business habits, these seem to be the chief causes of his lack of success in managing the Chamber and of the consequent irritation which is felt by the members, not on the Opposition benches only. Nobody imputes to him any deliberate intention to neglect the House of Commons or to show any want of respect to it. But from time to time he undoubtedly succeeds in impressing upon the members the feeling that, somehow or other, they are not treated as they ought to be and as they have been treated in times past. If, however, the members generally acquit Mr. Balfour of any intentional disregard for their accustomed privileges, many of them do not conceal their belief that in another quarter they are being treated with open indifference. Lord Salisbury cannot complain if this is the belief of a great number of members of Parliament, including not a few who are the supporters of his own Administration. He has never taken the trouble to dissimulate when speaking of the House of Commons. It may be quite true that he is equally cynical in his attitude towards the House of Lords; but that is a different matter. A peer speaking among his peers may say what he likes about his own House; a peer who is also the head of the Government cannot be equally outspoken regarding the House of Commons without creating a very angry feeling in the latter place. WEMYSS Reid. The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake ALTHOUGH the labours and the anxieties of Great Britain in South Africa still continue, there are everywhere signs of the gradual approach of the end of the war. De Wet's disastrous failure in the late invasion of the Cape Colony-General French's successes in the eastern districts of the Transvaal-the occupation of Pietersburg by Colonel Plumer's forces-the loss of nearly the whole of the Boer artillery-the increasing scarcity of small-arms ammunition-the almost daily surrender of Boers who have been on commando-are so many proofs that the means of resistance are nearly exhausted, and that the desperate struggle is nearing its close. When the task of the Imperial forces is accomplished, and not until then, the difficulties of reconstruction will be fully realised. Questions political, social, financial, will then demand immediate solution, both at home and in South Africa. In South Africa, How and by what means can nearly twenty VOL. XLIX-No. 291 3 D thousand Boer prisoners of war be restored to their homes consistently with public safety, and without risk to the new order of things? At home, the first question will be, How, and by whom, and in what proportions, are the costs of the war to be defrayed? This latter question is of first-rate importance to the British taxpayer. The military bill for the war has already, as every one knows, attained formidable dimensions, and is still growing at the rate of more than 1,000,000l. a week. In addition to the direct military expenditure, indirect local claims for damages will have to be dealt with such as the claims of Natal colonists for losses arising from the Boer invasion of the colony in October 1899; the claims of Cape Colonists for damage sustained in the early part of the war, and also in the later incursions by De Wet and by other Boer commandoes. It may also be necessary to pay regard to the complaints of Uitlanders resident in the two late republics, who were plundered and ruined by their Boer neighbours on account of their British sympathies. Last, though not least, it appears from official information that a loan amounting to 1,000,000l. may be made to the inhabitants of the two late republics, including even Boers who have been fighting during the war, to enable them to restock their farms and to make a fresh start under the new Administration. Can history furnish an instance of such extreme generosity on the part of a victorious nation-in the face, too, of unparalleled provocation, and in view of a probability amounting almost to certainty that this action of the British Government will, like all its previous actions, be misinterpreted and misunderstood by the Boers, either through that 'slimness' which disgraces an otherwise sterling character, or through impenetrable stupidity and ignorance? What is quite certain is that the direct and indirect expenses of the war will amount to nearly 100,000,000l. or perhaps to even a larger sum. It will be necessary to submit to very close examination the claims for damages which may be put forward in South Africa, and also to consider carefully the respective liability of different colonial Governments. The Colony of Natal has displayed firm loyalty and courage, has assisted in its own defence, and, if we leave out of consideration the not unnatural terror of the Government at the outbreak of the war which influenced and hampered the disposition of the British forces, has deserved well of the Empire. The Cape Colony appears in a rather different light. Any damages suffered in the early part of the war can be shown to be directly attributable to the action and to the inaction of the colonial executive and legislature. Not only did the Cape Ministers refuse up to the last moment to believe in any hostile intention on the part of the Boer Republics, not only did they permit warlike stores, guns, and ammunition to pass without hindrance into the Orange Free State, but they declined to allow the local authorities at Kimberley to import arms or to prepare otherwise for self-defence. If Kimberley had been captured, if the Cape Colony had been occupied by the Boers, the Government of the Cape Colony would have been wholly and solely to blame. A colony which receives the privilege of self-government accepts at the same time the responsibility for self-defence; and if, owing to the neglect of the colonial Government, a colony suffers damage, the colony must look for reparation to itself and to itself alone. Although subsequent events have shown that Mr. Schreiner, and some at all events of his colleagues, were deceived by the declarations and protests of President Steyn and President Kruger, this does not absolve them nor the Cape Colony from the consequences of their neglect of duty. With regard to the losses occasioned by Boer incursions later in the war, the case may possibly be different. A considerable part of the colony had been placed under martial law, and it may with some reason be argued that the Imperial forces had assumed the duty of defending the country. Even, however, in this case it is to be hoped that strict inquiry will be made, and that no compensation will be given from any Imperial source to those who either directly or indirectly aided, abetted, or showed favour to the enemy. It is notorious that disaffection was general in the north-eastern districts of the colony; and it is politic, as well as just, that the disloyal (who, moreover, had no excuse whatever for their disloyalty) should feel the disagreeable realities of being invaded and looted by their friends. The first set-off against the expenses of the war will be the assets belonging to the Governments of the late Republics. Of these perhaps the most important are the profits derived from the Stateowned and other railways. The railways of the Orange Free State, being State railways, have lapsed by conquest to Great Britain. They were originally constructed and worked by the Cape Colony under an agreement; but a few years ago the Orange Free State determined, in an unfortunate moment for itself, to repay to the Cape Colony the capital cost of construction, a sum of 2,700,000l., and to take over the working of the lines. The public accounts show that in 1896 a net profit of over 500,000l. was thus obtained, and in 1897 a profit of 408,000l. The Netherlands Railway, the principal railway in the Transvaal, stands on a rather peculiar footing. Although it belongs ostensibly to a private company with a capital of 1,166,6661., shares to the amount of 476,000l. belonged to the Transvaal Government, which also received 85 per cent. of the profits after a fixed dividend of 6 per cent. had been paid to the shareholders. The profits received by the State, according to the official returns, amounted in 1897 to 737,000l., a sum sufficient to pay interest of 3 per cent. on a capital of nearly 25,000,000l. This Government interest in the railway has, of course, passed to Great Britain. It appears, however, from the evidence taken before the Royal Commission on Transvaal Concessions, that the railway company, whose line was, under their charter, liable to be taken over by the Government in the event of public necessity, saw fit to exceed their contract, and to become an active belligerent, by coming to the assistance of the republics with every means at their disposal. The evidence proving this allegation has already been published in the newspapers, and will, doubtless, appear at length in the report of the Royal Commission, which is awaited with much interest. It is sufficient to reproduce here an extract from the letter of the managing director, M. Van Kretschmar, addressed to the Board on the 28th of April, 1900. If it should come to the worst and the English become masters here, I am afraid we have hopelessly compromised ourselves in deed, word, and writing. We have made cannon and ammunition, sold material to the Republics, and blown up bridges in English territory. We have not discharged our staff while absent on commando; we have assisted the Free State with personnel and materiel. There are in existence letters and telegrams which are living witnesses that we strongly supported the Government defence. ... It appears from other letters of M. Van Kretschmar that the Board, in the early part of the war, approved of the active part taken, and even asked for a report of gallant actions performed by their officials, for insertion in the annual report. In the spring, however, of 1900 the Board in Holland changed their minds in view of the altered circumstances, and began to enjoin the observance of neutrality; when they were reminded by their managing Director of their previous attitude, and informed that it was now too late to pretend to be neutral. The Netherlands Railway Company, having thus chosen actively to war against Great Britain, have rendered their whole property in South Africa liable to forfeiture; and even were this not so, it is clear that the British Government may levy any indemnity which it chooses, in respect of the damage done. In what position the debenture holders may stand it is difficult to judge until the report of the Royal Commission is published. It matters not who the shareholders may be, or to what nationality they belong. They are bound by the action of their Board and of their officials. They have richly deserved the punishment which awaits them; and it will be strange indeed if the British Government should hesitate to exact the full penalty of total confiscation. |