but what in fome refpect or other, either promotes this End, or prevents it; from this Indifference they declare, that we have an Opportunity of rejecting or receiving any thing. For though we can choofe nothing but under the Appearance of Good, i. e. unless it be in fome manner connected with the Chief Good, as a Means or Appendage; yet this does not determine the Choice, because every Object may be varied, and represented by the Understanding under very different Appearances.

NOTES.

III. Se

The Mind (fays the Author of the Efay on Confcioufnefs, p. 208.) before ever it exerts its Will or Power of choofing, is confcious, and knows within itself, that it hath a Power of • Choice or Preference; and this is a neceffary Condition of ⚫ willing at all, infomuch that the very first time I had occa'fion to exert my Will, or make use of my elective Power, I could not poffibly exercise it, or do any voluntary Act, without knowing and being confcious to myfelf [before hand] that I have fuch a Faculty or Power in myself. A thing that feems at firft fight very ftrange and wonderful; to know I have a power of acting before ever I have acted, or had any trial or experience of it: But a little Reflection will quickly fatisfy any one that in the nature of the thing it must be fo, and cannot poffibly be otherwife; and which is peculiar to this Faculty For we know nothing of our Powers of Perceiving, Understanding, Remembering, &c. but by experi menting their Acts, it being neceffary firft to perceive or think, before we can know that we have a Power of perceiving or thinking.' The Author proceeds-to fhew, that this Foreconfcioufness of a power of willing or choofing, does most clearly demonftrate that the Mind in all its Volitions begins the Motion, or acteth from itself. T

6

To argue ftill that fome minute imperceptible Caufes, fome particular Circumstances in our own Bodies, or those about us, muft determine even these feemingly indifferent Actions, is either running into the former abfurdity of making us act upon Motives which we don't apprehend; or faying, that we act mechanically, i. e. do not act at all: and in the laft place, to say that we are determin'd to choose any of these trifles jult as we happen to fix our Thoughts upon it in particular, at the very instant of Action, is either attributing all to the felf-moving Power of the Mind, which is granting the Queftion or re

P 2

Effay on Confcioufnef, p. 209, 210.

ferring

the Will

follows

fome

derstand

*

Though III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is protherefore pofed which is not the Chief, the Will can fufpend the Action, and command the Understanding to propofe fome other thing, or the fame in fome Judgment different view: which may be always done, fince of the Un- every thing except the chief Good is of fuch a Nature, that the Understanding may apprehend ing, yet it is not fome respect or relation wherein it is incommodious. neceffarily Notwithstanding therefore that the Will always does follow fome Judgment of the Understanding, which is made about the fubfequent Actions, yet it is not neceffarily determin'd by any, for it can fufpend its Act, and order fome other Judgment, which it may follow. Since therefore it can either exert or fufpend its Act, it is not only free from Compulfion, but also indifferent in itself, with regard to its Actions, and determines itself without neceffity.

deter

min'd by

it.

NOTES.

IV. It

ferring us to the minute and imperceptible Caufes abovemention'd; or obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning Word Chance instead of a Phyfical Cause, which is faying nothing at all. How hard muft Men be prefs'd under an Hypothefis, when they fly to fuch evafive fhifts as thefe! How much eafier and better would it be to give up all fuch blind, unknown, and unaccountable Impulfes, and own, what common Senfe and Experience dictate, an Independent, Free, Self-moving Principle, the true, the obvious, and only Source of both Volition and Action!

With regard to Mr. Locke's Inconfiftencies, I fhall only add one Obfervation more, viz. that he feems to place the Caufe (Motive, or whatever he means by it) of his Determination of the Will after the Effect. The Caufe of that Determination is, according to him, Anxiety; this he fometimes makes concomitant, fometimes confequent upon Defire; and Sect. 31. he says, the one is scarce diftinguishable from the other.

But this fame Defire appears to me to be the very Determination of the Will itfelf; what we abfolutely defire we always will, and vice verfa; whether it be in our Power to pursue that Will, and produce it into Act, or not: and indeed Defire seems to be no otherwise diftinguishable from Volition, than as the latter is generally attended with the Power of Action, which

• See Note 48.

the

nion efta

IV. It must be confefs'd, that this Opinion does This Opiestablish Liberty, and on that account is more agree-blithes Liable to reafon, experience, and the common sense of Mankind, yet fome things in it feem to be pre- yet there fum'd upon and not fufficiently explain'd.

NOTES.

berty, but

are fome

V. For things not fufficiently explain

the former is confider'd without. This I think is all the Di- ed in it. ftinction that they are capable of, which yet is only nominal: Nor do his Inftances in §. 30. prove that there is any Difference between them. Thus when I am oblig'd to ufe perfuafions with another, which I wish may not prevail upon him: or fuffer one Pain to prevent a greater: here are two oppofite Wills, or a weak imperfect Volition conquer'd by, and giving way to a stronger and we might as well fay, Defire is oppofite to Defire, as to Volition. I will, or defire, that this Man may not be prevailed upon, but yet I will, or defire more powerfully and effectually to use these perfuafions with him: Or rather, here is but one actual Defire or Will in the Cafe, and the other is only hypothetical. Thus I fhould will to be cured of the Gout, if that Cure would not throw me into greater Pain: but in the prefent, Circumftances I do not really will it, nor exert any one act which may serve to remove it: nay, in this Cafe, I will or defire to bear the Gout rather than a worse Evil, that would attend the removal of it. His Axiom therefore, that wherever there is pain, there is a defire to be rid of it, is not abfolutely true.

Again, I fhould refufe a painful Remedy or difagreeable Potion, if I could enjoy perfect Health without them; but as I manifeftly cannot, I choose the leaft Evil of the two. Nor can I indeed be properly faid to choose or defire both in the present Circumstances, or to will one and defire the contrary; fince I know that only one of them is poffible: which therefore I now certainly will or defire, though I should certainly have willed the contrary had it been equally poffible. These then, and the like Inftances are not fufficient to prove any oppofition between Will and Defire; except the latter be only taken for a mere paí five Appetite; in which Senfe the Words choofe, prefer, c. muft then be very improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I believe Mr. Locke here fets the Word Defire to fignify what we commonly mean by the Will, as he does in Sect. 48. where 'tis call'd the Power of preferring: and puts Volition into the place of Action; as feems probable from his defcription of Willing in the 16th, 28th and 30th Sections, as alfo, C. 23. Sect. 18. where he defines the Will to be a Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought. And the fame Notion, I think, runs through all his Letters to Limborch.

Such a

this feems

to be of

nefit to Mankind.

V. For in the first place, 'tis faid that the Will Liberty as determines itself, but we are not inform'd how that is poffible, nor what use fuch a Power would be of, more pre- were it admitted: nay, it seems rather prejudicial judice than advantageous to Mankind. For that Goodthan be- nefs which it is fuppofed to purfue, is in the things themselves, and arifes from their connection with the chief Good; it is not therefore to be form'd, but difcovered by the Understanding. If then the Understanding performs its Duty right, it will discover what is belt: but it is our Advantage to be determined to that which is beft: it had therefore been better for Man if Nature had given him up absolutely to the Determination of his own Judgment and

NOTES.

Upon a Review of this Chapter of Mr. Locke's Effay, and comparing the first Edition of it with the reft, I find a remarkable Paffage omitted in all the following ones, which may serve to fhew us upon what Ground he at first supposed the Will to be determin'd from without, and why upon altering part of his Scheme, and leaving the reft, he was obliged to take that for granted, and let his former Suppofition ftand without its Reafon. It begins at Sect. 28. "We must remember that Volition or "Willing, regarding only what is in our power, is nothing but preferring the doing of any thing to the not doing of it; "Action to reft, and contra. Well, but what is this preferr" ing? It is nothing but the being pleafed more with one thing “than another. Is then a Man indifferent to be pleased or not pleafed more with one thing than another? Is it in his Choice, "whether he will or will not be better pleased with one thing than another?

"And to this I think every one's Experience is ready to "make answer, No. From whence it follows, that the Will or Preference is determin'd by fomething without itself; "let us fee then what it is determin'd by. If willing be but the being better pleased, as has been fhewn, it is easy to know "what 'tis determines the Will, what 'tis pleafes beft; every one knows 'tis Happiness, or that which makes any part of Happiness, or contributes to it, and that is it we call Good. Good then, the greater Good, is that alone which deter"mines the Will."

65

From hence we may obferye, that as he here makes the Will a mere paffive Affection of the Mind, a power of being pleased with fome things more than others, (which Definition will with

equal

and Understanding, and not allowed that Judg ment to be fufpended by the power of the Will. For by that means he would have obtained his End with greater certainty and ease. I grant, that if a Man were abfolutely determin'd in his Actions to the beft, there would be no room for virtue, properly fo called; for virtue, as it is commonly understood, requires a free Act, and this Liberty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue; and with good reafon, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleafes; (For thus it would be impoffible to attain the end of choosing, i. e. to please ourselves, without Liberty, fince that very thing which pleases in Action, viz. Liberty, would

NOTES.

be

equal propriety take in all the Senfes too) he was naturally led to enquire after the Ground of these its different Pleasures, which could only be the different Natures of external Objects acting differently upon it; (as they do alfo on the Senfes.) For what is only acted upon, muft have fomething without itself to act upon it; and to be pleafed in a different manner by the Action of different Objects is only, in other Words, to receive different Degrees of Happiness from them. Upon this Scheme we muft always be unavoidably determin'd by the greatest apparent Good, or neceffarily prefer what seems productive of the highest Degree of Happinefs; which is indeed fufficiently intelligible, and he pursued it throughout confiftently. But upon fecond Thoughts, finding this not very reconcileable with matter of Fact, (as he obferved in Sect. 35, 38, 43, 44, 69, &c. of the following Editions, where he has fully fhewn that we do not always prefer or choose the greater apparent Good) and fill fuppofing the Will to be paffive or determin'd from without, he alters his former Hypothefis fo far as to make the Will be determin'd, not by the greater Good immediately, but by that Uneafinefs, which is founded in the Defire, which arifes from the profpect of fome Good. But it being likewise evident that all things do not raise our Defire in proportion to their apparent Goodness; He endeavours to account for this, by faying, that "We do not look on them to make a part of that Happi"nefs wherewith we in our present Thoughts can fatisfy our"felves, Sect. 43." i e. We can be content without them; or, in our Author's Language, they do not abfolutely please us, because we do not will them. He proceeds therefore to mend his Hypothefis farther, by making the Mind in fome fort active in