The Twentieth Century

Assuming that Great Britain will take possession of the railways in the new colonies, there is an overwhelming preponderance of argument in favour of her retaining in her own hands, as the Imperial Power, the working of the lines. Apart altogether from the superiority of a British board of management, it is evident that the control of the railways will be the most potent means of preventing any future rising. Those who superintend the working of the railways possess unequalled opportunities of observing what is passing in the country, and of obtaining information. It will be impossible, too, to introduce guns and ammunition as pianos when there are no longer friendly officials to assist in the fraud. Moreover, the great body of railway servants, being in the service of Great Britain, would have the strongest inducement to loyalty, and would be able to render valuable assistance in any emergency.

It is to be hoped that the British Government will never relinquish the management of the railways, even after the new colonies have received representative institutions. What has recently happened in the Cape Colony is a warning and an example of what might occur in the new colonies in the event of a Dutch majority in the legislature. It cannot be forgotten that the Dutch Cabinet had been steadily dismissing railway officials and servants of British origin, in order to substitute men of Afrikander origin and sympathies. It cannot be forgotten that grave exception was taken in the Cape Parliament to the use of the railways by the Imperial forces, even although parts of the Cape Colony had been invaded.

The necessity of harmonious co-operation and agreement in regard to railway tariffs and facilities throughout South Africa is another strong reason why Great Britain should retain railway control in the new colonies. The quarrels and disputes of the late Transvaal Government with the Cape Colony and with Natal about railway communication were endless, and, at least on one occasion, very nearly developed into war. The rapidly growing railways of Rhodesia will soon become an important factor in the problem of the future South African railway system. A little consideration of the problem will show that the British Government, being impartial and free from local jealousies, is in a position eminently favourable for exercising a beneficial influence upon the railway destinies of South Africa.

One practical argument, however, outweighs all other arguments, viz. the fact that Great Britain has recently been reminded by the Dutch party in the Cape Colony that her predominance in South Africa must be maintained by her own right hand. Political equality -full and complete freedom of every kind-have not been able to overcome in the Dutch mind the desire to substitute Dutch for British sovereignty. The aim of British statesmen must be to render the fulfilment of that desire more and more impossible; and, after late

experience, it seems almost incredible that Great Britain should part with the control of the railways which give access to the central portions of Africa, and which, in unfriendly hands, might again be used against her.

Whether, under British management, the net profits of the railways would-at first, at all events-be maintained at the figures reached under the late Transvaal Government by the aid of exorbitant tariffs and by the concession of a virtual monopoly to the Netherlands Railway, may reasonably be doubted. On the other hand it is not improbable that under an improved system of management and a policy of judicious extensions these profits may in course of time even be increased.

At the present moment, in the apportionment of the costs of the war, the value of the railways might, not unfairly, be taken at their present amount, viz. between 1,100,000l. and 1,200,000l. per annum, which would be equivalent to the interest on, say, 40,000,000l. From this sum there would fall to be deducted whatever payment, if is found to be due to the debenture holders.

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Besides the railways there are other valuable assets belonging to the late Republics to which Great Britain will succeed, and which must be taken into account. Amongst these are the Bewaarplatzen; all the land remaining to the State, including the undeveloped mines, and mining rights; and also all the farms whose owners have disappeared during the war.

After deducting the value of the above mentioned and of any other public assets, the next task will be to apportion the remaining cost between Great Britain and the new colonies.

A strong effort will be made-and in a certain portion of the South African Press is already being made-to impose the whole liability upon the British taxpayer.

It is argued that it would be unwise to impose taxes on a colony; and the result of the taxation by Great Britain of her American colonies is cited as a warning. It is pointed out that for some years the new Colonies will be unable to do more than meet the heavy cost of the police and military forces which will be required for their safety.

Those who adopt these arguments omit altogether essential points in the case which do not lead to the conclusions at which they desire to arrive. They argue as if they are a self-governing British Colony -and as if the present war had not been undertaken at all on their account. They omit to remember that what led to the war was the refusal of the Transvaal Government to remedy or alleviate the unjust treatment of the Uitlanders, including themselves. They omit to remember that at this moment they are not self-governing British colonists, but persons residing or owning property in territory lately annexed by Great Britain, part of which is as yet under

military rule. They omit to remember that but for the war there would have been no question of a British colony at all.

When representative institutions are offered to the new colonies, the terms will be fixed on which self-government will be conceded, but which it will not be necessary to accept. On undertaking self-government, these Colonies will be started on unprecedentedly favourable terms, being from the commencement in possession of ample revenues, with a territory in course of rapid development, and with towns already built and enjoying municipal government. The value of all property is being greatly enhanced and the future expansion and prosperity of the country are secured by the hoisting of the British flag. Why, then, is it unjust to impose upon these Colonies their fair share of the costs of the war by means of which alone they will have been brought into existence? The case of the American Colonies is not in any way analogous. Great Britain endeavoured to impose upon them customs duties for her benefit, and not for theirs. They had been left to work out for themselves their own development.

It may be conceded, for the sake of argument, that the new Colonies may at first be unable to meet their portion of the charge for the war debt. Is that any reason why, for all time to come, they should be exempted from all payment? Under a wise system of taxation and administration, aided by the rapid development of the country, the Colonial revenue is certain to expand. If the portion of the debt falling to the new Colonies be guaranteed by Great Britain, no long time will elapse before they will be able to meet the interest and arrears, whether they are under the government of the Crown or whether they govern themselves. Even if the event were to turn out otherwise, and if it should ultimately become necessary for Great Britain to assume the whole of the burden, it would be none the less unjust and inexpedient at the present moment to impose it upon Great Britain alone.

CAMPERDOWN.

experience, it seems almost incredible that Great Britain should part with the control of the railways which give access to the central portions of Africa, and which, in unfriendly hands, might again be used against her.

Whether, under British management, the net profits of the railways would-at first, at all events-be maintained at the figures reached under the late Transvaal Government by the aid of exorbitant tariffs and by the concession of a virtual monopoly to the Netherlands Railway, may reasonably be doubted. On the other hand it is not improbable that under an improved system of management and a policy of judicious extensions these profits may in course of time even be increased.

At the present moment, in the apportionment of the costs of the war, the value of the railways might, not unfairly, be taken at their present amount, viz. between 1,100,000l. and 1,200,000l. per annum, which would be equivalent to the interest on, say, 40,000,000. From this sum there would fall to be deducted whatever payment, if any, is found to be due to the debenture holders.