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XXXIII.

Mr. Justice Clifford.

Mr. Justice Clifford, of the Supreme Court of the United States, says: "Counties and other municipal corporations were created by the States; but the States were not created by the United States, as the States existed as independent sovereignties before even the Union was formed."-Printed Copy of Judge Clifford's Opinion, among the papers in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, of the United States Boston.

XXXIV.

Chief Justice Chase.

Mr. Chief Justice Chase, of the Supreme Court of the United States, says: "Under the Articles of Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, not expressly delegated to the United States."Wallace's Reports, Vol. VII, p. 725.

XXXV.

Edward Everett.

Edward Everett said: "The framers of the Constitution devised a scheme of confederate and representative sovereign Republics, united in a happy distribution of powers, which, reserving to the separate States all the political functions essential to local administration and private justice, bestowed upon the General Government those, and those only, required for the service of the whole."-Everett's Orations and Speeches, Vol. I, p. 167.

CHAPTER II.

I.

Influence of Authorities.

Br the instruction of the numerous and influential authorities which are cited in the preceding chapter, and by the writings and the speeches of a great number of politicians (who, if they are less distinguished than these authorities, have been very earnestly engaged in the work of disseminating their views), a large part of the population of the United States have been induced to believe that the Declaration of American Independence made thirteen separate, sovereign, and independent States-that these thirteen separate, sovereign, and independent States formed for themselves Articles of Confederation, as treaties of alliance, commerce, &c. are formed between sovereign and independent nations-that the Constitution of the United States was not ordained and established by the will of "the people of the United States," but that it was established as a compact between sovereign and independent States-and that the Congress of the United States can lawfully exercise only such powers as are expressly granted by the Constitution, or those which may be necessary and proper to carry such powers into effect.

II.

Contradictory Theories.

The two contradictory theories relating to the origin and nature of the Government of the United States of America, ought to be treated as questions which can be rightfully decided only in the light of evidence arising from history, from the principles of international law, and from the legislation and general jurisprudence of the nation.

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The acts, opinions, and intentions of the statesmen who proclaimed the Declaration of American Independence, and adopted the Articles of Confederation, and the acts, opinions, and intentions of the statesmen who framed the Constitution of the United States, ought to be admitted as evidence of the highest authority on the subjects to which they are relative; and as conclusive evidence on certain questions concerning the true principles on which the Government of the United States of America is founded.

IV.

Contemporaneous Construction.

Presumptive evidence of the state of public opinion in the United States, in reference to the nature of the Government during the time that elapsed between the years 1776 and 1788, may be based upon the statements of eminent men of that period. "Great regard," says Lord Coke, "ought, in construing a statute, to be paid to the construction which the sages of the law who lived about the time or soon after it was made, put upon it; because

they were best able to judge of the intention of the makers at the time when the law was made." The same principle has been applied in the United States, to a certain extent, in the construction of constitutions."Sedgwick's Treatise, p. 251.

V.

Rules of Construction.

The unreasonable and profitless controversies which are still maintained, relative to the true meaning of certain words, or phrases, which appear in the Declaration of Independence, in the Articles of Confederation, and in the Constitution of the United States, ought to be definitively settled in conformity with the most reasonable and equitable rules which have been established among enlightened nations, for the interpretation of contracts, laws, and constitutions. According to these rules, it is necessary—

1st.—To make, in all the particular cases which present themselves, a just application of what has been decreed in a general manner.

2d.-As soon as we meet with any obscurity in a document, we should seek for what was probably in the thoughts of those who drew it up; and we ought to interpret it accordingly.

3d.-Every interpretation that leads to an absurdity ought to be rejected.

4th.-Words ought to be construed according to the intent of those who use them, and not otherwise.

5th.-Ambiguous words, or words having a double sense, are to be construed so as to make them stand with law and equity.

6th.-Words which are in themselves uncertain, may be made certain by subsequent words.

7th.—In every agreement the intent is the chief thing to be considered.

8th.—In an Act of Parliament the intention appearing in the Preamble shall control the letter of the law.

9th. When a word, or a sentence, is capable of several significations, conjectures are necessary to find out the true one.

10th.-Obscure expressions must not have meanings put upon them, contrary to express declarations.

11th.-"Where the language of a document, of whatever description, is doubtful, its meaning is best understood by reference to, and consideration of, the circumstances attending its original formation."-Wharton's Legal Maxims, p. 41.

12th. When the subject relates to things favorable, we ought to give the terms all the extent they are capable of in common use; and, if a term has many significations, the most extensive ought to be preferred.- Vide Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace, B. II, ch. xvi; Pufendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations, B. V, ch. xii; Vattel's Law of Nations, B. II, ch. xvii; Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law, B. II, ch. vii; Sedgwick's Treatise, p. 231; Jac. Law Dic., "Intention"; Ayliffe's Civil Law, B. I, tit. x.

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