Colonial Offices can decide on their behalf-whether they prefer this policy or its alternative, a policy of drift. It is certain that there will be division of opinion.

An extensive political system-although preferable to a small community, as a defence against foreign aggression-is not so favourable a ground for social or political experiments; and of all systems of government the Federal is the most complex and unwieldy. The inevitable disputes as to the limits of Federal and State powersinevitable because no human intelligence can draw a line of demarcation between all the unforeseen activities of growing communities-and the uncertainties of judicial interpretation, make legislation difficult and often disappoint the expectations of the legislator. Therefore an extension of their self-governing powers probably will not gain support from those who, in their ardour for reform, ignore the warnings of history, and believe that the close of this war will inaugurate a new era of universal peace. All who do not recognise that the world is about to enter on a new era of organisation for the purpose of preventing war, will be content to leave things as they are. Moreover, the conditions and habits of centuries will be ranged against a change. The claims of a wider British citizenship do not appeal, for example, to the French Canadian, who has an ingrained dread of becoming involved in European conflicts; nor is it certain that the English voter will be willing to share his hereditary supremacy with the voters of the Dominions, or acquiesce in the division-which would probably follow-of his ancient Parliament into four (or five if Ireland be divided) subordinate local legislatures. Certainly no external authority and no conference of eminent statesmen can impose these changes on the peoples of the Empire; but these must recognise for themselves the necessity for Imperial organisation, remembering that in the field of politics there is never any question of the absolutely best, but that the choice is always between two or more courses, of which it is the part of wisdom to choose the most promising. If this spirit prevail, the recognition of differences becomes a step towards agreement.

Therefore let the peoples of the Empire, in such manner as each pleases, choose delegates to a Convention to determine, first, if closer union be desirable, and, if

this be affirmed, to frame an Imperial Constitution for acceptance or rejection by the peoples whom they represent. The task will not be easy. The constitution of the new Imperial Parliament-whether it shall consist of one chamber or of two, how each is to be constituted, and what shall be the number of its members; the nature and elements of an Imperial Electorate; the composition of the Imperial Executive; the nature of the Imperial Franchise; the sources of an Imperial Revenue and the method of raising it; the distribution of the burdens of common defence; the relations of the new Parliament to the Crown Colonies and the Dependencies; the distribution of political power among the component parts of the Empire; and every other question which is involved in the creation and exercise of Sovereign Power-all these will have to be discussed from many points of view and will create difficulties which may appear insuperable. Yet every people which has joined a Federal Union or framed a written constitution-the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Switzerland and the German Empire-has overcome similar obstacles; and, although the Imperial Problem has its peculiar difficulties, in that the federating communities are not of equal status, and that union will involve the surrender of Great Britain of her existing sovereignty, we need not on this account despair of the political genius of our race.

Most political problems have more than one solution; and the last word upon any has not yet been spoken. The Convention might even reject the purely British device of responsible government, or conclude that the party system was unsuited to an Imperial Parliament. Still, it might be possible to obtain an efficient and popular Executive. Mr Worsfold's account of the Swiss Executive is much in point in this connexion. These, however, are matters which the Convention will determine according to its wisdom, because they lie within the competence of statesmen to decide in this way or that. Mr Curtis, with great wisdom, has limited his enquiry to points which no statesman can alter, because they are inherent in the nature of things.

'No statesman (he says) can make one Executive responsible to two different legislatures or electorates. No statesman

can divorce the conduct of foreign affairs from defence, or either from the control of dependencies containing one-fifth of the human race. No statesman can render Ministers responsible to taxpayers without making these taxpayers severally liable to the Ministers for these taxes. These are conditions which no convention can alter. . . . They are the inexorable conditions of extending responsible government to British subjects beyond the British Isles without disrupting the Commonwealth.'

Nevertheless Mr Curtis, not quite consistently with the opinion he expresses here, proposes that the taxes levied by the Imperial Parliament shall be collected in the Dominions by Imperial officers, following in this respect the practice by the Australian Commonwealth. The alternative is that the collection of taxes should be the concern of the local authority. The choice between these alternatives is clearly one of those matters which may be left to the determination of the Imperial Convention. On the one side is the infraction of local authority; on the other, the risk of weakening unduly the Central Executive and putting it in the power of a recalcitrant State to refuse its contribution to the common fund. Such a refusal would necessitate either secession or coercion; but this is a standing difficulty in all federations. It would be better to run that risk, which is a very remote one, than to adopt a measure which would violate one of Mr Curtis' fundamental principles, and constantly irritate local feeling.

Events have marched rapidly since Mr Curtis penned these words. The Constituent Convention, which he and Mr Worsfold advocate, is to be summoned, so we are told by Mr Asquith, 'soon after the peace,' and will discuss the whole range of our Imperial relations. This is good news to those who feared, from Mr Lloyd George's first utterance on this subject, that the primary purpose of the Convention was the adjustment of Irish relations. This, indeed, is involved in the larger question; but to permit the election, or selection, of delegates to the Convention to turn upon Irish issues would rather create strife than tend towards union.

The date of the proposed Convention is of much importance. Australia certainly will insist on being represented by elected delegates; and provision for their

election must be made by Act of Parliament in each of the six States. It took two years to assemble the Convention which framed the Constitution for the Commonwealth; and it is not likely that the machinery for securing the election of delegates to the Convention, which Mr Asquith proposes to summon, would be in operation in less than six months. Also, in addition to Parliamentary delays, time must be allowed to candidates to present their views. Probably the Australian Delegates could not reach London for a year after the signing of peace, when other problems would be occupying public attention. Thus, the golden opportunity might be lost, when interest and sentiment alike are impelling the peoples of the Empire to a closer Union. This danger would be averted if formal notice of the intention to summon a Convention were given without delay, in order that the preliminary arrangements might be put in hand. Australian experience would suggest another warning: viz. that the Convention be not too small. It should include all shades of local opinion; and its members should be numerous enough to explain and recommend to all the electors of their several States any constitution which the Convention may frame. A small assembly lacks the general support which prevents the formation of groups; and division into committees and sub-committees soon overcomes what may seem at first to be the insurmountable difficulty of unwieldy numbers. A Convention of 600 members would not be too large to give expression to the views of all parts of the Empire. The essential matter, however, is the summoning of a Convention which will satisfy both the suspicious and the unfriendly that there is no manoeuvring either to avoid a settlement or to make one behind the backs of the electorate.' Mr Asquith's statement is at all events a great step forward. Let it only be acted upon, without vacillation or reserve, and more progress will have been made towards Imperial Unity during the last two months than during the last thirty years.

Art. 16. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

IN his fascinating book 'Rasplata,' or 'The Reckoning,' Commander Semenoff told us of the Russian fleet's long and slow voyage to the culminating battle of Tsushima. It took twenty-two months for the German High Seas Fleet to make a start on May 31 last; and it was back again— or what was left of it-by the next morning. The reason for this proceeding was given in advance by its former chief, Grand Admiral von Köster, in a lecture delivered at Kiel early in February 1915. He pointed out that, if Germany lost ship for ship, she would be left without a fleet, and her coast would be seriously menaced by invasion. Whatever, then, may have been 'the enterprise directed north,' it is certain that the German Admiral was resolved to keep his fleet'in being.'

Sensitiveness to criticism from a public which has been taught to expect much from the Navy is probably responsible for the attempts of the Germans to conceal their losses. There is always, however, an aftermath of evidence, for, apart from what is gleaned by neutral travellers, a battle may rage near some great fishingground; and survivors, picked up from lost vessels, find their way to neutral countries. In this way certain facts have come to light, in addition to those drawn from German official sources. The first official wireless, circulated all over the world, gave only the battleship 'Pommern' and the new cruiser 'Wiesbaden' as lost, and the cruiser Frauenlob' and some torpedo-boats as 'not yet returned to port.' Later the new cruiser Elbing' was added; and finally the battle-cruiser Lützow' and the new cruiser 'Rostock.' The loss of the two last ships was only given out on June 8, when the Reichstag had adjourned until Sept. 26, having voted a credit of 600,000,000l. the previous day; and after it was said in Hamburg that these ships, as well as the battleship 'Westphalen,' had been lost. It is still asserted that only five torpedo-boats failed to return, a statement which may be contrasted with that of Admiral Beatty, when he told his crews that the Germans had lost 'destroyers so numerous that we have not managed to count them.' This speech is confirmed by the three survivors of V48 landed at Aarhus. 'They said that