with a concert of mufick; or fuppofe fome object of a fine fhape, and bright lively colours, to be prefented before you; or imagine your smell is gratified with the fragrance of a rofe; or if without any previous thirft you were to drink of fome pleasant kind of wine, or to tafte of some sweetmeat without being hungry; in all the feveral fenfes, of hearing, fmelling, and tafting, you undoubtedly find a pleasure; yet if I inquire into the state of your mind previous to these gratifications, you will hardly tell me that they found you in any kind of pain; or, having fatisfied these feveral senses with their several pleasures, will you fay that any pain has fucceeded, though the plea, fure is abfolutely over? Suppofe, on the other hand, a man in the fame state of indifference, to receive a violent blow, or to drink of fome bitter potion, or to have his ears wounded with fome harth and grating found; here is no removal of pleasure; and yet here is felt, in here is felt, in every fenfe which is affected, a pain very distinguishable. It may be faid, perhaps, that the pain in thefe cafes had its rife from the removal of the pleafure which the anan enjoyed before, though that pleasure was of fo low a degree as to be perceived only by the removal. But this feems to me a fubtilty, that is not difcoverable in nature. For if, previous to the pain, I do not feel any actual pleasure, I have no reason to judge that any fuch thing exifts; fince pleasure is only pleafure as it is felt. The fame may be faid of pain, and with equal reafon. I can never perfuade myself that pleasure and pain are mere relations, which can only exift as they are contrafted; but I think I can difcern clearly that there are pofitive pains, and pleasures, which do not at all depend upon each other. Nothing is more certain to my own feelings than this. There is nothing which I can diftinguifh in my mind with more clearness than the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of these I can perceive without any fort of idea of its relation to any thing elfe. Caius is afflicted with a fit of the cholick; this man is actually in pain; ftretch Caius upon the rack, he will feel a much greater pain: but does this pain of the rack arife from the removal of any pleasure? or is the fit of the cholick a pleasure or a pain just as we are pleased to confider it? SECT. III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF PAIN AND POSITIVE PLEASURE. WE fhall carry this propofition yet a step farther. We shall venture to propofe, that pain and pleasure are not only not neceffarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or re moval, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceafing of pleasure does not operate like pofitive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in its effect, has very little resemblance to pofitive pleasure.* The former of these propofitions will, I believe, be much more readily allowed than the latter; because it is very evident that pleasure, when it has run its career, fets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind quickly fatisfies; and when it is over, we relapfe into indifference, or rather we fall into a foft tranquillity, which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the former fenfation. I own it is not at firft view so apparent, that the removal of a great pain does not refemble pofitive pleafure; but let us recollect in what ftate we have found our minds upon escaping fome imminent danger, or on being released from the feverity of fome cruel pain. We have on fuch occafions found, if I am not much mistaken, the temper of our minds in a tenour very remote from that which attends the prefence of pofitive pleasure; we have found them in a state of much fobriety, impreffed with a fenfe of awe, in a fort of tranquillity fhadowed with horrour. *Mr. Locke [Effay on Human Underftanding, 1. ii. c. 20. fect. 16.] thinks that the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered and operates as a pleafure, and the lofs or diminishing of pleasure as a pain. It is this opinion which we confider here. The The fashion of the countenance and the gefture of the body on fuch occafions is fo correspondent to this ftate of mind, that any perfon, a ftranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under fome confternation, than in the enjoy ment of any thing like pofitive pleasure. Ως δ' όταν ανδρ αλη πυκινη λάξη, ος εν παίρη Iliad. 24 As when a wretch, who, conscious of his crime, This ftriking appearance of the man whom Homer fuppofes to have just escaped an imminent danger, the fort of mixed paffion of terrour and furprise, with which he affects the fpectators, paints very ftrongly the manner in which we find ourfelves affected upon occafions any way funilar. For when we have fuffered from any violent emotion,, the mind naturally continues in something like the fame condition, after the cause which firft produced it has ceased to operate. The toffing of the fea remains after the ftorm; and when this remain of horrour has entirely subsided, all the pas fion, which the accident raised, fubfides along with it; and the mind returns to its usual state of indifference. In fhort, pleasure, (I mean any thing either in the inward sensation, or in the outward appearance, like pleasure from a pofitive cause) has never, I imagine, its origin from the removal of pain or danger. SECT. IV. OF DELIGHT AND PLEASURE AS OPPOSED TO EACH no means. OTHER. BUT fhall we therefore fay, that the removal of pain or its diminution is always fimply painful? or affirm that the ceffation or the leffening of pleafure is always attended itself with a pleasure? By What I advance is no more than this; firft, that there are pleasures and pains of a pofitive and independent nature; and fecondly, that the feeling which refults from the ceafing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient refemblance to pofitive pleasure, to have it confidered as of the fame nature, or to entitle it to be known by the fame name; and thirdly, that upon the fame principle the removal or qualification of pleafure has no refemblance to pofitive pain. It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or moderation of pain) has fomething in it far from diftreffing or disagreeable in its nature. This feeling, in many cafes fo agreeable, but in all fo different from |