diminishes. To prove this, it is only necessary to quote one experiment made at Okehampton. Two rows of figures were placed at 1,000 yards from a battery of sixteen-pounders (six guns). The figures-dummies' as they were called-represented a first or firing line of infantry 100 strong with its supports, about as numerous. The battery fired for four minutes and placed hors de combat 71 men in the first line, 24 in the second. Then the dummies were placed at 600 yards from the battery, their number being increased to about 150 in each line. Three men were taken away from each gun to represent losses; only two minutes were allowed to the battery, and in that time it placed hors de combat 98 men in the front line, 36 in the second. Again the range was shortened to 400 yards, and two more gunners taken from the crew of each gun. In two minutes 117 men of the first line would have been down, and 39 of the second line. Once more was the range shortened to 200 yards; another gunner was taken from each gun, and one minute allowed. Only one line of 156 infantry was given the battery to fire at. In their one minute 81 dummies were disabled, or more than half. Lastly the same line of 156 infantry faced the battery at 100 yards range, and in one minute lost 113 of its number. Thus the number of men killed increased rapidly as the distance diminished, and, taking the average percentage of first-line men disabled in one minute, we find that the proportion was 18 per cent. at 1,000 yards, about 33 per cent. at 600 yards, 40 per cent. at 400 yards, more than 50 per cent. at 200 yards, and about 75 per cent. at 100 yards. We are not concerned here with the question of what infantry would have done in the same time against the artillery, but merely with the fact that the actual destructive effect of artillery fire increased steadily from 18 per cent. per minute killed at 1,000 yards, to 75 per cent. at 100 yards, and this though the number of gunners was diminished to represent losses from the fire of the infantry. Out of this interesting experiment we get two facts worth remembering. First, that the destructive power of artillery at close quarters is practically annihilating; and secondly, that guns can be worked with rapidity and excellent effect even though six men be removed from each gun. The next point to which attention must be directed is the immunity of the guns themselves from destruction in modern battles. If we take as examples the battles round Metz which resulted in the investment of the maiden fortress, and compare the loss of men and horses with that of material, we have the following very curious results: Horses 1 gun-carriage, 5 limbers, 8 wheels, 1 pole, and 1 axletree seat. GRAVELOTTE. 988 1,563 2 gun-carriages, 5 limbers, 2 limber-boxes, The losses at Mars la Tour were, on an average, one fourth of the men who go to the front with the guns, and three-fourths of the horses. In each battle there is the clearest possible proof that the chief loss of field artillery is in horses, for the number of horses which go into action is 18 less per battery than that of officers and men, while the loss in horses was invariably greater. The next loss is in officers and men, while the damage to material is so small as to be hardly worth reckoning. Now, let us assemble our facts in order. First, the fire of field artillery is almost annihilating to infantry at close quarters if even a small number of men remain to work the guns; and this power is intensified at any point in proportion to the number of guns acting together. Secondly, under present arrangements artillery suffers much by the fire of infantry so distributed as hardly to attract the notice of the guns, which cannot waste ammunition on individual sharpshooters. Thirdly, the losses sustained by artillery in well-fought battles are chiefly in horses, next in officers and men, hardly at all in material. Fourthly, by its nature artillery can carry with it into action all the heavy stores it needs both for offence and defence. Fifthly, the only method of protecting field artillery against losses, yet devised, is the digging of gun-pits, which needs much time, fatigues the men, and tends to limit the free movements of the batteries. In rocky ground, gun-pits could not be made at all with the means at disposal of artillery. Sixthly, if the gunners are fairly protected from infantry fire, there is no reason why the practice of the guns should not be perfectly steady, and their effect nearly as good as that obtained on the practice ground during peace. Lastly, while the offensive power of infantry has immensely increased since the introduction of breechloading arms of precision, their defensive power has not increased at all. To protect themselves from the fire of artillery, they must still cover themselves with works, and so lose all power of movement. These are facts which can hardly be challenged, and they point directly to the inference that, if artillery can place its men and horses under good protection, a system of tactics may be based on the supposition that its fire will be immeasurably superior to that of opposing infantry, so superior that no infantry can come near it or annoy it on ordinary ground. But the power of carrying its protection with it is a function of the very nature of the arm. Add one or possibly two carriages to each battery; let them carry thin iron shields capable of protecting the gunners against infantry fire, and who can doubt that the importance of field artillery will have been raised to a point beyond the highest hopes of its present friends and advocates? Such shields should be of a moderately soft material, such as wroughtiron-hard enough to stop the leaden bullets of infantry or shrapnel at all ranges, soft enough to let shells from opposing artillery pass through without cracking and splintering the plates. The farriers and shoeing smiths of a battery could repair such plates with the greatest ease by welding new pieces of plate over the holes if any were made. The shields should be in sections small enough to be easily carried by the gunners, and should be high enough to protect, even from long-range infantry fire, a space behind sufficient to contain the gun and the men who work it. Almost all the loss sustained by artillery is caused by the infantry fire or the shrapnel of the enemy, and it is probable that the losses in men might thus be reduced to a tenth of their present proportions. Then the artillery might calmly await any attack whatever, certain to destroy an enemy long before he could reach the guns. All anxiety as to capture would be extinguished, and we might proceed to build up a system of tactics based upon the supposition that artillery will not need to run away from anything in front of it. Let us now consider what is to become of the horses, which, at present, suffer more than the men. A gun-carriage as equipped for the field is in two parts. The one part supports the piece; the other, called the limber, is separated from the gun when in action, and, according to the present system, stands somewhere close to the gun, under cover if possible, with the horses attached to it. The limber must be close to the gun because it contains the ammunition, and it is plain that cover has seldom been obtained, because the recorded loss of horses is so heavy. But if the gun is not to run away at the approach of the enemy, there can be no reason for keeping the horses under the same fire as is directed against the guns. Let them be unhooked from the limber and placed in safety. Even as the case stands to-day, leaving the horses under fire seems to be quite unnecessary, and likely to create more confusion and loss of time by the number of their wounded and the difficulty of getting these removed from the teams, than would be caused by their having to come up from a place of safety and be hooked in' again. If the guns are to hold their own against infantry, there can be no need for hurry in removing them. Other advantages would spring immediately from the adoption of this system. The guns should of course be limbered up by running the gun back to its limber, which would stand in the proper position to receive it. We should have abolished the sweep round of the team with a limber behind it, and there would be no reason for keeping guns so far apart as they now stand in action. For all purpose of simple movements on a battle-field, the guns may with advantage be kept at 'half interval.' Thus a line of 100 guns would occupy just half the ground which is at present necessary, and the control over them be rendered only half as difficult. But to explain this would lead us into the technicalities of drill, and be beyond the scope of the present paper. One of the chief developments introduced by the Germans in 1870 was the bold use of field artillery, which was always pushed to the front before the infantry could come into line. Partly from necessity, partly from the natural result of using batteries with audacity and decision, all the guns which used to be kept in reserve were gradually absorbed by the front line, and in no case did any evil result follow. But, so far as is known, not even the Germans have yet carried out to their full issue the lessons derived from their own battles. It is, indeed, accepted that reserves of guns are unnecessary, but the severe loss sustained in men and horses appears to point to a very definite modification of artillery tactics. Reserves for all arms of the service have three functions. They may either be used to feed and reinforce a fighting line, or to take the place of exhausted combatants, or to act independently by making a separate attack, usually on the enemy's flank. A general principle, not yet laid down by military writers, may, I think, be stated thus. The necessity for retaining a reserve is exactly in proportion to the loss and confusion attendant on the action of the particular arm. Thus cavalry is helpless without a reserve, and this is practically stated in the dictum that the cavalry which can bring up the last squadron into a fight wins the day. The deep order now adopted for infantry in action is but a series of reserves, necessary because all the front must suffer great loss and become mixed. But we have seen that the guns themselves of field artillery suffer virtually no loss at all, nor does their action involve confusion. Therefore there is no reason for a reserve of guns. There has been a great loss of gunners and of horses. Therefore reserves of men and horses should be kept ready to supply casualties and bring batteries out of action. If the present unnecessary exposure of the gunners and horses were continued, it would be requisite to provide reserves of them as well as of ammunition in addition to the ordinary strength of the battery. But if the shields now proposed were adopted, the strength of the In either case battery itself would be sufficient for its own reserve. the men not actually necessary to work the guns should be kept back under cover, and all the horses. Or, if the measure of removing all the horses is too startling for present acceptance, then leave one pair of wheelers with the limber. With the limber placed as it should be, the wheel-horses would be partly protected by it. In any case the principle should be that the fewest possible men should be retained to work the guns, while the rest, and all or most of the horses, should remain out of reach of fire till required for work. We should never lose sight of the fact that it is the number of guns and not the number of gunners which tells in action; therefore, the fewer the gunners exposed at a time, provided the guns are not undermanned for shooting purposes, the longer will the artillery remain efficient. 6 The present moment is favourable for raising these questions; for though it is true that in each forward step which English artillery has taken, it has passed its rivals on the Continent, it is equally true that they have lately passed us in the race. Both German and Austrian field-guns are at this moment superior to English in range, accuracy, and shell power. No blame attaches to the artillery branch of the War Office on this account. It is but the natural result of military progress. Other nations have re-armed themselves since we have, and we might as well expect to retain our superiority on the sea by adhering to the Warrior' type of vessels as to remain at the front in matters connected with field artillery while holding faithfully to the type of field-gun possessed by us at any given time. The new guns should be breechloaders, because it is easier to protect the men working them from infantry and shrapnel fire. We know that we can obtain velocities of 2,000 feet or even more with them. The velocity should therefore only be limited by the power of the carriage to bear the recoil of the piece, and may be vastly increased beyond that of the present guns. At the same time, in order to increase the power of the piece for work at close quarters, a few shells should be carried twice the size of ordinary shrapnel, and therefore carrying twice as many bullets. It will be seen that these proposals aim at placing artillery in a more favourable condition for combat at close quarers than any other arm, for it would carry its own Plevna with it. According to present English ideas on the subject of tactics, artilley is regarded as an arm to be coddled and protected. In our fiele-days may be seen batteries busy enough at the opening of the figt, but silent when the decisive struggle of infantry against infany is taking place, the very moment when every exertion should be ade to turn the scale. Even under present circumstances I believe his habit to be altogether wrong, and nothing is more common tan to hear officers who have visited German manoeuvres saying, vth critical |