formidable attack on some part of our Empire by land, which we shall have to meet with large military force. We think of India mostly in such a connection, and of Russia as a possible assailant, as we must always remember that the India we are bound to defend practically includes Afghanistan, with which Russia in Central Asia is conterminous. But there are other possibilities also, of which the recent invasion of our territory in South Africa is an illustration. I cannot help thinking that we are less secure against land attack at other points than we are often assumed to be. When the Fashoda incident occurred, there was no little amusement at the talk in French newspapers of making a land attack on Egypt from Algeria. There was good cause for amusement, as no such attack could be improvised. But, great as the distance is from Algeria to Egypt, is it so certain that, in conditions which are not inconceivable, an attack of this sort, long foreseen and arranged, would be altogether without chances of success such as would encourage adventurous generals and officers? Another possibility is that Turkey in alliance with other Powers might attack Egypt from Asia Minor, as Egypt has so often been attacked in historical times, and our defence might not be so easy. These are only illustrations. An empire with land frontiers like those of the British Empire cannot but need land defence, and those who have charge of the military forces of the Crown must consider all the chances.

scene.

A sixth object was suggested by Mr. Brodrick in his speech on Army Reform. The Army, it is said, may have to take part in continental warfare by assisting an ally, in which case two or three army corps would be required for a respectable appearance on the With combatants nearly balanced, a force of this sort thrown into the scale by England would possibly have the kind of effect which resulted from the appearance of English troops in the Peninsula in the great war with France; but the use of the English Army in this fashion would arise from diplomatic and military incidents of a peculiar kind, and does not appear a special object to provide for. As the greater includes the less, provision for the other objects stated will secure that we can participate, when required, in a European

war.

Having stated the problem in this way, I come to the question of numbers-how many on a peace, how many on a war footing?

It will be obvious from the description above given of the objects of our Army that the peace footing should adequately provide for the first three of these objects, viz. defence against civil commotion; defence against raids by sea on the mother country at the outbreak of war and until our general naval preponderance is converted in fact into unquestioned and overwhelming superiority over the particular enemy engaged against us; and the similar defence of

our dependencies and coaling stations and depôts abroad. The essence of security against civil commotion is the provision of a force adequate to prevent any riot becoming a rebellion; and the use of garrisons is to prevent surprise, so that they should be always ready. On the outbreak of war it will be too late to raise new levies and reinforce stations that are inadequately protected. The Army on a peace footing, then, must be equal to the duties described. In addition, the peace army must be a nucleus of force, and must contain an organisation enabling it to expand on a war footing for the other purposes contemplated-defence against possible invasion at home in contingencies that are not impossible, defence against serious invasion by land of any part of our extended Empire, and offensive action in certain contingencies against other Powers.

What force, then, is needed on a peace footing to meet these various objects?

I should say, to begin with, that about 30,000 men appear to be necessary, at least, for garrisoning our fortified depôts and fortified commercial centres at home. Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, the Thames, the Mersey, the Tyne, the Clyde, Queenstown, and other places must all have fortifications sufficient to protect them against stray cruisers, and even against stronger attempts by sea, which may become possible by the successful evasion of our fleets. How this can be done with less than 30,000 men, if it can be done with even that number, it is difficult to imagine. Fortifications swallow up men. The Garrison Artillery on the home establishment appears to amount to about 10,000 men, and with Engineers and other troops to supplement them a figure of 30,000 is very soon arrived at. These are all required, let it be repeated, on the peace establishment. Should war break out, the garrisons may perhaps be increased or set free for other work by mobilising Militia and Volunteers; but the brunt of the outbreak, the defence at the most critical moment, must be borne by the effective garrison actually in existence.

In addition, there should always be a field force at home of 80,000 trained soldiers at least, to guarantee civil order and to meet a descent upon Ireland or a large raid of that description. Half the 80,000, or nearly that number, will apparently be required in Ireland itself, about 30,000 to prevent the scandal that would be caused by any civil commotion, and the remainder being added to make sure that no expeditionary force can effect a successful landing. Many years ago, when I referred to the actual and indispensable garrison of Ireland as being about 30,000, military authorities challenged the statement, holding that although 30,000 soldiers were kept in Ireland, yet this was largely for reasons of convenience, and a garrison of 10,000, it was held, would suffice.

I ascertained, however, that in the opinion of the highest civil authorities in Ireland nothing less than 30,000 was considered sufficient, the object being not merely to hold the country with a firm military grip, but to prevent even the beginning of a rising. In putting down 40,000, therefore, as the needful force to be stationed in Ireland for all objects in time of peace, including the stoppage of raids at the outbreak of war, I believe I am not so wide of the mark.' The estimate, again, of other 40,000 troops at home, in addition to garrisons, does not seem extravagant. We must be ready in Great Britain against raids at the outbreak of war on at least as great a scale as we are ready in Ireland, and even the chances of civil commotion are not wholly to be overlooked.

Along with the garrisons of fortified places, therefore, we should on this estimate always require at home on a peace footing about 110,000 trained soldiers-30,000 for garrisons, and a field force of 80,000. If we had such a field force it is obvious that incidentally an emergency like the late South African war could be met. The field force could be sent away and reserves of some kind called out to take their place. But equally the force must be there on a peace footing before such a use could be found for it.

I have to call special attention to the phrase 'trained soldiers' which I have used. There is a great deal of confusion in these matters, from the way in which, for certain purposes, the numbers on the home establishment of the Regular Army are spoken of. These numbers, by the last estimate, are 155,000, which is 45,000 in excess of the number of trained soldiers required. Unfortunately the 155,000 comprise a vast number of raw recruits and immature youths who cannot be considered fit for service, to the number of perhaps 90,000 altogether. Deducting this 90,000 from the 155,000, we get no more than 65,000, in place of the 110,000 which is the minimum number we ought to have according to the above estimate. But this by the way. I am only calling attention for the moment to a cardinal ambiguity in the Army statistics which is apt to confuse the amateur when politicians are handling the figures, not for the purpose of enlightenment, but in order to throw dust in his eyes.

Next, what should be the peace footing of the Army outside the United Kingdom? Here again it must be remembered that, for the ordinary objects in view, peace footing and war footing are identical expressions, as at the outbreak of war there will be no time, and there may not be time for a certain period afterwards, to call out new forces and send them to the threatened points.

Answering this question, what we find is that, voluntarily or involuntarily, many parts of the Empire are capable of a great deal of

2 See also the references in the debate on Mr. Brodrick's Resolutions to Mr. Childers's letters at the time of the Majuba business.

self-defence, and do in fact raise forces which can be useful not only on their own territories but elsewhere. Canada and Australia are especially useful in this respect; but there are local defence forces in some of our Crown Colonies as well, while even settlements like Hong Kong and Singapore provide in part for their own defence. The strength already added to the Empire in this way is enormous, and with proper organisation would be incalculable. It renders secure, with little or no Imperial effort, a great many commercial centres, depôts, and coaling stations throughout the Empire, and in a serious struggle, while we are preponderant at sea, gives us a large area from which to draw men and supplies. But the Imperial Government itself must contribute to the defence. The garrisons are a very serious matter. Apart from India, we maintain during peace about 55,000 troops in our dependencies, including the garrisons of Gibraltar, Malta, Hong Kong, Capetown and Simon's Bay, &c., &c., and no one can say the numbers are too many. About 40,000 of these garrisons also are English soldiers, notwithstanding all that has been done to replace them in part by troops belonging to tropical races. In India we have or ought to have in normal times an English garrison of 70,000 men in addition to about 125,000 native troops: again another illustration of the local resources which the Empire can draw upon. Assuming for the present that the garrisons of such places as Gibraltar, Malta, Hong Kong, &c. &c., and of the great dependency of India, are generally sufficient on a peace footing-I should be very sorry to believe the contrary-yet there are one or two points in this business of garrisoning the Empire where the normal provision with which our rulers have hitherto been content is apparently inadequate. I would refer especially to South Africa and Egypt. In South Africa in 1899 we had no more than 15,000 troops, and according to the latest War Estimates this is apparently the normal garrison contemplated in future. I cannot help thinking, after the experiences we have had, that this is not business. No doubt South Africa is properly expected to provide largely for its own defence. Hence we are to have such forces as Baden-Powell's police. But a larger garrison of our own would appear to be necessary to make sure that we shall not have to fight another South African war. Instead of 15,000 we ought to have 50,000 men in South Africa for a few years at least, perhaps 100,000, mostly mounted men. There is the more reason for suggesting this as South Africa will obviously be an excellent training ground for the Army, giving plenty of room for manœuvres; while troops there, if they happen to be in excess, will be placed conveniently for transport to the East, or even home, if any emergency should arise. As regards Egypt, what I have said already will have indicated the nature of my apprehension. We have an English garrison in Egypt of 5,000 men only; and it may well be asked, What is this to meet a surprise and a raid by 20,000

men or more, which seems not altogether impossible? Of course there are native Egyptian forces, but precisely one of the dangers to be feared is the nerve of such troops when pitted against a European force, and possibly the existence of treachery at a critical moment. To those who urge the impossibility of even a surprise on Egypt while we are preponderant at sea, it may also be pointed out that the Suez Canal is theoretically neutralised, and foreign troops are continually passing through it; so that at the outbreak of war, in addition to the raiders by force, we might suddenly have upon our hands a few thousand enemy's troops passing through the Canal ostensibly on legitimate business, but suddenly diverted to an attack upon the English position in Egypt. Here, again, is a case for making An addition of 15,000 men to the permanent garrison is apparently required.

sure.

Let us see, then, how we stand as regards our Army on a peace footing. The numbers required, exclusive of recruits and exclusive of the native troops used in India and elsewhere, appear to be as follows:

To these numbers, moreover, must be added the number of recruits and young soldiers in training required to feed the effective army with drafts. These recruits and young soldiers are untrained or otherwise unfit for active service, but they have to be paid for from the time they enlist. The numbers required with our present system of recruiting must, however, be about 90,000,3 making the total numbers on our peace establishment 360,000. This is 90,000 more than are now provided for in the Estimates and on the Indian establishment; but can it be said that the proposed numbers are at any point excessive? Recollecting what happened in the United States for want of an army, and what happened to ourselves in South Africa two years ago, we can all see how much cheaper it is to maintain a proper force than to run any risks such as we are now doing. Whatever nice calculations we make, we should conform ia this matter to the practice of engineers in estimating for works, and add a large percentage for under-estimates and the unforeseen.

We come then to the second question as regards the Army, viz. the numbers on a war footing. Here we have in view the last three This was practically unquestioned in the recent debates on Mr. Brodrick's Resolutions.