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fence of a system calculated for a curse to mankind? a curse under which they smart and groan to this hour, without thoroughly knowing the nature of the disease, and wanting understanding or courage to fupply the remedy.

I need not excuse myself to your Lordship, nor, I think, to any honest man, for the zeal I have shewn in this cause; for it is an honest zeal, and in a good cause. I have defended natural religion against a confederacy of atheists and divines. I now plead for natural fociety against politicians, and for natural reason against all three. When the world is in a fitter temper than it is at present to hear truth, or when I shall be more indifferent about its temper; my thoughts may become more publick. In the mean time, let them repose in my own bosom, and in the bofoms of such men as are fit to be initiated in the sober mysteries of truth and reason. My antagonists have already done as much as I could defire. Parties in religion and politicks make fufficient discoveries concerning each other, to give a fober man a proper caution against them all. The monarchick, and aristocratical, and popular partisans have been jointly laying their axes to the root of all government, and have in their turns proved each other absurd and inconvenient. In vain you tell me that artificial government is good, but that I fall out only with the abuse. The thing! the thing itself is the abuse! Observe, my Lord, I pray you, that grand errour upon which all artificial legiflative power is founded. It was obferved, that men had ungovernable passions, which made it neceffary to guard against the violence they might offer to each other. They appointed governours over them for this reafon! but a worse and more perplexing difficulty arifes, how to be defended against the governours? Quis cuftodiet ipfos cuftodes? In vain they change from a fingle perfon to a few. These few have the paffions of the one, and they unite to strengthen themselves, and fecure the gratification of their lawless paffions at the expence of the general good. In vain do we fly to the many. The cafe is worse; their passions are less under the government of reason, they are augmented by the contagion, and defended against all attacks by their multitude.

I have purposely avoided the mention of the mixed form of government, for reasons that will be very obvious to your Lordship. But my caution can avail me but little. You will not fail to urge it against me in favour of political society. You will not fail to show how the errours of the several simple modes are corrected by a mixture of all of them, and a proper balance of the feveral powers in such a state. I confefs, my Lord, that this has been long a darling mistake of my own; and that of all the facrifices I have made to. truth, this

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this has been by far the greatest. When I confefs that I think this notion a mistake, I know to whom I am fpeaking, for I am fatisfied that reasons are like liquors, and there are some of fuch a nature as none but strong heads can bear. There are few with whom I can communicate so freely as with Pope. But Pope cannot bear every truth. He has a timidity which hinders the full exertion of his faculties, almost as effectually as bigotry cramps those of the general herd of mankind. But whoever is a genuine follower of truth, keeps his eye steady upon his guide, indifferent whither he is led, provided that she is the leader. And, my Lord, if it be properly confidered, it were infinitely better to remain poffefsed by the whole legion of vulgar mistakes, than to reject some, and at the fame time to retain a fondness for others altogether as absurd and irrational. The first has at least a consistency, that makes a man, however erroneously, uniform at least; but the latter way of proceeding is such an inconsistent chimæra and jumble of philofophy, and vulgar prejudice, that hardly any thing more ridiculous can be conceived. Let us therefore freely, and without fear or prejudice, examine this last contrivance of policy. And without confidering how near the quick our instruments may come, let us fearch it to the bottom.

• First then, all men are agreed that this junction of regal, aristocratick, and popular power, must form a very complex, nice, and intricate machine, which being composed of fuch a variety of parts, with fuch oppofite tendencies and movements, it must be liable on every accident to be difordered. To speak without metaphor, such a government must be liable to frequent cabals, tumults, and revolutions, from its very constitution. These are undoubtedly as ill effects as can happen in a fociety; for in fuch a cafe, the closeness acquired by community, instead of serving for mutual defence, ferves only to increase the danger. Such a system is like a city, where trades that require constant fires are much exercifed, where the houses are built of combustible materials, and where they stand extremely close.

In the fecond place, the several conftituent parts having their distinct rights, and these many of them so neceffary to be determined with exactness, are yet so indeterminate in their nature, that it becomes a new and constant fource of debate and confufion. Hence it is, that whilst the business of government should be carrying on, the question is, Who has a right to exercise this or that function of it, or what men have power to keep their offices in any function? Whilst this conteft continues, and whilst the balance in any fort continues, it has never any remiffion; all manner of abuses and villanies in officers remain unpunished;

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the greatest frauds and robberies in the publick revenues are committed in defiance of justice; and abuses grow, by time and impunity, into customs; until they prescribe against the laws, and grow too inveterate often to admit a cure, unless fuch as may be as bad as the disease.

Thirdly, the several parts of this species of government, though united, preserve the spirit which each form has feparately. Kings are ambitious; the nobility haughty; and the populace tumultuous and ungovernable. Each party, however in appearance peaceable, carries on a design upon the others; and it is owing to this, that in all questions, whether concerning foreign or domestick affairs, the whole generally turns more upon some party-matter than upon the nature of the thing itself; whether fuch a step will diminish or augment the power of the crown, or how far the privileges of the subject are like to be extended or restricted by it. And these questions are conftantly refolved, without any confideration of the merits of the cause, merely as the parties who uphold these jarring interests may chance to prevail; and as they prevail, the balance is overset, now upon one fide, now upon the other. The government is one day, arbitrary power in a single person; another, a juggling confederacy of a few to cheat the prince and enslave the people; and the third, a frantick and unmanageable democracy.

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