have for our mothers, where the parental authority is almost melted down into the mother's fondnefs and indulgence. But we generally have a great love for our grandfathers in whom this authority is removed a degree from us, and where the weakness of age mellows it into something of a feminine partiality.

SECT. ΧΙ.

HOW FAR THE IDEA OF BEAUTY MAY BE APPLIED TO VIRTUE.

FROM what has been faid in the foregoing section we may easily fee, how far the application of beauty to virtue, may be made with propriety. The general application of this quality to virtue, has a strong tendency to confound our ideas of things; and it has given rise to an infinite deal of whimfical theory; as the affixing the name of beauty to proportion, congruity, and perfection, as well as to qualities of things yet more remote from our natural ideas of it, and from one another, has tended to confound our ideas of beauty, and left us no ftandard or rule to judge by, that was not even more uncertain and fallacious than our own fancies. This loofe and inaccurate manner of speaking, has therefore mifled us both in the theory of taste and of morals; and induced us to remove the science of our duties from their proper proper bafis, (our reason, our relations, and our neceffities,) to rest it upon foundations altogether vifionary and unsubstantial.

SECT. XII.

THE REAL CAUSE OF BEAUTY.

HAVING endeavoured to shew what beauty is not, it remains that we should examine, at least with equal attention, in what it really confifts. Beauty is a thing much too affecting not to depend upon some positive qualities. And, fince it is no creature of our reason, since it fstrikes us without any reference to use, and even where no use at all can be difcerned, fince the order and method of nature is generally very different from our meafures and proportions, we must conclude that beauty is, for the greater part, fome quality in bodies acting mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses. We ought therefore to confider attentively in what manner those sensible qualities are disposed, in fuch things as by experience we find beautiful, or which excite in us the paffion of love, or fome correfpondent affection.

SECT. SECT. XIII.

BEAUTIFUL OBJECTS SMALL.

THE most obvious point that presents itself to us in examining any object, is its extent or quantity. And what degree of extent prevails in bodies that are held beautiful, may be gathered from the usual manner of expreffion concerning it. I am told that, in most languages, the objects of love are spoken of under diminutive epithets. It is fo in all the languages of which I have any knowledge. In Greek the των and other diminutive terms are almost always the terms of affection and tenderness. These diminutives were com monly added by the Greeks, to the names of per. fons with whom they conversed on the terms of friendship and familiarity. Though the Romans were a people of less quick and delicate feelings, yet they naturally flid into the lefsening termination upon the fame occafions. Antiently in the English language the diminishing ling was added to the names of persons and things that were the objects of love. Some we retain still, as darling (or little dear), and a few others. But to this day, in ordinary conversation, it is usual to add the endearing name of little to every thing we love: the French and Italians make use of these affectionate diminutives even more than we. In the animal

animal creation, out of our own species, it is the small we are inclined to be fond of; little birds, and fome of the smaller kinds of beafts. A great beautiful thing is a manner of expreffion scarcely ever used; but that of a great ugly thing, is very common. There is a wide difference between admiration and love. The fublime, which is the cause of the former, always dwells on great objects, and terrible; the latter on small ones, and pleasing; we fubmit to what we admire, but we love what submits to us; in one cafe we are forced, in the other we are flattered, into compliance. In short, the ideas of the fublime and the beautiful stand on foundations so different, that it is hard, I had almost said impoffible, to think of reconciling them in the same subject, without confiderably leffening the effect of the one or the other upon the paffions. So that, attending to their quantity, beautiful objects are comparatively small.

SECT. XIV.

SMOOTHNESS.

THE next property constantly obfervable in such objects is *Smoothness: A quality so effential to beauty, that I do not now recollect any thing beautiful that is not fmooth. In trees and flowers, smooth leavés are beautiful; fmooth flopes of earth

* Part IV. fect. 21.

in

in gardens; smooth streams in the landscape; fmooth coats of birds and beasts in animal beauties; in fine women, fmooth skins; and in several forts of ornamental furniture, smooth and polished furfaces. A very confiderable part of the effect of beauty is owing to this quality; indeed the most confiderable. For take any beautiful object, and give it a broken and rugged surface; and however well formed it may be in other refpects, it pleases no longer. Whereas, let it want ever so many of the other constituents, if it wants not this, it becomes more pleasing than almost all the others without it. This feems to me fo evident, that I am a good deal surprised, that none who have handled the subject have made any mention of the quality of smoothness, in the enumeration of those that go to the forming of beauty. For indeed any ruggedness, any fudden projection, any sharp angle, is in the highest degree contrary to that idea.

SECT. XV.

GRADUAL VARIATION.

BUT as perfectly beautiful bodies are not composed of angular parts, so their parts never continue long in the fame right line. *They vary their direction every moment, and they change