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him from obtaining possession of the colonies of Spain; and, it was naturally to be expected, that, under colour of preserving Florida to its rightful sovereign, England would have taken possession of it, if Napoleon became wholly master of old Spain. Thus, end in what way it would, the struggle in Old Spain threatened the American States with a dangerous neighbour, and which neighbour, therefore, they were, it seems, resolved not to have. They would have disliked us for neighbours more than the French; but they resolved to have neither. From the Old, feeble, crazy government of Spain they had nothing to dread; but they had much to dread from France and more to dread from us. Therefore, they resolved to be before hand, knowing, that, amongst nations as well as amongst individuals, possession is nine points out of ten in any dispute. But, after all, it may be a question how far the American States would have been justified in taking possession of the Floridas merely upon viewing the situation of Old Spain. What is that si

of it as a security for a debt, due by Spain to the people of the United States. As to this last claim, it is alledged, by Mr. Monroe, that Spain, several years ago, committed great spoliations upon the commerce of America; that the latter made application for payment for these; that a cession of the Spanish part of Florida had been proposed as a compensation to America; but that the negociation was put an end to by those troubles in Spain which led to the struggle now going on in that country. Therefore, say the Americans, we hold this territory as a security for the payment of the debt due to us from Spain. This is very fair ground, supposing all the facts to be true; for, one nation has certainly as good a right to seize the land of another as that other has to seize its ships and merchandize. The seizure of the Floridas, as far as they belong to Spain, is, in this case, an act of retaliation fully justified by reason as well as by the usages of nations; and, it is the less to be blamed as coming so late; for, it appears from Mr. Monroe's statement, that the American States were endeavour-tuation? Why, the Old King of Spain, ing, for a long time, to obtain by negociation that which they were at any moment, able to secure by force. But, the question presents itself in a point of view much more interesting than this, when Mr. Monroe comes to talk of third powers, and the necessity there was of preventing any third power from taking possession of the territory in question.The contest in Spain was from the first, a very interesting one to the American States; for, if it ended in the placing of a Buonaparté upon the throne, or in the subjugation of Spain by France, and the annexation of it to the French empire; then Florida became a colony of France, and placed a most formidable power on one of the flanks of the American States, which they could not look forward to without alarm. If France was foiled in her attempts upon Spain, it was evident, that, considering the situation of Ferdinand VII. and other circumstances, Spain would be wholly dependent upon England, and the probabilities were that the latter would obtain from her some colonial cession in repayment of loans or of services, and that, at any rate, the Spanish government would, in all its acts, become subservient to England. Besides, if Napoleon did obtain the complete sovereignty of Spain, it was not to be doubted, that England, having the command of the sea, would prevent

the only sovereign of Spain that the American States have ever acknowledged, has, in our view of the matter, been succeeded by his son, in whose name the Regency of Spain is acting. This Old King denies that his son has any lawful authority as sovereign of Spain. And, both of them have abdicated their rights in favour of Buonaparte, who has the persons of both in his possession. Now, under these circumstances, how are the Americans to be supposed to pay any regard to any of the acts of the Regency or Cortes of Spain, who have controul over scarcely any part of Spain, where, indeed, there is a Buonaparte reigning in virtue of the abdication of the Old family? How are the Americans to know who will finally be sovereign of Spain? It appears to me, that, agreeably to every principle of public law, they are at full liberty to choose whether they will acknowledge any sovereign in Spain, except the Old King, as long as he shall live. They have a right, of course, to consider any other power as power usurped, or assumed by conquest; and, be it observed, that the right of conquest, though perfect, as far as actual force extends, cannot give any right to territory not actually conquered. Buonaparte, if he conquer Spain, will have a right to Spain, as we have to Martinico and Java; but, the conquestof Spain will give him no title to

ther, and, therefore, the change of shape amounts, generally, to no more than robbing Peter to pay Paul. Yet, there are cases, when it may be useful to know how other materials besides wheat may be

being the article of food in most general use. I will, for this reason, give an account of what has been done in the application of rice to this purpose by a Mr. Gates, a Baker at Peckham, at the sugges tion and with the friendly assistance of Mr. Timothy Brown. I speak from experience; I have the bread regularly; it is as good if not better than the common baker's bread: and it is two-pence in the quartern loaf cheaper. The rice is not ground, but dissolved in cold water. There appears to be no difficulty in the process; and this is certainly one way in which it may be used to advantage. About one pound of rice to three of flour is the quantity used.I am aware that the whole quantity of rice in the kingdom is not great, and I am also aware, that, if not eaten in the shape of bread, the rice would be eaten in some other way; but, there are cases, in which this sort of application may be of utility, and it is a fact worth knowing, that the bread thus composed, while it is foll as good, not only can be, but actually is, sold, at a price one ninth below that of the common baker's bread.

Florida. To have an equal right to that he must first actually gain possession of it by conquest.Therefore, if Buonaparté were even to tender the Americans payment of the debt due to them from Spain, they would have solid grounds for object-made to assist in the making of bread, that ing to deliver Florida up to him. They would have equally solid ground for refusing to deliver it up to us or to the new govemment in Spain; and, in short, unless the old king, or his lineal descendant, be re-established upon the throne of Spain, and actually governing that country, the Americans have always good ground whereon to resist any demand of a relinquishment of the territory in question. --The American government have avoided touching upon these points; but, they give us clearly to understand, that they will suffer no third power to set a foot in Florida. And, really, it does seem wonderful, that our Ministers should not have foreseen this; that they should have imagined, that the Americans would be induced by their remonstrances to give up so important an object, a thing in which their peace and safety are so deeply involved. What do the Americans know about our alliance with Spain? What do they know about the Spanish Regency and Cortes? We say that these are the rightful rulers of Spain and that the Spanish colonies are under their controul; but, the Americans have never said so; they have never acknowledged Ferdinand; they may have no faith in that political transubstantiation which makes Ferdinand present at Cadiz and in France at the same time; theirs may be a more narrow belief than ours; and, even if they saw Ferdinand at Cadiz, they see Joseph at Madrid with more of the people of Spain on his side than there would be on the side of his rival. If, indeed, the people of Spain had assumed the government of their country; if they had made war against Napoleon in their own name; then the Americans might have been a little puzzled for grounds whereon to take and keep possession of the Floridas, unless the people of Florida had chosen to unite themselves to the States; but, as things now stand, the grounds of justification are so clear as not to admit of disputation, except for disputation sake.

PRICE OF BREAD.— -I am not one of those who have much opinion of what are called substitutes in times of dearth, since all the food will be eaten in one shape or ano

WM. COBBETT. State Prison, Newgate, Friday, 3d January, 1812.

AMERICAN STATES. ORDERS IN COUNCIL. Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe. July 3, 1811. (Continued from Vol. 20, p. 832.) This fact will not be suffered to remain in doubt; and if the repeal of the orders in council should take place, the intention of his Majesty's government respecting the blockade of May, 1800, will be notified at the same time.-I need not recapitulate to you the sentiments of his Majesty's government, so often repeated, on the subject of the French minister's note to General Armstrong, dated the 6th of last August. The studied ambiguity of that note has since been amply explained by the conduct and language of the government of France; of which one of the most remarkable instances is to be found in the speech of the chief of the French government, on the 17th of last month, to certain deputies from

tion as to that not being then the case; the capture of the ship New-Orleans Packet seized at Bordeaux, and the GraceAnn-Green, seized at or carried into Marseilles, being cases arising under the French decrees of Berlin and Milan as is very evident. Great Britain might therefore complain of being treated with injustice by America, even supposing that the conduct of France had since been unequivocal.-America contends, that the French decrees are revoked as it respects her ships upon the high seas; and you, Sir, inform me, that the only two American ships taken under their maritime operation, as you are pleased to term it, since Nov. 1, have been restored; but may they not have been restored in consequence of the satisfaction felt in France at the passing of the Non-importation Act in the American Congress, an event so little to be expected; for, otherwise, having been captured in direct contradiction to the supposed revocation, why were they not restored immediately?—The fears of the French navy, however, prevent many cases of the kind occurring on the ocean under the decrees of Berlin and Milan; but the most obnoxious and destructive parts of those decrees are exercised with full violence, not only in the ports of France, but in those of all other countries to which France thinks she can commit injustice with impunity.-Great Britain has a right to complain that neutral nations should overlook the very worst fea

the free cities of Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck; wherein he declares, that the Berlin and Milan decrees shall be the public code of France as long as England maintains her orders in council of 1806 and 1807. Thus pronouncing as plainly as language will admit, that the system of violence and injustice of which he is the founder, will be maintained by him until the offensive measures of retaliation to which they gave rise on the part of Great Britain shall be abandoned. — If other proofs were necessary to shew the continued existence of those obnoxious de crees, they may be discovered in the imperial edict, dated at Fontainbleau, in Oct. 19, 1810-that monstrous production of violence, in which they are made the basis of a system of general and unexampled tyranny and oppression over all countries subject to, allied with, or within the reach of the power of France; in the report of the French minister for foreign affairs, dated last December, and in the letter of the French minister of justice to the president of the council of prizes. To this latter, Sir, I would wish particularly to invite your attention: the date is the 25th Dec. the authority it comes from most unquestionable, and you will there find, Sir, the Duke of Massa, in giving his instructions to the council of prizes, in consequence of the President of the United States' proclamation of Nov. 3, most cautiously avoiding to assert that the French decrees were repealed, and ascribing not to such repeal, but to the ambiguous pastures of those extraordinary acts, and sage which he quotes at length from M. Champagny's letter of Aug. 5, the new attitude taken by America; and you will also find an evidence in the same letter of the continued capture of American ships after Nov. and under the Berlin and Milan decrees, having been contemplated by the French government, since there is a special direction given for judgment on such ships being suspended in consequence of the American proclamation, and for their being kept as pledges for its enforcement. -Can then, Sir, these decrees be said to have been repealed at the period when the proclamation of the President of the United States appeared, or when America enforced her Non-importation Act against Great Britain? Are they so at this moment? To the first question, the state papers which I have referred to, appear to give a sufficient answer: for, even supposing that the repeal has since taken place, it is clear that on November 3rd, there was no ques

should suffer their trade to be made a medium of an unprecedented, violent, and monstrous system of attack upon her resources; a species of warfare unattempted by any civilised nation before the present period. Not only has America suffered her trade to be moulded into the means of annoyance to Great Britain under the provisions of the French decrees; but, as construing those decrees as extinct upon a deceitful declaration of the French Cabinet, she has enforced her Non-importation Act against Great Britain.-Under these circumstances, I am instructed by my Government, to urge to that of the United States, the injustice of thus enforcing that Act against his Majesty's dominions; and I cannot but hope that a spirit of justice will induce the United States' Government to re-consider the line of conduct they have pursued, and at least to re-establish their former state of strict neutrality.— I have only to add, Sir, that on my part,

I shall ever be ready to meet you on any opening which may seem to afford a prospect of restoring complete harmony between the two countries, and that it will at all times give me the greatest satisfaction to treat with you on the important concerns so interesting to both.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe, July 11, 1811.

Sir,-In consequence of our conversation of yesterday, and the observations which you made respecting that part of my letter to you of the 3d instant, wherein I have alluded to the principle on which his Majesty's Orders in Council were originally founded, I think it right to explain myself, in order to prevent any possible mistake as to the present situation of neu tral trade with his Majesty's enemies.—It will only be necessary for me to repeat what has already, long since, been an. nounced to the American Government, namely, that his Majesty's Order in Council, of April 26, 1809, superseded those of November, 1807, and relieved the system of retaliation adopted by his Majesty against his enemies from what was considered in this country as the most objectionable part of it,the option given to neutrals to trade with the enemies of Great Britain through British ports on payment of a transit duty.This explanation, Sir, will, I trust, be sufficient to do away any impression that you may have received to the contrary from my observations respecting the effects which his Majesty's Orders in Council originally had on the trade of neutral nations. Those observations were merely meant as preliminary to a consideration of the question now at issue between the two countries.

Mr. Monroe to Mr. Foster, July 23, 1811.

into the question concerning the priority of aggression by the two belligerents, which could not be justified by either by the priority of those of the other; but as you bring forward that plea in support of the orders in council, I must be permitted to remark, that you have yourself furnished a conclusive answer to it, by admitting that the blockade of May, 1806, which was prior to the first of the French decrees, would not be legal, unless supported through the whole extent of the coast from the Elbe to Brest by an adequate naval force. That such a naval force was actually applied and continued in the requisite strictness until that blockade was comprised in and superseded by the orders of November of the following year, or even until the French decree of the same year, will not, I presume, be alleged.But waving this question of priority, can it be seen without both surprise and regret, that it is still contended that the orders in council are justified by the principle of retaliation, and that this principle is strengthened by the inability of France to enforce her decrees. A retaliation is in its name, and its essential character, a returning like for like. Is the deadly blow of the orders in council against one half of our commerce, a return of like for like to an empty threat in the French decrees against the other half? It may be a vindicative hostility, as far as its effects fall on the enemy: but when falling on a neutral, who on no pretext can be liable for more than the measure of injury received through such neutral, it would not be a retaliation, but a positive wrong, by the plea on which it is founded.-It is to be farther remarked, that the orders in council went even beyond the plea, such as this as appeared to be, in extending its operation against the trade of the United States, with nations which, like Russia, had not adopted the French decrees, and with all nations which had merely excluded the British flag-an exclusion result

Sir, I have submitted to the President your several letters of the 3d and 16th of this month, relative to the British orders in council, and the blockade of May, 1806; and I have now the honour to communicate to you his sentiments on the viewing as matter of course with respect to which you have presented of those measures of your government.-It was hoped that your communication would have led to an immediate accommodation of the differences subsisting between our countries, on the ground on which alone it is possible to meet you. It is regretted that you have confined yourself to a vindication of those measures which produced some of them.The United States are as little disposed now as heretofore to enter

whatever nation Great Britain might happen to be at war.-I am far from viewing the modification originally contained in these orders, which permits neutrals to prosecute their trade with the Continent through Great Britain, in the favourable light in which you represent it. It is impossible to proceed to notice the effect of this modification, without expressing our astonishment at the extravagance of the political pretension set up by it: a preten

neither no longer than it should persevere in its aggressions on our neutral rights. The embargo and non-intercourse were peaceful measures. The regulations which they imposed on our trade were such as any nation might adopt in peace or war, without offence to any other nation. The non-importation is of the same character; and if it makes a distinction at this time in its operation between the belligerents, it necessarily results from a, compliance of one with the offer made to both, and which is still open to the compliance of the other.

In the discussions which have taken place on the subject of the Orders in Council and blockade of May 1806, the British Government, in conformity to the principle on which the Orders in Council are said to be founded, declared, that they should cease to operate as soon as France revoked her edicts. It was stated, also, that the British government would proceed par passu, with the government of France, in the revocation of her cdicts. I will proceed to shew that the obligation on Great Britain to revoke her orders is com

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sion which is utterly incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of other states. In a commercial view it is not less objectionable, as it cannot fail to prove destructive to neutral commerce. As an enemy, Great Britain cannot trade with France. Nor does France permit a nentral to come into her ports from Great Britain. The attempt of Great Britain to force our trade through her ports would have therefore the commercial effect of depriving the United States altogether of the market of her enemy for their productions, and of destroying their value in her market by a surcharge of it. Heretofore it has been the usage of belligerent nations to carry on their trade through the intervention of neutrals; and this had the beneficial effect of extending to the former the advantages of peace, while suffering under the calamities of war. To reverse the rule, and to extend to nations at peace the calamities of war, is a change as novel and extraordinary, as it is at variance with justice and public law. Against this unjust system, the United States entered, at an early period, their solemn protest.plete, according to her own engagements, They considered it their duty to evince to the world their high disapprobation of it, and they have done so by such acts as were deemed most consistent with the rights and the policy of the nation. Remote from the contentious scene which desolates Europe, it has been their uniform object to avoid becoming a party to the war. With this view they have endeavoured to cultivate friendship with both parties by a system of conduct which ought to have produced that effect. They have done justice to each party in every transaction in which they have been separately engaged with it. They have observed the impartiality which was due to both as belligerents standing on equal ground, having in no instance given a preference to either at the expence of the other. They have borne, too, with equal indulgence injuries from both; being willing, while it was possible to impute them to casualties inseparable from a cause of war, and not to a deliberate intention to violate their rights; and even when that intention could not be mistaken, they have not lost sight of the ultimate object of their policy. In the measures to which they have been compelled to resort, they have in all respects maintained pacific relations with both parties. The alternative presented by their late acts, was referred equally to both, and could operate on

and that the revocation ought not to be longer delayed -By the act of May 1, 1810, it is provided, That if either Great Britain or France should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President should declare by proclamation, and the other party should not within three months thereafter revoke or modify its edicts in like manner, that then certain sections in a former act interdicting the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, should from and after the expiration of three months from the date of the procla mation, be revived and have full force against the former, its colonies and dependencies, and against all articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the same.'The violations of neutral commerce alluded to in this act were such as were committed on the high seas. It was in the trade between the United States and the British dominions, that France had violated the neutral rights of the United States by her blockading edicts. It was with the trade of France and her allies that Great Britain had committed similar violations by similar edicts. It was the revocation of those edicts, so far as they committed such violations, which the United States had in view when they passed the law of May 1, 1810, On the

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