Answers from be X. I confefs, they offer fome Solutions here, There are but fuch as are fo fubtle, so obscure, and so much offered to above the comprehenfion of the Vulgar, that most thefe difPerfons have taken a distaste to them, given up the ficulties, cause of Liberty as defperate, and gone over to the but they former Sect but if any one will undertake either are far to give a more clear and full Explication of the ing clear. common Opinion, or bring Solutions of thofe Dif- On this ficulties which occur in it, he will find me fo far account from being his Adversary, that he may expect my have gone affent, encouragement and affiftance. This indeed over to were very much to be wifhed, but in the mean time the former I shall endeavour to fee whether these things cannot Opinion. be explained more clearly in another manner. NOTES. "with our real Happiness." And again, Sect. 52. "What ever Neceffity determines to the purfuit of real Bliss, the "fame neceffity, with the fame force, establishes Sufpenfe, "Deliberation and Scrutiny of each fucceffive defire, whether "the fatisfaction of it does not interfere with our true Happi"nefs and mislead us from it." If by the Word Neceffity he means abfolute phyfical Neceffity (which it muft be, if it be any thing to the prefent purpose) he has difcovered a pretty odd foundation for his Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us towards Happiness in general, be abfolute and irresistible, as his Words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and confequently prove as bad a ground for Sufpenfion as for Liberty. But in truth this Sufpenfion is neither founded in any Neceffity of purfuing Happinefs in general, nor is itself an original Power of the Mind diftin&t from that of Volition, but only one particular exercise or Modification of it. "'Tis willing (as the Author of the Philofophical Enquiry rightly obferves) to defer willing a"bout the matter propofed," and is no way different from the common cafes of willing and choofing, except that it is the most evident demonftration of the Mind's perfect Liberty in willing, and fo obvious that Mr. Locke could not get over it, and therefore ftiles it the fource of all our Liberty, and that wherein confifts Free-will. Sect. 47. Though he foon explains it away again, by endeavouring to force it into his System. That this Power of Sufpenfion is not fufficient to denominate a Man free, See Impartial Enquiry, p. 44. 66 many SUB The Ap SUBSECT. III. Another Notion of Liberty and Election proposed. petites IN and Powers attain their proper End, by Exer N order to make my meaning better understood, we must obferve, in the first place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and Appetites implanted in us by Nature, which are defigned for Action; and when these exert their proper Actions about Objects, they produce a grateful and agreeable Senfation in us. The exercise of them therefore pleases us; and from hence probably all the grea- our Pleafure and Delight arifes; confequently our teft perfection of Happiness, if we have any, feems to confift in them, and the proper exercise of thofe Powers and Faculties their best which Nature has bestowed upon us: for they ap cife, which is Eftate. pear to be implanted in us for no other end, but that by the ufe and exercife of them those things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at reft, or enjoy themselves any otherwife than as those things are produced by or in them, for the production or reception of which they are There is a defigned by Naturé. Now every Power or Faculty certain a- is directed to the profecution of its greement fixt by Nature between fome Ap petites, c. and their Objects, whereby of them, Acts. proper They attain their End therefore by Exercise, which must be esteemed the greatest Perfection, and most happy State of any Being.* For that is a State of Happiness, if any fuch can be conceived, wherein every thing is done which pleases, and every thing removed which is difpleafing: neither doth it seem poffible to imagine a more happy one. they act II. Secondly, It is to be obferved, that among upon the our Appetites, Faculties and Powers, fome are deprefence termined to their Operations by objects peculiar to and ceafe themselves. For upon the prefence of their Objects from Ac- they neceffarily exert their Actions, if rightly difpoftion upon ed, and ceafe from Operation upon their abfence, their Removal. * See Scott's Christian Life. Vol.1. pag. 8, 9. and and have no tendency towards any other Objects but their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing but Light, Colours, &c. and upon the Removal of thefe, its Action* ceases. The Understanding itfelf diftinguishes thofe Objects which are communicated to it by the Senfes, or perceived by reflection, from one another; difpofes and repofits them in the Memory; but yet has certain bounds which it cannot exceed and fo of the reft. There is therefore a certain natural Fitnefs, a fixt conformity between these Powers and their Objects, on which account they exert their Actions upon the presence of the Objects, and delight theinfelves in Exercife but are uneafy at the prefence of those things which hinder it. If then there be any Liberty natural force in any Object to promote or hinder would be the exercise of any Power or Faculty, that Object of differin regard to it is to be esteemed Good or Evil. vice to an Agent en &c. as III. Those Objects which thus promote or im- dowed pede the Action, are fufficiently distinguished from with fuch each other by the Power or Faculty itfelf; thofe Appetites, that are abfent or future, are judged of by the Un- thefe only. derstanding, and what the Mind determines to be the best in them, that we are obliged to purfue. He We may that does otherwife difobeys the Law of Reafon. conceive If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus a Power determined to their proper Objects, it would feem which an Imperfection for Man to be free, and he would and any have been much more happy without fuch a Liber- particular ty: for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of Object the greatest Evils, viz. a Power of doing amifs. naturally IV. It seems not impoffible to conceive a Power no other of a quite different Nature from these which may agreeable * NOTES. be between there is nefs but what may arife from It may be obferved here once for all, that our Author the Deterfeldom uses this Word Action in a ftrict Philofophical Senle mination (according to which these should rather be called Paffions) but of the generally takes the vulgar expreffions, when they will ferve to Power explain his meaning. itself. be more indifferent in respect of the Objects about which it exercises itself.* To which no one thing is naturally more agreeable than another, but that will be the fitteft to which it shall happen† to be applyed: Between which and the Object, to which it is determined, by it felf or by fomething else, there fhould naturally be no more fuitableness or connection than between it and any other thing; but all the Suitableness there is, fhould arife from the Application or Determination itself. For as the Earth is no Man's Right by nature, but belongs to the prime Occupant, and the Right arises from that very Occupation; fo there may poffibly be a Power to which no Object is by Nature peculiarly adapted, but any thing may become fuitable to it, if it happen to be applyed; fince its Suitableness proceeds from the Application, as we faid before. Now it does not seem any more abfurd for a Power to create an Agreeablenefs between itself and an Object, by applying itself to that Object, or that to itself, than for a Man to acquire a Right to a thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil Laws, fome things are forbidden because they are inconvenient, others are inconvenient and Evil because forbidden; fo it may be in Powers, Faculties and Appetites; viz. fome may be determined by the natural Suitableness of the Objects, and in others, the Suitableness to the Objects may arise from the Determination. For this Faculty may be naturally inclined to exercife, and one Exercise be more agreeable than another, not from any natural fitness of one more than another, but from the Application of the Faculty itself; fince another would often be no lefs agreeable, if it had happened to be determined to that. Nothing therefore feems to hinder but that there NOTES. * See Sect. 5. Subfect. 2. par. 12. and 15. + That this Word is not intended to imply what we commonly mean by Chance, see par. 18. there may be fuch a Power or Faculty, at least with respect to very many Objects. (49.) NOTES. མ. (49) Our Author's Notion of Indifference has been grofly misunderstood by all his Adverfaries, who have accordingly raised terrible Outcries against it, as destroying the effential and immutable diftinction between Good and Evil; fubverting Appetites, making Reafon and Judgment ufelefs, and con founding every thing. We fhall juft obferve here, that it can not be applyed to the whole Man, nor was defigned by our Author to include all manner of external Objects, Actions, and Relations of things, as they feem to have understood it. For every Man in his Wits must be fufficiently fenfible that all things don't affect him in the fame manner, even before he has willed any of them. I cannot be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, or Reft, when I am hungry, thirsty, or weary. Some natural Objects are agreeable, and produce pleasure in me, and others the contrary, whether I will or no and the fame may be faid of the moral Senfe. Nay our Author every where allows their full force to what he calls the Appetites; and afferts that whatever contradicts them must be attended with Uneafinefs. 'Tis not an absolute indifference therefore of the Man or Mind in general, nor of the Senfes, Perception or Judgment, which he contends for; but it relates wholly to that particu lar Power of the Mind which we call Willing, and which will appear to be in its own Nature, or phyfically, indifferent to acting or not acting in any particular manner, notwithstanding all thefe different Affections or Paffions of the Mind raised by the different Objects. Let a thing feem never fo pleasant and agreeable, never fo reasonable, fit and eligible to us, yet there is ftill a natural poffibility for us to will the contrary; and confequently the bare Power of willing is in itself indifferent to either Side; which is all the indifference that our Author contends for. Now fuch an Indifference as this Mr. Locke allows to be in the operative Powers of Man, though he confines it, I think, improperly to them alone* "I have the ability, fays he, to move my hand, or to let it reft; that operative Power is indifferent to move or not to move my hand: I am then in that refpect perfectly free. My Will determines that operative Power to reft; yet I am free, be"cause the Indifferency of that my operative Power to act or not to act ftill remains; the Power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the Determination of my Will, which at present orders reft; the Indifferency of that Power to fact is just as it was before, as will appear, if the Will puts ff it to the trial, by ordering the contrary." The fame, I Q think B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 71, |