fence of a fyftem calculated for a curse to mankind? a curse under which they smart and groan to this hour, without thoroughly knowing the nature of the difeafe, and wanting understanding or courage to fupply the remedy.

I need not excufe myself to your Lordship, nor, I think, to any honeft man, for the zeal I have fhewn in this caufe; for it is an honeft zeal, and in a good cause. I have defended natural religion against a confederacy of atheifts and divines. I now plead for natural fociety against politicians, and for natural reason against all three. When the world is in a fitter temper than it is at prefent to hear truth, or when I fhall be more indifferent about its temper; my thoughts may become more publick. In the mean time, let them repofe in my own bofom, and in the bofoms of fuch men as are fit to be initiated in the fober myfteries of truth and reafon. My antagonists have already done as much as I could defire. Parties in religion and politicks make fufficient discoveries concerning each other, to give a sober man a proper caution against them all. The monarchick, and aristocratical, and popular partifans have been jointly laying their axes to the root of all government, and have in their turns proved each other abfurd and inconvenient. In vain you tell me that artificial government is good, but that I fall out only with the abuse. The thing! the thing itself

is the abufe! Obferve, my Lord, I pray you, that grand errour upon which all artificial legislative power is founded. It was obferved, that men had ungovernable paffions, which made it neceffary to guard against the violence they might offer to each other. They appointed governours over them for this reafon! but a worfe and more perplexing difficulty arifes, how to be defended against the governours? Quis cuftodiet ipfos cuftodes? In vain they change from a fingle perfon to a few. These few have the paffions of the one, and they unite to ftrengthen themfelves, and fecure the gratification of their lawless paffions at the expence of the general good. In vain do we fly to the many. The cafe is worfe; their paffions are less under the government of reason, they are augmented by the contagion, and defended against all attacks by their multitude.

I have purpofely avoided the mention of the mixed form of government, for reasons that will be very obvious to your Lordship. But my caution can avail me but little. You will not fail to urge it against me in favour of political fociety. You will not fail to show how the errours of the several simple modes are corrected by a mixture of all of them, and a proper balance of the feveral powers in such a ftate. I confefs, my Lord, that this has been long a darling mistake of my own; and that of all the facrifices I have made to. truth,

this has been by far the greatest. When I confefs that I think this notion a mistake, I know to whom I am speaking, for I am satisfied that reafons are like liquors, and there are fome of fuch a nature as none but strong heads can bear. There are few with whom I can communicate fo freely as with Pope. But Pope cannot bear every truth. He has a timidity which hinders the full exertion of his faculties, almoft as effectually as bigotry cramps those of the general herd of mankind. But whoever is a genuine follower of truth, keeps his eye fteady upon his guide, indifferent whither he is led, provided that she is the leader. And, my Lord, if it be properly confidered, it were infinitely better to remain poffeffed by the whole legion of vulgar mistakes, than to reject fome, and at the fame time to retain a fondness for others altogether as abfurd and irrational. The firft has at leaft a confiftency, that makes a man, however erroneously, uniform at least; but the latter way of proceeding is fuch an inconsistent chimæra and jumble of philofophy, and vulgar prejudice, that hardly any thing more ridiculous can be conceived. Let us therefore freely, and without fear or prejudice, examine this laft contrivance of policy. And without confidering how near the quick our inftruments may come, let us fearch it to the bottom.

First then, all men are agreed that this junc

tion of regal, ariftocratick, and popular power, muft form a very complex, nice, and intricate machine, which being composed of fuch a variety of parts, with fuch oppofite tendencies and movements, it must be liable on every accident to be difordered. To fpeak without metaphor, fuch a government must be liable to frequent cabals, tumults, and revolutions, from its very conftitution. These are undoubtedly as ill effects as can happen in a fociety; for in fuch a cafe, the closenefs acquired by community, instead of serving for mutual defence, ferves only to increase the danger. Such a fyftem is like a city, where trades that require conftant fires are much exercifed, where the houfes are built of combuftible materials, and where they ftand extremely close.

In the second place, the feveral conftituent parts having their diftinct rights, and these many of them fo neceffary to be determined with exactness, are yet fo indeterminate in their nature, that it becomes a new and conftant fource of debate and confufion. Hence it is, that whilft the business of government should be carrying on, the queftion is, Who has a right to exercise this or that func tion of it, or what men have power to keep their offices in any function? Whilst this conteft continues, and whilft the balance in any fort continues, it has never any remiffion; all manner of abufes and villanies in officers remain unpunished;

the

the greatest frauds and robberies in the publick revenues are committed in defiance of juftice; and abufes grow, by time and impunity, into cuftoms; until they prescribe against the laws, and grow too inveterate often to admit a cure, unless fuch as may be as bad as the disease.

Thirdly, the feveral parts of this fpecies of government, though united, preferve the fpirit which each form has feparately. Kings are ambitious; the nobility haughty; and the populace tumultuous and ungovernable. Each party, however in appearance peaceable, carries on a defign upon the others; and it is owing to this, that in all questions, whether concerning foreign or domeftick affairs, the whole generally turns more upon fome party-matter than upon the nature of the thing itself; whether fuch a step will diminish or augment the power of the crown, or how far the privileges of the fubject are like to be extended or reftricted by it. And these questions are conftantly refolved, without any confideration of the merits of the cause, merely as the parties who uphold these jarring interefts may chance to prevail; and as they prevail, the balance is overfet, now upon one fide, now upon the other. The government is one day, arbitrary power in a single perfon; another, a juggling confederacy of a few to cheat the prince and enflave the people; and the third, a frantick and unmanageable demo

cracy.