to be generally acknow ledged, that with regard to truth and falfehood there is fomething fixed. We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tefts and standards, which are allowed on all fides, and are fuppofed to be established in our common nature. But there is not the fame obvious concurrence in any uniform or fettled principles which relate to

tafte.

taste. It is even commonly fuppofed that this delicate and aërial faculty, which feems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be properly tried by any teft, nor regulated by any ftandard. There is fo continual a call for the exercife of the reasoning faculty, and it is fo much ftrengthened by perpetual contention, that certain maxims of right reafon seem to be tacitly fettled amongst the most ignorant. The learned have improved on this rude science, and reduced thofe maxims into a fyftem. If tafte has not been fo happily cultivated, it was not that the subject was barren, but that the labourers were few or negligent; for to fay the truth, there are not the fame interefting motives to impel us to fix the one, which urge us to afcertain the other. And after all, if men differ in their opinion concerning fuch matters, their difference is not attended with the fame important confequences; elfe I make no doubt but that the logick of tafte, if I may be allowed the expreffion, might very poffibly be as well digefted, and we might come to difcufs matters of this nature with as much certainty, as thofe which feem more immediately within the province of mere reason. And indeed, it is very neceffary,

And indeed, it is

at the entrance into fuch an inquiry as our prefent, to make this point as clear as poffible; for if tafte has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not affected according to fome invariable and

certain

certain laws, our labour is like to be employed to very little purpose; as it must be judged an useless, if not an abfurd undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice, and to fet up for a legiflator of whims and fancies.

The term taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate; the thing which we understand by it, is far from a fimple and determinate idea in the minds of moft men, and it is therefore liable to uncertainty and confufion. I have no great opinion of a definition, the celebrated remedy for the cure of this diforder. For when we define, we seem in danger of circumfcribing nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up by hazard, or embrace on truft, or form out of a limited and partial confideration of the object before us, instead of extending our ideas to take in all that nature comprehends, according to her manner of combining, We are limited in our inquiry by the ftrict laws to which we have fubmited at our fetting out.

Circa vilem patulumque morabimur orbem, Unde pudor proferre pedem vetat aut operis lex.

but

A definition may be very exact, and yet go a very little way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined; but let the virtue of a definition be what it will, in the order of things,

VOL. I.

H

it

it feems rather to follow than to precede our inquiry, of which it ought to be confidered as the refult. It must be acknowledged that the methods of difquifition and teaching may be fometimes different, and on very good reafon undoubtedly; but for my part, I am convinced that the method of teaching which approaches moft nearly to the method of investigation, is incomparably the best; fince, not content with ferving up a few barrén and lifeless truths, it leads to the ftock on which they grew; it tends to fet the reader himself in the track of invention, and to direct him into those paths in which the author has made his own difcoveries, if he fhould be fo happy as to have made any that are valuable.

But to cut off all pretence for cavilling, I mean by the word Tafte no more than that faculty or thofe faculties of the mind, which are affected with, or which form a judgment of, the works of imagination and the elegant arts. This is, I think, the most general idea of that word, and what is the leaft connected with any particular theory. And my point in this inquiry is, to find whether there are any principles, on which the imagination is affected, fo common to all, fo grounded and certain, as to fupply the means of reasoning fatisfactorily about them. And fuch principles of tafte I fancy there are; however paradoxical it may feem to those, who on a fuperficial view imagine,

that

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